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This study has focused on the conditions of indigenous entrepreneurs of production in the urban 
informal sector. In that sense, it is a first of its kind. Eleven Maya entrepreneurs in the city of 
Quetzaltenango, Guatemala, in five different productive activities, were interviewed.  In 
addition a control group of three Ladino entrepreneurs was established and some large formal 
enterprises were visited.  
 Besides analyzing the general working situation of the Maya entrepreneurs, the study 
tested two hypotheses on ethnicity. The first put forward the assumption that Maya 
entrepreneurs use their ethnic network to promote their enterprises, the other that Maya 
entrepreneurs are active in certain activities of the informal sector and not in others, due to, for 
example, structural conditions in the ethnically stratified and segregated society of Guatemala. 
Neither of these hypotheses were substantiated by the data.  However, while ethnic segregation 
was not observed among Ladino and Maya entrepreneurs of production, there is circumstantial 
evidence of a structural discrimination that forces many Mayans who do not succeed in 
establishing a productive enterprise, to try their luck in the less economically promising sector 
of commerce. 
 Besides the ethnic aspects, the study gave conclusive evidence for answers to some of the 
questions directed towards the informal sector in general, among them, the question whether or 
not  capital accumulation takes place and, eventually, to which extent. The annual capital 
accumulation among productive enterprises in the informal sector of the city of Quetzaltenango 
was modeled. The results indicate an accumulation per year of roughly $1.5 million. 
Recalculations with a sensible variation of some of the crucial assumptions, gave results within 
a band of $1.35 million - $1.65 million. The capital is accumulated by 258 enterprises, with four 
or more workers (including the owner), with a total work force of 1,320 workers, out of a total 
of 1879 enterprises of production. To this author’s knowledge, no similar attempt of such an 
estimation has been reported in the literature before.  
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 The study offers calculations on the economic take-home earnings of some of the Maya 
entrepreneurs and identifies the mechanisms behind the entrepreneurial successes and failures. It 
concludes that it is necessary to distinguish between enterprises of production and enterprises of 
commerce due to their different natures. It presents data on the labor wages in the informal 
sector. It shows that the salaries are, first, closely related to the productivity of the individual 
worker, and, second, that, probably more often than not, they are tied to fluctuations in the 
demand of the market for the products of the enterprise. This means that the salary bracket 
within one economic activity may vary widely throughout the year. Other topics where the study 
offers new insight on entrepreneurial practice in the informal sector, are on lending conditions 
and the use of formal loans, on taxation, on the use of different management schemes and the 
potential of these, and on productivity and profitability within different economic activities.  A 
list of the findings of the study is given at the end. 
---o---  
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The objective of this study was to identify the specifics of the working situation of Maya 
entrepreneurs in the urban informal sector of Guatemala. More concretely, the ambition was to 
determine if ethnicity plays a role in the success or failure of indigenous entrepreneurs and, if 
so, which aspects influence the outcome. Two hypotheses with respect to ethnicity were 
forwarded for testing. First, that Maya entrepreneurs may work primarily in certain economic 
activities and not in others (hypothesis #1). And, secondly, that they may have to use their 
ethnic social network to maintain and promote their enterprise (hypothesis #2).  In addition, it 
was expected that the study would offer information of value to ongoing debates in the 
academic literature directed towards the informal sector. Among subjects focusing on 
unresolved questions can be mentioned those of the structure of informal wages, financial 
opportunities, the possibility of capital accumulation,, productivity of the informal versus the 




The focus of the study was enterprises of production. The fieldwork was done in 
Quetzaltenango, Guatemala’s second largest city that has an ethnic population mix of roughly 
60-to-40 percent Maya-to-Ladino people. The fieldwork was based on interviews with eleven 
Maya entrepreneurs who were running workshops within five different activity sectors - car 
work, carpentry, and manufacture of clothes, shoes, and food.  For control purposes, interviews 
were made with three Ladino entrepreneurs in some of the aforementioned activities, i.e., in car 
work and production of clothes and shoes. To identify the kinds of state regulation that are being 
avoided by the informal enterprises, i.e., those conditions which, by definition, make them 
“informal” in the first place, a number of large formal enterprises in Quetzaltenango were 
contacted. The fieldwork and the draft of this report were completed in Quetzaltenango during 




Conforming to an increasingly pronounced trend, the terms Maya and Ladino are used for a 
member of the indigenous and the mestizo population of Guatemala, respectively. 
* The terms Maya and Ladino will refer to members of different socio-cultural groups, with 
the proviso that the term Ladino will most commonly be used for those parts of the 
population that have a Spanish-oriented cultural background. This topic will be discussed in 
the text. 
* By informal sector will be understood those enterprises that avoid state regulation, such as 
fiscal obligations and labor standards, in contexts where similar activities are so regulated. 
If not otherwise stated, the term will refer to the urban (non-rural) sector. 
* By an entrepreneur will be understood a self-employed person who has established an 
enterprise with the purpose of earning his daily living. 
* By a microenterprise will be understood an enterprise with less than 10 workers (including 
the owner) if not otherwise stated. In the academic literature, the definition of a 
microenterprise varies, sometimes meaning an enterprise of up to five and sometimes up to 
ten workers. Some definitions include explicitly the owner in their number, others don’t.  In  
this study, for reasons explained in the text, the term small enterprise will be preferred, to 
indicate that enterprises referred to employed few workers but not rigidly less than ten. 
* By an enterprise of production (a productive enterprise) will be understood an enterprise 
whose primary objective is to transform primary materials into value-added products for 
intermediate or final consumption.  A productive enterprise that includes a shop where the 
products are sold will be included in this category. 
* By an enterprise of commerce (a commercial enterprise) will be understood an enterprise 
whose primary objective is to buy and sell goods and/or perishable products. Included in 
this category is also entrepreneurship related to transport of these kinds of products. 
* The terms poverty line, not poor, poor and extremely poor are measures of a family’s 
ability to acquire the basic necessities of certain goods and services by using its total 
income and taking advantage of social services, if any, offered by the state. By ‘basic 
necessities’ are meant the conditions of the living quarter (as housing quality, construction 
materials used); degree of access to public services (as drinkable water, bath, sanitary 
system); access to the educational system (as schools for the children); and access to wage-
earning work (as source for other basic necessities).   
* By an ethnic community will be understood a social group that shares a common ideology, 
common institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity. For other definitions related 
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to ethnicity, see the discussion in Chapter 2. 
* By an entrepreneur’s take-home earnings will be understood the entrepreneur’s economic 
gain on the activity of his enterprise after salaries to workers and expenses on the raw 
material of the products have been subtracted. For reasons given in the text, expenses like 
the cost of housing, electricity, taxes etc. have been ignored. 
* By capital accumulation of an enterprise will be understood, loosely, that part of the take-
home earnings of the entrepreneur that is above the maintenance cost of his family and the 
upkeep of the equipment and the installations of his enterprise.   
* By minimum wage will be understood the monthly income necessary for a family to cover 
its basic necessities.  The size of the family (the norm being two adults and four to five 
children) and whether or not it lives in an urban or rural area, need to be specified. 
 
THE OVERARCHING HYPOTHESES  
The focus on ethnicity with respect to the informal sector in a developing country, like 
Guatemala, implies attention to three aspects that neither individually nor collectively are well 
described in the academic literature. 
 The first aspect is the possible manifestations of differences in networking within 
interacting ethnic communities with respect to working conditions of consolidated business 
environments in ethnically stratified societies. I hypothesized that differences in culture and 
socioeconomic profile between the Ladino and Maya population would be reflected in the kind 
of economic niche informal entrepreneurs of the two categories would decide to establish their  
enterprise within, the way they would establish a market for their enterprise, how they would do 
networking to facilitate their workshop, and the degree of success they would experience under 
otherwise equal conditions. 
 The second aspect refers to possible differences in how informal entrepreneurs of 
different ethnic background exploit their opportunities to raise capital for start-up and operation 
of their enterprise. It was hypothesized that if certain crucial factors were favorable - like a good 
social and professional network, established trust among parties involved, a successful past of 
the enterprise, promising prospects for the activity, and/or the presence of some kind of 
collateral - an informal entrepreneur ought to be able to raise capital for his enterprise or delay 
payment on his financial obligations, and thereby either expand his enterprise or keep his 
operations afloat in times of hardship.  As will be shown, the academic literature does report on 
financial opportunities in the informal sector, but primarily as fall-outs from studies of other 
foci. While the financing opportunities, in theory, may be equally accessible for entrepreneurs 
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of different ethnicities, they may be used differently for reasons which could be explained, in 
part or in full, by structural conditions of the society and the ethnic communities themselves. 
 And, finally, the third aspect refers to the fact that the extent and the nature of crossovers 
between the formal and informal sector are, in general, only weakly understood and has not 
been approached from the angle of ethnicity before.  As will be shown, the literature makes 
clear that, at times, successful cross-linkages indeed take place between the formal and informal 
sector, either in the form of financial opportunities offered by the formal sector to the informal 
entrepreneurs or as market opportunities, like subcontracting of petty production. 
 Because this study was an analysis of the economic situation of a relatively small number 
of interviewees in a previous uncharted sector of the informal activities where ethnicity was 
supposed to play a role, the preparatory work for the study was extensive. It included reviews of 
what has been reported in the literature not only on the aforementioned ethnic aspects, but also 
on economic aspects of the formal sector, like financial opportunities, income levels and capital 
accumulation. Unpublished but authoritative data on the present lending pattern in the informal 
sector that were received from Guatemala during the preparation for this study, are commented 
upon. 
 It is widely assumed that the overwhelming majority of small-scale entrepreneurs are 
working closely to the margin of profitability. Saving on overheads, such as fiscal and social 
welfare obligations and insurance costs for the workers, as well as expenses on the safety 
standard of the working environment, becomes an important part of the survival strategies, 
thereby driving the enterprises into the informal sector.  Informal entrepreneurs may, out of 
necessity, observe one or more of their legal obligations, but never all. It is important to 
understand that they are less a part of a clandestine activity than economic operators who take 
advantage of the authority’s lack of ability to impose its will.  For this reason, the distinction 
between formal and informal entrepreneurs should be seen as a continuum rather than as a sharp 
break. 
 
RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND METHODOLOGY 
It was expected that the ethnic aspects discussed above would manifest themselves as 
differences in the economic situation of entrepreneurs of different ethnicity. Therefore 
information on the economic circumstances of the entrepreneurs was assumed to be the key to 
the research questions of this study. It was appreciated, however, that the data this study would 
ask for were of a sensitive nature and that the survey necessarily would address the very basis - 
informal, at best, and illegal, at worst - of the involved enterprises. Benería (1989) mentions that 
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the task of establishing contacts with informal workshops was a major problem in her and her 
coworker, Roldán‘s study from 1987. My study did not have the benefit of support from formal 
subcontracting firms as those two authors had since its approach was different, going from the 
informal to the formal enterprises in case the latter category was involved. Further, it was 
expected that the author, an apparent gringo, would be met with more skepticism by Mayans 
than by Ladinos. For these reasons it was decided that owners of Maya enterprises would have 
to be identified and trust would have to be established with the help of a third party known to 
the entrepreneur, before the actual fieldwork could start. To identify these go-betweens would 
require a difficult and time-consuming process, which would limit the scale of the study. As will 
be discussed later, this part should not be an obstacle as perceived. 
 Initially I planned to focus on Maya entrepreneurs who manage small enterprises of  
minimum 1-2 and maximum 7-8 employees, in addition to possible family members of the 
entrepreneur. The reason for these limits were, on one hand, that a considerable amount of 
scholarly work has already been done on “single-person” and family-led microenterprises of one 
to two persons working part- or full-time (Babb, 1989; De Soto, 1989; Bromley, 1978), 
sometimes in connection with research on household subsistence strategies (Roberts, 1991, 
1994). On the other hand, it was assumed that the supposed ethnic distinction among small 
enterprises would be watered down or be less easily distinguishable the more persons the 
enterprise employed and the need increased to spread the activity more widely around. During 
the fieldwork, however, it was quickly realized that economic and not ethnic considerations 
determine the professional dispositions of the entrepreneurs. Enterprises with a reasonably large 
work force often had more subtle experiences than owners of smaller enterprises on the same 
kind of problems with respect to the market, labor, financing of their activities and relations to 
the authorities. For this reason, enterprises with ten and more workers were not excluded from 
this study solely on the basis of quantitative criteria. The enterprise of the study with the largest 
work force had 13 workers, including the owner.  (The enterprise of entrepreneur EM-3 - the 
coding of the entrepreneurs will be explained later - represents a special case.) 
 It was decided that the enterprises had to be chosen from a “fair” number of different 
economic activity sectors to ensure that possible aspects of only one or a few trades would not 
bias the generalized conclusions I expected from the study. Typically productive activities in 
Quetzaltenango are garment manufacture, shoe manufacturing, equipment repair, 
furniture/wood products, petty production of a range of products, and food processing, to 
mention a few, with the first two being the most dominant.  In total, five sectors would be 
sampled. 
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 The qualitative questions that were raised by the study implied that a “sufficient”, though, 
not necessarily a large number of Maya interviewees were required. Initially, it was proposed 
that 6-8 persons would be enough. During the fieldwork the number of interviewees was 
increased to a total of eleven, primarily to meet the objectives of the study, but also to resolve 
ambiguities in the information received and to justify more generalized conclusions. In addition, 
three Ladino entrepreneurs were interviewed.  The latter group was included to ensure that what 
could be perceived as unique for Maya entrepreneurs by the Mayans themselves, particularly 
with respect to possible difficulties they had encountered when they established or had been 
running their enterprises, were not common entrepreneurial problems.  A number of large 
formal enterprises was also contacted to determine which public regulations were bent or 
ignored by the informal entrepreneurs.  To manage conceptually and interpret correctly the 
extensive and sometimes complex information that was generated directly and indirectly from 
my conversations with the interviewees, I established contacts with individuals from various 
professional environments in Quetzaltenango. My non-entrepreneurial contacts and their 
organizational affiliations are listed in Appendix A, part 1. 
 It was decided that the assumed presence of ethnic networks and the extent to which the 
individual Maya entrepreneur used his ethnic environment for professional ends, would be 
determined solely on the basis of the individual’s self-awareness of its presence and his 
conscious use of it. The same applied to the entrepreneur’s perceptions of his own ethnic 
background. The techniques for mapping social networks are well established (Portes and Bach, 
1985), but identification of the networks was not a goal of this study. It was satisfactory to have the 
hypothesis of their existence confirmed. Since other more important data were being asked for, 
particularly those that addressed the individual’s private economy and his economic 
dispositions, background research on the individual entrepreneur’s social environment was kept 
to a minimum to prevent unfortunate reactions. Basically, each entrepreneur’s awareness of and 
willingness to inform about the use of his ethnicity in relation to his economic activity had to be 
trusted.   
 A rigorous control of the economic information I expected to get from the entrepreneurs 
was deemed crucial. I intended to match their general information with data I hoped to get from 
pointed by veiled questions directed at the running revenues and expenditures of the enterprise, 
i.e., production data, wages, raw material purchases, various operational costs, etc. Combined, 
this information would be used to make an assessment of the economic situation of each 
enterprise. Since the operation of an informal small enterprise interacts with the economy of the 
entrepreneur’s household, the latter would have to be incorporate, as well.  Even though a 
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household may have more than one source of income and not all transactions would be known 
in full, the approach would offer an enhanced degree of confidence in my data. Also, since wage 
outlays were assumed to be by far the largest operational expenditure of small informal 
enterprises (Watanabe, 1983:178), my conclusions would both add to and benefit from having a 
reference to a matured and extensive research on household subsistence strategies.  As will be 
explained later, the study never reached the level of detail hoped for on this part. The reason was 
lack of proper accounting among the entrepreneurs themselves, but, more important, that most 
entrepreneurs responded with a consistent evasiveness, if not conscious disinformation, when 
their economy was put on the agenda. In retrospect, referring to the qualitative nature of the 
study, my failure to accomplish my goal on this matter proved to be of no importance for the 
over-all conclusions.  However, as I gained experiences with my subject and my interviewing 
techniques were refined, I did succeed in extracting detailed information of the quality I initially 
had intended, on a sufficient number of enterprises.  These data were used to assess the take-
home earnings of some of the entrepreneurs and ultimately used in estimating the capital 
accumulation in the informal sector of Quetzaltenango. 
 The focus of this research was born out of the contradiction that the urban informal sector 
is widely perceived as a huge, heterogeneous mixture of marginalized actors operating in a sea 
of poverty, while, at the same time, some informal entrepreneurs operate small enterprises that 
implies prosperity and a certain degree of  complex production. Some run sweatshops 
“underground” (Benería and Roldán, 1987:34), other run informal but extensive public 
transportation microenterprises (De Soto, 1989). In both cases - and in many more not 
mentioned - up-front investment and/or operational capital must have been needed to initiate 
and expand these operations up to their present levels. Undoubtedly, this capital must have been 
generated from the economic activity itself.   
 As mentioned, the academic literature, while offering data on the financing opportunities 
in the informal sector, more often than not in a sketchy way, pays no attention to the possible 
influence of ethnicity.  In countries like Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala and Bolivia - all countries 
with a high proportion of indigenous people in their populations - those referred to as indios, 
indigenas or naturales are, as a group, situated solidly at the low end of the socioeconomic 
ladder. In addition to those mentioned above, one ambition of this study was to determine if the 
national ethnic stratification in Guatemala was translated into the informal sector. At a time 
when economic policies are designed to stimulate the economy of the informal sector and 
incorporate it into the national economy (Rakowski, 1994), this would have been an appropriate 
task given the data I expected to collect.   
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 Addressing the many multifaceted research questions that arise from combining ethnicity 
and the economy of the informal sector did create a fairly complex agenda, as the discussion 
above makes clear. However, as will be explained in the following two sections, the site of this 
study, the city of Quetzaltenango, has economic and ethnic characteristics that would facilitate 
my research goals very well.   
 
THE ENVIRONMENT OF QUETZALTENANGO 
Before discussing the economic characteristics of the city of Quetzaltenango itself, it is 
necessary to describe the economic and ethnic setting of the city, i.e., both its immediate and 
extended environment. Guatemala is a small country between 13o 30’ and 17o 30’ N, slightly 
less in area than Cuba and only one third of Norway, i.e., 108,890 km2. The region has a sizable 
Maya population. Roberts (1995: 142-3) states that US estimates of  1990 put the Maya 
proportion of the over-all population at 44 percent. Even at the low official 1994 census number 
of 42 percent (INE, 1996), it would mean that there are 4.8 million Mayans out of a national 
population of roughly 11.5 million inhabitants. Warren (1998: 8, 12), however, puts the number 
at 60.3 percent, representing close to seven million Mayans. These differences reflect inaccurate 
census data and differences in the definitions applied, but also the misuse of population data for 
political ends. Most recent studies I have read, including numerous estimates reported in the 
Guatemalan press, put the Maya proportion near to Warren’s estimate. The latter will be used in 
the following.  
 One-third of the country’s departments (primarily in the western highlands) have Maya 
majorities that range from 60.5 to 97.2 percent; one-third have roughly balanced numbers of 
Maya and non-Maya inhabitants; and one-third (primarily in the southeastern sections of the 
country) have non-Maya majorities of 66.4 to 99.2 percent (ibid.). As a comparison, the 
indigenous population of Mexico represents less than ten percent of the total. The Guatemalan 
republic as a whole has a rural-to-urban population of 65-to-35. The proportion of Mayans that 
live in the urban areas is 20.5 percent, while the number for Ladinos is 45.7 percent (INE, 
1991). The population of Guatemala contains four distinct ethnic categories: the Maya, the 
Ladino, the Garifuna, and the Xinca. The last two are of insignificant size, comprising in total 
less than one percent of the population (Q’uq’ Kumatz-Menmagua, 1999:19). 
 Nearly 80 percent of all Guatemalans are classified as “poor”, while 59 percent are 
“extremely poor” and 20 percent are “not poor”. (See comments to these terms in the section on 
definitions in the Introduction.) The poorest regions of Guatemala, without exceptions, are those 
with a majority of Maya population. Close to 90 percent of all Mayans are classified as “poor”, 
9 
76 percent are “extremely poor”, and 10 percent are “not poor”. The numbers for the same 
categories for the Ladino part of the population are 74, 49 and 26 percent, respectively. The 
poverty is most significant in the rural areas where 87 percent of the population are poor and 71 
percent lives in “extreme” poverty. In the urban areas, the same categories are 67 percent and 36 
percent, respectively. Another poverty indicator is illiteracy.  It is 68 percent among the 
Mayans, compared with 32 percent for the national population over-all. 
 The split between urban and rural population of the department of Quetzaltenango, a 
mostly agricultural region located in the western part of Guatemala, is 39.8 and 60.2 percent of 
the total population. It has an area of 1,951 km2 (1.8 percent of the national area) and 504,000 
inhabitants. The ratio between Ladinos and Mayans is 40-to-60, with 31.6 percent of the 
Mayans and 52.6 percent of the Ladinos living in the urban areas (INE, 1994). The complex 
picture of ethnicity and economy that characterizes the environment of the city of 
Quetzaltenango, as we will see, is to a large extent a feature of the city as well. To lay the 
groundwork for the later discussion, I will now focus on the economic aspects of the city of 
Quetzaltenango. I will comment upon the ethnic characteristics of the city in more length in 
Chapter 6 as part of the discussion on my research findings. 
 
THE CITY OF QUETZALTENANGO 
Studies of the urban informal sector have the last 10-15 years focused on survival strategies, 
types of informal activities, gender, households, legality aspects, case studies etc. (Portes et al., 
1991; Tokman, 1992; Scott, 1995; Roberts, 1994; Rakowski, 1994). Only recently have the kind 
of work started by Benería and Roldán (1987), focusing on the interaction between the informal 
microenterprises and the formal sector, been followed up more consistently and seen in the light 
of public policies (Rakowski, 1994a). It was hoped that this study’s emphasis on the interaction 
between the informal market and ethnicity, would contribute as well as benefit from work 
carried out along those recent research trends. On one hand, the ethnic features of the 
department of Quetzaltenago, as discussed above, would seem to facilitate the ethnic objective 
of the study. On the other, the varied economy of the department’s capital, the city of 
Quetzaltenango with its immediate environment, would seem to support equally well the other 
main point on my agenda, i.e., my focus on the informal economy. As an informal economy 
reaches a more mature stage, as is the case in a city of Quetzaltenango’s size, one may 
hypothesize that increasingly more economic links will be established between the formal and 
the informal sector (Moser, 1978; Tokman, 1978). Attention to possible economic 
interrelationships between the formal and informal sector would therefore be a natural 
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consequence of this study. In the following, I will discuss why Quetzaltenango can be seen as 
having unique advantages as the site of my investigations, not only with respect to ethnicity as 
indicated above, but also with regard to the economic dimension. 
 El municipio de Quetzaltenango, the territory of the capital of the department of 
Quetzaltenango, comprising a densely urban and a large rural part, is the second largest city in 
the country with 108,000 inhabitants and has an area of 120 km2 (INE, 1994). Quetzaltenango, 
the city itself, is located at 2,300 meters above sea level where the temperature may drop below 
freezing in the dry season (October - March). It is linked to Guatemala City, 210 km to the east 
(five hours by bus), by paved highway and by air. Quetzaltenango is a center for trade between 
the coast and the highlands and comprises a diversity of trades and commercial activities. Its 
four major mercados serve as trading posts for agricultural and artisan products brought in daily 
from numerous villages scattered in the rural landscape around the city. By the same token, the 
city fills the role as a major service center for the region. Leaving out the Spanish language 
schools - at the latest count, around 28, that cater to a young, international clientele - the ‘gringo 
trail’ of the tourists passes it by in spite of the presence of numerous “whaw!” attractions 
nearby, in addition  to the colorful life in the streets and other features of the town. The 
proportion of Maya women in their colorful trajes tipicos is far higher than what is observed in 
other urban parts of Guatemala. The reason is the higher proportion of Mayans living in the city 
itself and the proximity with the rural Maya-dominated environment. More data of  relevance to 
the city of Quetzaltenango are given in the discussion in Chapter 6.  
 As mentioned, it was expected that Quetzaltenango because of its economic importance 
would have a large, diversified, informal economy with ample possibilities for cross-links 
between the formal and informal sector. The first part of that assumption was verified shortly 
after the start of the fieldwork of this study. After a house-to-house survey in 1998, carried out 
by CUNOC (Centro Universitario de Occidente, Quetzaltenango), it was concluded that within 
the municipality of Quetzaltenango (including the rural area and the valley of Palajunoj and 
Chiquilajá) there existed 1785 productive microenterprises. Most, if not all of them, can best be 
labeled as belonging to the informal sector because of their size. In the survey, microenterprises 
were defined as productive workshops with five or less workers, including the owner (Vital, 
1999). Main informal activities are shoe production and garment manufacturing of both 
traditional Maya dresses and a variety of regular clothes.  Smaller but still important activities 
are equipment repair, wood products, food processing and numerous kinds of petty production. 
In addition to these so-called productive activities are the commercial activities - not part of this 
study - that, most likely, employ far more people than the first-mentioned ones. (Sr. Quemé, 
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President of ADEQ [Asociación de Empresarios de Quetzaltenango], private communication). 
 The city of Quetzaltenango has felt the impact of recent structural changes in the regional 
economy. Vital (1997) reports that the number of formal industrial enterprises within the so-
called Region VI - the departments of Quetzaltenago, Totonicapán, Solalá, San Marcos, 
Retalhuleu and Suchitepéquez - fell from 269 in 1993 to 168 in 1997. Of the latter, 115 (68.4 
percent) were fairly small with between 5 and 19 employees (ibid.: Table 3). This has been 
explained as the result of a trend towards a concentration of the production in fewer units and a 
capital flow from production and commerce to finance (source: Lic. Vital, private 
communication). The number of formal enterprises with more than 200 employees dropped 
from 10 to 6 in the same period. Most, if not all, of the large industries still operating, and many 
of the second largest industries of the region, are located in the city of Quetzaltenango. Among 
them are the very large industries like Cervecería National (brewery/soft drink producer), 
Licorera La Nacional S.A. (distillery), and a textile industry with a number of production units 
like Fábrica El Zeppelin, Industrias Capuano, and Fábrica de Cantel. Cervecería National, 
Fábrica de Cantel and Fábrica El Zeppelin were contacted as part of this study, due to their size 
and their position in the formal sector. My purpose was to familiarize myself with the various 
public regulations enterprises in the informal sector most likely would be in conflict with. 
Large, but a step behind in size, measured by work force, is Xelapán (a bakery with numerous 
shops), Rosmo (auto bodywork, coachwork), and Vitra and Copavic (glass blowing products). 
Another activity with a large influence on the city’s formal economy is the construction industry 
that delivers private housing and office buildings and handles the urban road infrastructure.  
 However, only 12 percent of the formal enterprises in Guatemala’s Region VI in 1997 
generated employment for more than 50 workers. This indicates the reason for the low level of 
employment in the industrial sector in the region, as well as nationwide (ibid.). The 
economically active population (defined as seven years of age and above) of Region VI, 
comprising 764,751 persons, was in 1997 employed as follows: 62.9 percent in agriculture, 
mines and quarries; 11.3 percent in industry; 25.8 percent in construction and services 
(commerce, tourism, transport, finance, public administration and services, education and 
health). The small number of industrial formal enterprises in the city of Quetzaltenango, their 
size, and their relatively small work force warn that the initial assumption of a reasonably large 
number of formal enterprises subcontracting informal workshops, may not be valid.   
---o--- 
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PART 1: THE BACKDROP 




Browsing the Informal Sector 
 
In the following I will give an introduction to what is known and what is debated about certain 
aspects of the informal sector that are important to this thesis. The former will address financial 
topics, particularly those related to the question on how loans are being raised by informal 
operators in times of hardship. The latter part will discuss subjects the findings of this study will 
add insight to, among them whether or not capital accumulation takes place, the wage structure 
and the kinds of interrelationships that take place between the informal and formal sector. 
 
BACKGROUND  
Since the term informal sector was first introduced in the early 1970s, its use has become 
commonplace. Moser (1994) mentions that the years from the 1970s and well into the 1980s 
were marked by studies that sought at various levels and in a diversity of contexts to define and 
describe the term. Today the definition proposed by Castells and Portes (1989:12), in a 
formulation slightly modified by Roberts (1995:116), is widely used. It says that the informal 
sector consists of “those enterprises that avoid state regulation, such as fiscal obligations and 
labor standards, in contexts where similar activities are so regulated”.  Unlawful activities fall 
outside. It should be emphasized that there is no such thing as the informal sector, but rather a 
complex and differentiated set of activities. Also, the distinction between the formal and 
informal sector is better understood as a continuum rather than a sharp break. 
 In spite of differences in definitions, estimation difficulties and variation in measurement 
methods used, it is widely agreed that the informal sector is significant in all developing 
countries, definitely with respect to the national employment but, perhaps, also to the national 
economy (Liedholm, 1994).  De Oliveira and Roberts (1994: 61, 63) refer to studies that 
reported informal employment in Mexico in 1987 to be 33 percent of the total labor force, and 
similar numbers have been reported for a number of medium to large cities in Latin America  
for 1989. It is estimated that 42 percent of the Mexico’s manufacturing labor force were 
working under informal employment conditions (Roberts, 1989: 48). Franks (1994: 93) refers to 
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his own unpublished data from 1989, based on numbers from twenty-nine countries. He 
concluded that forty-one percent of the urban economically active population was employed in 
the informal sector.  
 Using USAID data Prosigua (1998) reports that 35 percent of the total urban and rural 
economic active population in Guatemala were working in the informal sector, many of them in 
the country’s 356,000 informal microenterprises that for the largest part were found in the rural 
areas. Of these enterprises 35 percent were within production, 52 percent in trade (commerce) 
and 13 percent in services. The percentages of informal employment in the three sectors were 
50, 33 and 18 percent, respectively. Otero (1994:179) puts the number of informal urban 
microenterprises in Guatemala at 125,000, a number which is not in conflict with the estimate of 
Prosigua. These assessments are confirmed by studies of own-account workers and unpaid 
family workers in Latin America (Rosenbluth, 1994: Table 2). It is worth emphasizing that 
Prosigua’s (1998) data support the suggestions made earlier by Roberts (1989) and others, that 
the size of the rural informal sector is relatively larger than the urban informal sector. In this 
context, size is measured in number of persons employed relative to the economically active 
population. 
 While much effort has been put into describing the life of individuals and families in the 
informal sector, very little is known about its economy. There is no much disagreement that the 
informal sector is associated with wide-spread poverty for the overwhelming majority of its 
members. A few voices, however, have challenged the solidly gloomy picture that dominates 
the understanding of the informal sector, implying that pockets of moderate prosperity do exist. 
For example, Tokman (1977) claims that the informal sector is economically efficient and has 
comparative advantages in relation to similar activities developed in the formal sector. His 
argument is that the use of second-hand machinery and obsolete technology, judged by the 
standard of the formal sector, require less capital per unit produced in comparison with the 
formal sector. In addition come the factors which define the sector as informal in the first place - 
reduced expenses on wages, working environment and public obligations. Thomas (1992) goes 
further and hypothesize that capital accumulation takes place.   
 
HOW TO FINANCE AN INFORMAL ENTERPRISE 
Considering the diversity and size of the informal sector and the obvious need for its operators 
to raise money for different necessities at one time or another, the lack of systematic studies on 
how actors in the informal sector raise funds for their financial short- and long-term needs is 
surprising. Capital may be required for situations spanning from the initial investment in a small 
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enterprise to unexpected expenses for maintaining its operation or to a situation with loss of 
income due to, say, accidents, a fine or sickness. In cases where these topics have been 
mentioned, they regularly have been subordinated other objectives (Watanabe, 1983; Benería 
and Roldán, 1987; Babb, 1989; Benería, 1989). I will discuss what has been reported in the 
literature on both the needs and the financing opportunities as a backdrop for later discussion of 
my findings on financing opportunities in the informal sector of Guatemala.   
 
Financial Needs  
Studies show that not all microenterprises need financial help and among those that get it, some 
have difficulties in meeting the lending obligations (Prosigua, 1998:4). However, that capital 
sometimes is crucial for the informal activities have been reported by a number of studies. Babb 
(1989:87) reported that a three-wheeled triciclo, used in Huaraz for transport, mostly by 
younger men, represented a basic investment of S/18,000 (at the time equivalent to $240) that 
most often either was raised as loan or received as a gift from the owner’s parents.  Starting a 
restaurant or shop would require S/40-50,000. As a reference, Babb (1989,28) mentions that 
manual market laborers, shoemakers and fruit sellers earned S/6,200, S/3,000 and S/900 per 
month, respectively. While the majority of women in the markets of Huaraz sold fruit and 
vegetables bought on credit, the men were more often engaged in the sale of manufactured 
products brought up from Lima, which required a larger capital outlay. Some of these goods 
were purchased on credit, but to begin such an activity before trust had been established, up-
front capital for transport and other costs would normally be required.  
 Babb mentions that women occasionally would be engaged in selling locally produced 
items for the home that did not require significant capital, while men would control those 
sectors that demanded capital at hand. For example, the majority of the market sellers in Huaraz 
had had difficulties in raising the money required to meet their initial expenses, such as the cost 
of a knife, a scale, and a small chair to sit on - amounting to S/2-3,000. Petty traders would 
operate with no or small amount of their own savings, typically S/100-200. Actually, the lack of 
capital was the reason why they had no alternative but to work as retailers and why some were 
taking the risk of selling perishable items (Babb, 1989: 101, 112). Small-scale entrepreneurs 
normally worked close to the margins of profitability. In contrast, large-scale operators were 
often enmeshed in sophisticated networks of credit, marketing, and supply. Wholesalers who 
delivered fruit and vegetable to the markets of Huaraz, had at least S/10-20,000 in ready capital, 
in addition to what was invested in their trucks and storeroom. The situation Babb describes is 
not unique. De Soto (1989:108) reports from Lima that, initially, the informal transport 
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operators were able to use low-cost sedans that required fairly small investments. Later, 
economies of scale came into play and large investments were required for economic survival.   
 Babb’s and De Soto’s specific information not only identifies the prevailing need for 
capital in the informal sector for the start-up as well as for the operation of an enterprise, but 
also implies that ready cash indeed is available in the informal sector, often to a considerable 
extent. 
 
Financial Sources  
Even though no systematic studies have been carried out, the literature indicates that there exist 
numerous ways for the operators in the informal sector to raise capital, both in the informal and 
the formal sector. The following subsections will review what has been reported in the literature 
on the financial opportunities of the informal sector. The discussion in the last section of this 
chapter will address recent authoritative but unpublished data on lending pattern in the informal 
sector of Guatemala City.  
  
Formal Loans  
Formal loans refer to loans from banks and other traditional finance institutions. In Guatemala 
there is also a category of authorized moneylenders that offer loans, but at rates well above 
those of the traditional financial institutions (Prosigua, 1998). To my knowledge, Prosigua’s 
report is the first publication that gives specifics on the relationship between the formal 
institutionalized lending market and the informal sector.  
 Lending is often associated with demands for some kind of collateral. De Soto (1989:24) 
gives an example on how this obstacle within the constraints of the informal sector. He 
compared two informal settlements, built adjacent to one another during the same period and 
inhabited by people of the same socio-economic characteristics.  The only difference was that 
one property was legally classified as permanent and the other as removable. As a result the 
owner of the former was given access to formal loans by being able to use his property as 
collateral and, consequently, the value of a typical dwelling, including the land, in the legally 
secure settlement was nine times larger than one in the other settlement. 
 The urban informal sector is often perceived as a huge, heterogeneous mixture of 
marginalized actors. A study from Mexico from 1987-88 described the informal sector as one 
with few links to the formal finance sector and with little appreciable capital. Less than one 
percent of the microenterprises used bank or other formal credits (De Oliveira and Roberts, 
1994: 64). Another study from 1987 from Lima, indicated that informals did not receive much 
16 
credit from the formal financial system. Ninety-one percent of informals had not obtained any 
credit and an additional 2.6 percent had obtained credit of less than $10. Of those who had 
obtained loans, only 5.6 percent received loans from commercial banks and 6.3 percent from 
state banks, whereas 41.7 percent obtained loans from parents or friends (Thomas, 1992:287). 
Wormald and Rozas (1996: 70-1), however, came to a very different conclusion in their study of 
microenterprises in Santiago, Chile. Their data indicated that twenty-seven percent of the 
contacted microentrepreneurs had applied for financing in banks or other financial institutions. 
Seventy percent of these had obtained loans or credit.  A number of the interviewees expressed 
that they thought had a higher likelihood of obtaining a loan for their enterprise from a state 
bank, in this case Banco del Estado de Chile, than from any private commercial institution or 
even from friends or relatives. The authors conclude that access to credit was limited less by the 
difficulties and formalities imposed by the various financial entities - among them demand for 
collateral. More important was a preference among informal entrepreneurs to remain outside the 
system, primarily due to fear of indebtedness or unfamiliarity with the formal institutions. What 
stands out in a comparison between the findings of these studies, besides the divergence in the 
authors’ conclusions, is the fact that they were carried out at different times and in different 
countries.  The debate how to stimulate the informal sector and whether or not informal 
operators should be given access to the formal financial market, is probably not more than 10-15 
years old and  the views and proposals that followed were implemented at differently from 
country to country. Neoliberalistic economic policies took hold and reached the urban poor 
much earlier and on a broader front in, say, Chile than in Mexico as a comparison of the studies 
on housing policies in the two countries by Rojas and Greene (1995) and Ward (1990) will carry 
witness to. The conflicting conclusions mentioned above may reflect not only a variation from 
country to country but also the effect over time of economic priorities in the international 
community. The impact of this temporal perspective, i.e., the change in economic policies that 
has taken place over the last decades in Latin America, should be kept in mind when I later will 
identify contradictions between the concrete findings of my investigations and the conclusions 
or assumptions of older studies. Another cause for variation is that the burden put on the 
informal sector differs from country to country, as Tokman and Klein (1996:2) point out. They 
state that in Bolivia and Chile the financial costs are, relatively speaking, not high, while in 
Guatemala, Peru and Mexico, they are significant. Sometimes the restrictions the authorities 
keep operators of the informal sector out of the formal financial market all together (Franks, 
1994).  
 The degree of financial interrelationships between the formal and the informal sector 
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varies greatly from country to country. Tokman and Klein (1996:20) show that the contacts 
between the informal microenterprises and the large formal establishments were relatively more 
extensive in Chile and Ecuador than in Jamaica. Almost one-third of the informal enterprises 
they contacted bought wholesale in all the three countries, possibly indicating a stable access to 
capital or the availability of credit agreements. Buying from wholesalers or the industry directly 
reflects a more advanced degree of linkage than purchasing from retailers or asking clients 
themselves to provide the inputs for the production of the goods of the enterprise. 
  
Semi-Formal Loans 
 Semi-formal loans refer to loans given by international NGOs and “improvised” or less 
established finance institutions, as well as different types of financial cooperations. They do not 
incorporate loans from the type of national NGOs of Guatemala that will be discussed in Part 2.  
 Thomas (1990) mentions that Grameen Bank, started in Bangladesh, has operated in Peru 
with success, offering micro-loans to the poor at market interest rates. He uses this and other 
examples to support his argument that it is not necessary to subsidize credit because people are 
poor (ibid.: 289).  The point does not reflect hardheartedness, but sound economic sense. As De 
Soto (1987) also argues, the informal operators need neither welfare not the patronizing support 
of victimizing views; they need working conditions, safeguarded through legislation, that put 
them on equal footing with actors in the formal sector. Special arrangements often put the 
informal operators at the mercy of conditions outside their control when the political wind 
changes.  
 For traditional finance institutions, like banks and non-banking financing houses, demand 
on profit rate and administrative costs for small loans is usually too high to make the informal 
sector an attractive market on a strictly commercial basis. The costs of evaluating projects and 
assessing creditworthiness pull the same way. However, loans targeting the informal sector and 
administered by third party, is a form that is widely used by international aid organizations. 
Otero (1994:182) reports that USAID had $75 million earmarked for lending to 
microenterprises for the fiscal year of 1990, and that the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) the same year initiated its own program for support of microenterprises with nearly $500 
million earmarked for micro-loans over a five-years period. The problems facing an outsider, 
however, trying to reach out with micro-loans to myriad small enterprises, are obvious. NGOs 
have frequently been mentioned as a possible source of micro-loans to the informal sector, but 
normally they have limited structural and technical capacity, among other shortcomings, to do 
an effective job (ibid.: 193-4).  Wormald and Rozas (1996:76) did not see NGOs as an integral 
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assistance resource, and Thomas (1992) states that credit programs operated by the NGOs have 
had a mixed record. However, the experiences of NGOs show that the problems of transaction 
costs and risk of default on loans can be reduced in a variety of ways.  Since the NGOs are the 
source for much hope that there are ways to alleviate the need for capital in the informal sector, 
this topic was raised with the interviewees of this study.  
 A privately generated saving scheme to handle unexpected expenses is reported by Ward 
(1986: 6) from Mexico. Some households belong to an informal credit system in which an 
agreed sum is contributed, say, weekly, and each household takes turns to receive the pooled 
amount.  Ward saw this system as a strategy to overcome unexpected crises in the family. One 
may speculate whether a similar scheme could serve equally well among small enterprises to 
help maintain the operation in times of hardship. The rotating credit associations that are 
organized through community-based organizations and kinship associations, known from China 
and later carried over to United States by immigrants (Wong, 1998), do not seem to exist in 
Latin America. 
 
Informal Loans/Credits   
Babb (1989) reports from Huaraz, Peru, that having access to credit or short-term loans was 
essential to small vendors and marketers throughout their careers since their business rarely 
grew. It was particularly important during the start-up phase. In most of the cases she documents 
credit meant payment delayed some hours or a few days. She notes that several marketwomen 
working alone selling staples had difficulties because some wholesalers demanded payment at 
delivery and was not willing to delay payment until their clients had had time to sell their goods. 
Personal loans from family or friends were often a new seller’s only mean of entering the 
market place (ibid.: 76, 103).  In Babb’s observations there existed none of the elaborate savings 
and credit associations that have been observed in markets in Africa and Asia that Hart (1970) 
mentions or the type Ward (1986) refers to in Mexico.  
 Access to short-term credit smoothes out some of the difficulties for those who work 
daily at the economic margin. One incentive for the street vendors who moved into the first 
informal markets in Lima in 1950 - besides generating more profits by sales of scale - was to 
obtain credit from their suppliers in recognition of their special rights of ownership to a market 
stall (De Soto, 1989:79). The initiatives to raise capital are often quite imaginative. One 
example is informals without capital, organized within an association of their own, who 
successfully negotiated a deal with a foreign company on delivery of one hundred bus chassis. 
In another case, again in dealing with a foreign company, the informals put up their informal 
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housing as collateral for the purchase of new busses (ibid.: 118, 121).  
 In the 1970s and 1980s, many public programs offered technical assistance and training 
to established microentrepreneurs and followed up with credit and business extension services 
when certain conditions were met (McKean, 1994:202). Similar schemes have been mentioned 
by other investigators, but to which extent these have been successful and are viable in a wider 
context is not known.  Benería (1989:176), in her study of production chains in Mexico City, 
seems to indicate, without giving details, one unique financing possibility: a formal firm that 
sets up, through loan or credit, an informal shop to do the initial steps of its production 
“underground”. Cases where the formal enterprise lays off its workers and subcontracts its 
production to informal workshops is well-known (Portes, 1989; Rodgers, 1989).  
 
Savings   
Prosigua (1998) reports from Guatemala that savings play a major role in the start-up of an 
enterprise, see Table 1.1. That alone is an indication that at least some operators in the informal 
sector have opportunities to put capital aside for future investments or a rainy day.  However, 
the ways by which poor people handle unexpected crises in their families, may equally well be 
used to save money for a projected undertaking or to combat economic setbacks in an already 
operationally microenterprise. Ward (1986:6) lists four broad strategies used among the poor to 
overcome economic difficulties in a household. Some of them could possibly be used to start up 
or make a microenterprise weather bad times. The first, is that ongoing living patterns would be 
cut back or canceled, that is, children would drop out of school and take on some kind of 
employment; people stay ill and leave physical complaints untreated; and the normal diet may 
be replaced by cheaper but less nutritious substitutes. Secondly, households may be extended by 
the inclusion of outside relatives. Extended family structures offer greater security since more 
members are likely to be engaged in paid employment and, say, can organize mutual child care 
that allow more adults to work outside the home. Multiple employment strategies in both 
nuclear and extended households frequently aim to ensure that members are represented in both 
the formal and the informal sector, thereby enjoying the benefits of both. Thirdly, the poor may 
seek support from a wider social network that embraces kinsmen, friends, peers and neighbors. 
And, finally, one’s employer might be an important source of protection through patronage. 
This help usually takes the form of a loan or cash handouts. 
  
Miscellaneous   
Other ways to raise capital are sale of household possessions; family remittances, say, from 
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members abroad, inheritance, and retirement money. 
 
INFORMAL INCOMES 
It has been mentioned that wages are the largest operational expenditure of a small enterprise 
(Watanabe, 1983: 178). The academic literature indicates that mapping the earnings in the 
informal sector is not a simple matter. The instances that have been reported, identify mostly 
isolated single person and, more seldom, group cases, often street vendors and others who 
represent the visible part of the informal sector (Babb, 1989; De Soto, 1989). Missing are data 
on those who work within the sophisticated production, credit, marketing, and supply networks 
behind the surface. At the moment it is therefore not possible to make assessments of the 
structure of earnings in the informal sector in a given region and determine whether that insight 
could be generalized to describe the situation also in other places.  I will briefly mention efforts 
that have been done, again with the later discussion of my own findings in mind.  
 De Soto (1989: 61) estimate that on the average the net per-capita income from street 
vending in Lima was $58 per month. That was 38 percent more than the minimum legal wage at 
the time of the sampling. Unfortunately, De Soto did not discuss how representative the 
“minimum legal wage” was in the formal sector. Cartaya (1994: 223) reports that a large 
proportion of industrial (formal) workers receive incomes at or below the poverty level, while a 
significant number of  successful informal entrepreneurs have high incomes, though, without the 
benefits or opportunities available to employees of formal firms. A more composite picture of 
the informal sector is offered by Fortuna and Prates (1991). They argue that informality is not 
necessarily synonymous with poverty and marginality.  The relative success and ‘satisfactory 
earnings’ [Fortuna and Prates’ characteristic] derived from informal activities in various forms 
of self-employment and small family microenterprises, surpass, in some cases, the levels 
achieved by workers in the formal sector. Within an overall picture of hardship and struggling 
survival experienced by the majority in the informal sector, one finds economic differentiation 
that allows individuals to achieve success (Roberts, 1995: 126; see references in Babb, 1989: 47, 
50).  
 Portes and Schauffler (1993: 172) report that microentrepreneurs, representing 6-9 
percent of the employed labor force in the informal sector of the cities they studied, was the best 
paid group. This trend is supported by studies from Mexico. Roberts (1995: 132) indicates that, 
on the average, small-scale entrepreneurs and the self-employed earn the highest income, but 
differentiation prevails. Small-scale entrepreneurs earn three times more than their workers and 
fifty percent more than the self-employed. None of these reports distinguish between productive 
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and commercial enterprises. Other studies signal that there is a large variation among different 
economic sectors. A relatively small numbers of wholesalers in the markets of Huaraz, Peru, 
earned high profits, but, in contrast, most small marketers had pitiful incomes (Babb, 1989). 
 Not unexpectedly, conditions vary from country to country. For example, a number of 
studies listed by De Oliveira and Roberts (1994:58) conclude that, by the 1970s in Mexico, there 
were only marginal differences in wages of informal and formal workers.  Staudt (1998: figure 
2) reports on income distributions of informal workers in Mexico from 1988 in municipalities of 
100,000 or more inhabitants.  Using full-time legal minimum wage (LMW) - in Mexico in 1992 
equal to $30 per week - 13 percent was unpaid, 36 percent earned up to one LMW, 32 percent 
earned 1-2 LMW, and 13 percent were above 2 LMW (six percent were unspecified).  The 
corresponding percentages for formal workers were 8, 13, 55, and 24 percent (nil percent 
unspecified).  For some, these numbers might indicate a possible surplus for use outside the bare 
survival if need be.  
  In their study in Santiago, Chile, Wormald and Rozas (1996:65) report that workers with 
the lowest registered wages were those working in the garment industry.  Of the total number of 
persons interviewed in this sector, sixty percent declared earnings of less than two LMW.  
Among the four sectors of economic activity they had studied - garment manufacture, 
equipment repair, furniture/wood products and food processing - the sector of equipment repair  
offered  a distinctly higher wage and income stability. The authors  report also a clear trend 
toward an increasingly favorable wage situation as the size of the informal enterprise became 
larger (ibid.: 66). The changing character of the relations of production in the informal sector, as 
well as their complexity, is underscored by the data of Fortuna and Prates (1989). The authors 
also indicate that a transfer of activities from the formal to the informal sector are not 
uncommon.  
 
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR   
Even though economic units in the informal sector orient themselves towards a logic of 
accumulation, in practice, their activities are enmeshed in a logic of subsistence and economic 
survival. From this comes the central dominating feature of informality - its heterogeneity. 
Street vendors and unregistered market selling are only the tip of the iceberg. Beneath the 
surface are sophisticated networks of informal wholesalers, suppliers, service industries, and a 
diverse manufacturing sector I have alluded to earlier, crossing the hazy zone between the 
formal and informal sector.  Rosenbluth (1994) emphasizes a point that often seems to be 
forgotten when the informal sector is discussed and that has bearing on this study: that people in 
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the informal sector is poor does not mean that all members of this sector are poor. One 
implication might be, that even if the informal sector gives the impression of offering few or no 
opportunities for capital accumulation, as some authors claim, its heterogeneity implies that it is 
difficult to generalize.  
 Thomas (1992:287) claims that accumulation indeed takes place. He states that while 
parts of it undoubtedly are for the rainy days and are short-term or sporadic in nature, other parts 
are intended to build up capital, supposedly for investment. However, the economic 
circumstances of the informal sector, in general, are not inviting. Rosenbluth (1994) points out 
that the poverty rate is higher in the activity sectors of the informal sector than in the formal 
wage-earning ones. The official poverty rate among the informal occupations ranged from ten 
percent among own-account workers in commerce/services in Mexico to fifty-three percent  for 
domestic employment in Brazil. The poverty rate among informal wage-earners ranged from 
eight percent in commerce/services in Uruguay to thirty-three percent in manufacturing and 
construction in Mexico (ibid.: Table 7). 
 Hart (1970), in his well-known study from Ghana, claims that the economic surplus 
generated in the informal sector is reinvested within the sector or channeled into an informal 
financial system - a network also Babb (1989: 103) refers to - usually at high rates of interest.  
Personal savings are small, though there is disagreement about this. With exception of the  
aforementioned saving scheme Ward (1986) referred to in Mexico, similar schemes have not 
been reported in Latin America. As long as the literature has not reported data that can resolve 
the discussion whether or not capital accumulation takes place or, eventually, under which 
conditions it happens, it is premature to contemplate where a possible surplus would go. Both 
topics, however, will be discussed in light of the findings of this study. 
 A special case of capital accumulation is the increase in the value of favela housing in 
Rio de Janeiro that was valued to more than $50 million as of June 1966 (Tokman, 1977: 3).  
One may speculate whether capital has been raised by selling initially informal housing that has 
increased in value over time, and has been applied - after having acquired cheaper living quarter 
another place - as start-up capital in a small enterprise.  A similar case is De Soto’s  (1989) data 
from Lima. He mentions that the replacement cost of informal housing in Lima in 1982, which, 
at the time, comprised 43 percent of all the housing, was calculated to $8,300 million. 
 The estimation of a possible capital accumulation in the individual enterprise or in 
enterprises of certain trades is difficult. However, common sense indicates that it takes place, if 
only because of the magnitude and heterogeneity of the informal sector. De Soto (1989) claims 
that 91,000 street vendors in Lima supported an estimated 314,000 people and generated gross 
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sales of $322 million per year.  In transport, informal entrepreneurs controlled over 90 percent 
of urban public buses. The 1984 replacement value of their fleet was estimated at $620 million. 
The value of the related infrastructure (gas pumps, repair shops, etc.) was estimated to $400 
million. The recent report of Prosigua (1998) from Guatemala also take for granted that capital 
accumulation takes places, though, without giving either hard numbers or estimates. The report 
divides the informal microenterprises of less than five workers, rural and urban combined, into 
three groups. The first group, 50 percent of the total, comprises microenterprises that work on 
subsistence level and barely can pay the wages of its employees. The second group, 30 percent 
of the total, have a scant possibility for capital accumulation, but satisfies the needs of the 
entrepreneur and reproduces the activities at the same level. And the last group, 20 percent, has 
good possibilities for generating capital.  Prosigua gives no indication of which factors 
condition the last case. 
 Initially, this study had as one of its assumptions that some capital accumulation indeed 
took place in the informal sector, but that it was slow and was present more in certain activity 
sectors than in others, more in certain regions than in others,  that it was far from ubiquitous 
where it existed, and that lasting success was not assured.  When capital indeed is accumulated 
it is most likely invested in upgrading machinery and tools, similar to what Hart (1970) reports 
from Africa. Using the findings of this study, the topic of capital accumulation will be given 
extensive treatment in Chapter 4. 
  
INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTOR 
The interrelationships between the formal and informal sector takes primarily two forms, either 
as lending by formal institutions to individuals in the informal sector or as subcontracting of 
production. The former was discussed above and will be expanded upon as part of the 
discussion of recent data from Guatemala acquired in preparations for this study. The latter, on 
subcontracting, is discussed in the following.  
 
Subcontracting  
It has been claimed that the economy of the informal sector primarily is directed towards trade 
and services; production does occur, but it is confined to labor-intensive goods due to the low 
levels of investments in capital equipment that typifies informality (Pásara, 1989). My study 
concludes that it is necessary to distinguish between productive and commercial enterprises in 
the informal sector. Before the economic significance of both categories have been estimated 
and compared, there is no way to assess Pásara’s claim. 
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 In another study from Santiago, Chile, the principal clientele of the microenterprises was 
found to be primarily individual consumers. Clients from formal large-to-medium factories and 
small firms, represented each only fifteen percent of the clientele. The interaction between the 
formal and the informal sector changed over time, but not in any linear fashion nor in the same 
direction in all places (Wormald and Rozas, 1996:73). Fortuna and Prates (1989:84), however, 
found a high use of informal subcontracting or outfarming within different kinds of formal 
manufacturing, more than reported earlier. Only one in seven of the formal firms they 
approached did not resort to subcontracting. The other six used homeworkers in proportions that 
fluctuated between ten and fifty percent of their total labor force.  The studies by Fortuna and 
Prates (1989) in Montevideo and by Birkbeck (1978) in Cali document how informal garbage 
collectors were actually disguised workers for large industries, supplying these with significant 
quantities of recycled and sorted garbage.  The collectors sold the product to informal deposit 
owners who, in turn, passed the product to wholesalers that supplied the large orders of 
industrial firms. The firms dictated the final price on recyclables, while each intermediary along 
the chain took his cut. Benería (1989), in her study of production chains in Mexico, found a 
large proportion of vertical subcontracting among formal enterprises in different sectors of 
activity, using informal homeworkers. Half of the sixty-seven firms she contacted used 
subcontracting.  
 The contradictory conclusions among different studies could be due to the clandestine 
nature of outfarming factory work and therefore difficulties in disclosing the true nature of the 
situation, or it could be due to different circumstances from one place to another. The 
conclusion of De Pardo et al. (1989) from their study in Bogatá, indicates the latter. However, 
the discrepancies could also be explained by the difficulties in getting economic data to build 
the conclusion on and therefore, ultimately, on the methodology being applied.      
 Benería and Roldán (1987: chap. 3) raise a number of important topics in their discussion 
of the mechanics of subcontracting. Their sample of firms allowed them to illustrate connections 
among different productive units ranging from the piecework carried out in the household to 
small workshops, middle-size factories and large national and multinational firms. The authors 
report that lowering of the labor costs was the most important reason given by firms that 
involved themselves in subcontracting to informals. As the most basic parts, produced by 
informal homeworkers, moved up the production chain and increasingly got assembled into the 
final product at a higher level in the formal domain, the largest increase in wages from one level 
to the next was observed as the chain crossed over from being informal to be formal.  It has 
been argued that this is because productivity is lower where informal subcontracting work takes 
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place (ibid.). For that part of the informal sector that employs homeworkers, this is not 
necessarily true. For the client to have control over his costs, the homeworker is paid by the 
number of units he or she produces, not by the time spent on doing the work. Productivity 
among homeworkers, therefore, is not a factor.  However, the argument may be flawed for 
another reason, as well - it may be wrong. Fortuna and Prates (1991:84) studied footwear 
manufacturing in Uruguay. They found that the skill of homeworkers, and the piece-rate system 
by which they were paid, led to higher levels of productivity.  Homeworkers, most of them 
women, consistently surpassed factory workers in units produced per time unit. The authors 
argued that the reason for the difference was the higher motivation among homeworkers.  They 
would earn more money the faster they worked, while the factory worker had a fixed salary.  
Productivity in the informal sector is a far more important topic than what the low number of 
studies dedicated to it may imply. It has bearing on a number of the factors already addressed in 
the previous discussion - among them the possibility of capital accumulation and exploitation of 
the work force, but, surprisingly enough (according to my data), only conditionally on labor 
wages.  For these reasons the topic will be discussed in some length in Chapter 5.   
 According to Benería and Roldán (1987:38), a number of other reasons, besides labor 
costs, are involved when the initial part of a multi-level production chain is outfarmed to the 
informal sector by a formal enterprise. First, production of parts is highly specialized and can be 
obtained at a lower cost by those firms that concentrate on few products.  The question may 
arise in a formal production unit if the internal production of a relatively small number of 
subparts can justify the investment in new equipment. Secondly, in cases where the production 
is unstable or seasonal, subcontracting means transferring the problems of a future reduction in 
demand or temporary increases in production to another party, i.e., the homeworker or the 
informal workshop.  Thirdly, in situations where the technical competence or resources are 
limited and where managerial problems getting out of hand can become costly, the avoidance of 
growth is a way of keeping control of the enterprise. In the latter case, the larger visibility with 
respect to the authorities, as a result of more activity, may also plays in. And, finally, 
subcontracting can prevent internal labor conflicts and the demand for unionization.  In Mexico, 
at the time of the study, small firms with more than twenty employees were required by law to 
unionize (ibid.: 38-39).  
 Fortuna and Prates (1989) report that all the firms they contacted which used 
homeworkers, between 1975 and 1978 applied machinery of  high technological sophistication. 
The average age of the equipment was not more than ten years. From the authors’ comparison of 
productivities of the factory worker and the homeworker, it seems that the homeworker must 
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have had access to machinery of the same efficiency as that of the factory worker, either on 
loan, by renting or purchase.  If this is widely the case, the assumption that homeworkers - or, 
perhaps, informals in general -  always should be associated with outdated or low-productivity 
tools in comparison with those used in the  formal sector, needs modification. The findings of 
this study indicate that the conception should be changed. I will address the theme from a 
somewhat different angle later.  
 
Formal Lending In The Informal Sector (Guatemala, 1997) 
Unfortunately, the literature offers no specific information on the loan accessibility and lending 
conditions of loans given by the formal sector to the informal sector. This topic, therefore, will 
be addressed in some detail in Chapter 5 where I discuss my observations. In preparations for 
the fieldwork of this study, unpublished but authoritative information from 1997 on lending 
pattern in the informal sector and the lending conditions of state and private banks, traditional 
finance institutions and private money lenders in Guatemala City was received from Guatemala 
(Prosigua, 1998). As shown above, the academic literature is sketchy in its reporting on the 
needs for financial support within the informal sector and to which extent different opportunities 
are available and how these are being used.  Prosigua (1998: 6) refers to data on the financing of 
microenterprises (here defined as workshops of five or fewer workers) in different activity 
areas. The data are given in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1  
Lending pattern in the informal sector in Guatemala, 1997.  
(Prosigua, 1998). 
 
SOURCE        INITIAL CAPITAL           OPERATIONAL CAPITAL  
                                          Trade      Manu-     Services         Trade       Manu-     Services 
.        facture    facture .  
 
Savings 49.0 61.0 49.5 24.5 27.0 32.0 
Loans from family, friends 22.5 12.0 16.5 0.0 4.0 4.0 
Loans from NGOs and  
     financial cooperativas 22.5 19.0 24.0 57.0 53.0 51.0 
Loans from banks 3.0 2.0 3.5 6.5 2.5 3.0 
Individual money-lenders 3.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 
Other sources* 0.0 2.0 3.0 0.0 1.5 1.0 
No response 0.0 3.0 3.5 12.0 10.0 9.0 
.                        .                                        
*  Sale of household possessions; family remittances; inheritance; and retirement  money.       
 
Table 1.1 shows that microenterprises need capital both at start-up and during operation as was 
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hypothesized earlier. While savings and loans from family and friends - the latter only initially - 
are important financial sources, banks and traditional lending institutions play a near to 
insignificant role. (The term traditional institutions will be used to distinguish the lending, but 
non-banking institutions, from the national NGOs I will discuss in detail in later chapters.) The 
interest rates in private and state banks were in 1997 20-22 percent per year, with state banks in 
the low end, and those of the traditional institutions up to 3-5 percent monthly. Authorized  
moneylenders charged  even higher interest rates. Very important are the so-called NGOs and 
cooperativas (cooperatives). They play an even more crucial role today, and I will describe 
them in Chapter 5. From Prosigua’s data, combined they rank second  only to savings as a 
source of raising capital for an enterprise during the start-up period and dominate in the later 
operative phase. Unfortunately, Prosigua (1998) offers no information on the lending conditions 
of the national NGOs and the cooperativas. My data on the lending situation in Quetzaltenango 
in mid-1999, which differ from those of Prosigua’s report, will be discussed later. 
 Building on the observations of Prosigua (1998), one may hypothesize that the need for 
initial capital, particularly in manufacture, refers to high initial investments in machinery.  The 
entrance ticket to start one’s own productive enterprise and to keep indebtedness to a minimum, 
is to raise as much as possible of the capital from one’s own sources.  The lower cost of starting 
an enterprise of trade, permits a higher indebtedness, which the numbers of Table 1.1 also 
reflects.  However, as time passes by, the contributions from family and friends dry up and the 
entrepreneur has to rely on the income of his enterprise, while the bulk of his needs for 
operational capital are funded by loans. 
 
COMMENTS 
 The literature makes clear that the operators in the informal sector have numerous ways 
at their disposal to raise capital for the start-up and operation of their enterprises. This is 
confirmed for Guatemala by the data of Prosigua (1998) given in Table 1.1. Very little is 
known, however, under which circumstances, how frequently and to what extent these sources 
are being used, which conditions - security, collateral, repayment schedule etc. - are in effect, 
the amounts of money involved and other pertinent information. Also, it is worth noting that no 
study has tried to estimate how much capital is tied up in machinery, tools and other kinds of 
technical means in the different activities of the informal sector, nor has anyone tried to estimate 
what the running need for capital is, say, on an annual basis. Prosigua (1998) does not give 
specific numbers for the amount of capital being transferred to the informal sector in the form of 
loans, but its argument seems to indicate that the hesitancy among informals to use the formal 
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financial institutions reported by Wormald and Rozas (1996), mentioned above, is not a factor 
in Guatemala City.  That  observation is confirmed by the data of this study (see Chapter 5). 
 The academic literature does report on earnings of workers and entrepreneurs in the 
informal sector. The data are unsystematic and offer not much help if one tries to use them to 
identify the salary structure of the informal sector, either within one economic sector or in a 
comparison among sectors. With very few exceptions the scope of the numbers on salaries given 
are limited to specific places with no references to the regional and national situation and the 
discussion seldom links the observations to the wage structure of the formal sector. It is clear 
that there exists considerable disagreement among the scholars whether or not a noticeable 
capital accumulation takes place in the informal sector. At the same time, numerous authors 
have reported on small informal specialized workshops, which - one may assume - must have a 
relatively significant capital invested in the form of tools, machinery and housing. It is safe to 
assume that the capital behind must have been generated over time by the operation of those 
workshops. On the extent of interrelationship between the formal and informal sector and to 
which extent this takes place, disagreements prevail, though the trend seems to be towards a 
stand that the interaction is more extensive than previously perceived. On the particular features 
of this aspect of the informal sector, say, the degree of productivity differences between formal 
factory workers and homeworkers or between formal and informal workers in general, not much 
is known. A characterizing feature of the debate on the aforementioned aspects of the informal 
sector, even when countries with a high proportion of indigenous population are being studied - 
like Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Guatemala - is that the relationship to ethnicity has not been 
considered. In preparation for the later discussion the conceptual aspects of ethnicity and their 
practical consequences with respect to Guatemala will be discussed.    
 ---o--- 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
Dissecting ‘Ethnicity’ 
 
The objectives of this thesis focus on the combination of two subjects - the informal sector and 
ethnicity. The former was discussed in the previous chapter. In the following, the meaning and 
implications of the concept of ethnicity will be considered. This discussion will lead into a 
discussion on the practicalities of ethnicity as an upcoming political ideology among Mayans in 
the Guatemalan society, particularly how an ethnic consciousness is being produced (the word is 
used on purpose).  In the final section, I will briefly comment upon a study from 1969 on 
ethnicity in Quetzaltenango, the site of this study, to add specific insight on the relationship 
between the two population groups of that city.    
 
BACKGROUND 
The multi-national Guatemalan society invites for questions like: what is ethnicity and what 
determines a person’s ethnicity in the eyes of an individual and others?  What gives a group of 
same-ethnic persons an ethnic identity up towards an other-ethnic environment in spite of 
internal differences within the ethnic group?  And how does major political changes, as one has 
seen in Guatemala over the last fifteen years, create a climate whereby same-ethnic people 
identify with each other through their ethnicity and moves towards being a (ethnic) nation 
within the state-nation?  The fieldwork related to this study - in the form of conversations with 
persons directly and indirectly related to its main focus - has made clear that the topic of 
ethnicity is a painful theme in present-day Guatemala, creating responses ranging from 
vehement denial that Guatemala  is a multi-ethnic state, ignoring even the Garífunas and the 
Xincas, to positions of  individuals who keep their contacts with the other main ethnic group to 
a minimum.   
 
ETHNICITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL  
A central proposition about multi-ethnic societies, is that if a group’s demands reasonably can 
be linked to the group’s ethnic manifestations, its demands have, under otherwise equal 
conditions, a stronger and more effective - but also a more provocative - appeal.  I believe that 
this proposition captures a universal truth in the political climate of today, without implying that 
such demands always are brought to a successful conclusion.  From this I deduce the corollary 
that if a notable part of the population of a ethnically homogeneous state is replaced with a 
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population of a different ethnicity, other factors kept constant, that society as a whole will 
behave in ways that it did not do earlier. If the ethnic group becomes aware of what it perceives 
as its ethnic distinctiveness and promotes this in a political context, two conditions follow. First, 
some will rise to the top of that community and establish themselves as an elite. That conclusion 
follows from Mosca’s (1939:50) famous observation that  “In all societies (...) two classes 
appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled.”.  And, second, a tension - dormant or active - 
will exist between the rising elite of the ethnic community and the entrenched elite of the 
society as a whole, because of their different interests. To better understand the effect of 
ethnicity in practice, I will in this and the following sections develop reasons why this is so, 
under which conditions this scenario will happen and what may follow.  I start on the level of 
individuals, before a body of individuals has acquired a focus of its own. 
 The reason why demands linked to ethnic manifestations transcends normal limits, is the 
widely accepted view that identifying qualities rooted in a person’s ethnicity are regarded as 
being of uttermost importance to the individual’s existential self, with respect to both time 
(history) and space (environment, community). This realization, however, is a recent 
phenomenon. For only decades ago, a conflict between the dominating society and an ethnic 
community aspiring for recognition, was contained with brutal repression (for example, the 
Turkish attack on the Armenians 1910-20); by forcefully denying the existence of the challenge 
(Norway’s treatment of its Laps up to the 1970s and of its gypsies from 1950s to the 1970s); by 
forced or voluntary assimilation (the German Jews before 1933); or by institutional schemes (as 
in Sovjet Union up to 1989). While there are signs that may indicate that these types of 
politically manipulative remedies increasingly belong to the past, extreme violent measures, like 
ethnic cleansing (Rwanda 1997, Kosovo 1999) and ethnic dilution (Tibet and Xingyiang 
ongoing), continue to be applied where ethnic populations collide or political goals of the 
dominating ethnic nation are challenged by the presence of less powerful other-ethnic 
communities - minorities or majorities. 
 Connor (1994:40) defines an ethnic community as “a social group which shares a 
common ideology, common institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity”. The 
advantage of this definition is that it emphasizes the essence rather than the overt manifestations 
of the group. The essence of the ethnic community is not tangible; it is psychological, a matter 
of attitude among the community members rather than of facts. The definition points at another 
crucial characteristic, as well. A prerequisite of belonging to an ethnic community is the 
popularly held awareness or belief that one’s community is unique in some vital sense - not 
necessarily superior, but different.  Adams (1995:59-82) discusses different theories on what 
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this uniqueness may be and promotes the hypothesis of a common ancestry. Up against that 
stands Popper’s famous statement that a race is a collection of men united not by their origin, 
but by a common error in regard to their origin (Popper, 1945).  
 By giving the community to which one has decided to belong a unique value, one has 
given oneself a share in the importance one associates with that group through one’s 
membership in and allegiance to the group. In fact, often the individual’s own existential 
identity, as he sees it, is closely associated with that of his group. In the absence of such a 
conviction, the group is only a sample of individuals.  A lack of recognition of one’s chosen 
group from the larger community becomes a lack of recognition of oneself, a threat to one’s 
self-image.  This may in part explain the fervor of ethnic struggles. Ultimately, it is not what is, 
but what people believe is, that is important. What people perceive is what influences attitudes 
and behavior. Because the essence of the community is a matter of the attitude of its members, 
the tangible manifestations of cultural distinctiveness are significant only to the degree that they 
contribute to the sense of uniqueness among the members. A subconscious belief in the group’s 
unique origin and evolution becomes an important ingredient of national psychology. It is the 
psychological bond, rooted in the idea about themselves, that joins persons of the community 
together and, in their subconscious conviction, differentiates them from all non-members 
(Connor, 1994:42).  Huntington (1996) claims that in the post-Cold War world, the most 
important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic; they are 
cultural. In many contexts, that means the effects of ethnicity. Addressing the national arena, 
Brown (1998) suggests that nation-states have been weakened by the failure of the nation-state 
elites to deliver the promised social justice community, the nation. The inequities of 
development have exacerbated the need of individuals for an imagined community that could 
provide a sense of identity, security and authority, and the ethnic community in many regions is 
increasingly replacing the state in this role. People - and among them members of an ethnic 
group, with their consciousness of otherness - define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, 
language, values, cultural heritage, history, behavioral patterns, institutions and different beliefs, 
which distinguish them from other members of the larger society. They identify with cultural 
groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations. And people use politics not just to 
advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we 
know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against (ibid.: 21).  
 No group of some size, however, is a homogenous body. Different attributes, grades of 
attributes and the relevance each has within the different segments of, say, the indigenous group, 
combined with the subjective goals of each segment, result in a fragmentation of the group into 
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competing factions. Each segment’s understanding of itself and its relation to other segments 
and to the group as a whole, however, is subordinate to its idea of its uniqueness in relation to 
that of the other-ethnic society.  This applies very well to the Guatemalan case with respect to 
the Mayans. But since the attributes of the ethnic group, as well as those of its individual 
segments, as they are understood by the members, are psychological and not tangible, they can 
be created and they can be dismantled, as their importance and usefulness change.  This is why 
ethnicity ultimately is politics. 
 
THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 
An objective definition of ethnicity assumes that there is some distinguishing feature that clearly 
separates one ethnic group of people from another. However, not all members of ethnic groups 
are easily identifiable by objective, that is, physical characteristics. Also, it is difficult to 
determine the boundaries of ethnic categories in this way. The use of a behavioral definition, 
also somewhat objective, combined with cultural markers like language, religion, dress code or 
customs, is another troublesome advance. Characteristics of that category are susceptible to 
change.  
 Brass (1991) takes a qualitatively different approach that will be adhered to in the 
following analysis. He claims that ethnicity and nationalism can not be identified by either of 
the aforementioned definitions since both are social and political constructions. Brass (1991:8) 
claims that ethnic identities are creations of elites, which draw upon, distort, and sometimes 
fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their 
own well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well 
as for themselves.  Breuilly (1982), correspondingly, warns that to focus upon culture, ideology, 
identity, or class is to neglect that nationalism is about politics, i.e., about the struggle to get 
access to power. And power, in the modern world, is primarily about control of the state. In line 
with Breuilly’s view, Brass (1996:8) makes another claim, namely, that ethnicity and  
nationalism   are  modern  phenomena inseparably connected with the activities of the modern 
centralizing state. Interesting enough, this is supported by Wade (1997) who does not approach 
his topic, ethnicity and race, from a point of view of nationalist politics. Wade states that racist 
views was not invented in Europe until the mid-eighteenth century, an observation which is 
confirmed by contemporary paintings where representatives of the European elite are seen 
mixing freely as equals of people of dark skin. Ethnic identity and modern nationalism, 
according to Brass, arise out of specific types of interactions between the leaderships of 
centralized states, the state-national elites, and influential subgroups within subordinate ethnic 
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communities. It follows from the existence of ethnic variability, that ethnic group identities can 
be produced for the purpose of serving as political resources for elites in competition for 
political power and economic advantage. The identities become referents for the identification 
of members of the group that is called upon in order to create a political identity more easily. In 
short, ethnic identity formation can be seen as a process created in the dynamics of elite 
competition within the boundaries determined by political and economic realities. 
 
THE CREATION OF ETHNIC COHERENCE  
In the previous sections, I used the terms group and community loosely and interchangeably. In 
the academic literature, however, these two terms and a third one, nation, are stringently used to 
indicate levels of group self-awareness and political maturity, with group at the low and nation 
at the high end. I will adopt this usage. An ethnic group that uses cultural markers and symbols 
in order to create internal cohesion and differentiates itself from other-ethnic groups, is an ethnic 
community. It is subjectively self-conscious and has established criteria for who to include into 
and who to exclude from its body of members.  The next higher level of political awakening is 
when an ethnic group struggles to achieve and expand rights and influence through political 
action and mobilization. Then it has gone beyond ethnicity per se and is establishing itself as a 
political force; it has become a (ethnic) nation. That is, a nation is a politicized community, in 
the sense that the community’s beliefs, behavior, customs and other attributes accommodate a 
political message. This transformation can be accomplished by a competent leadership, a local 
elite, by either transforming the unfocused ethnic group into a self-conscious entity, a 
community, and politicizing it, or by amalgamating diverse ethnic groups and give them a 
common identity and a political focus. Ethnic demands center initially around certain central 
symbols - like language, religion, origin, history and territory - which are seen as distinguishing 
the ethnic community from its surroundings. As I will indicate later, this is the level most Maya 
activists are at today. Some of the more politically advanced activists, however, promote their 
views forcefully in the context of a political program with an ideological vision that intends to 
appeal to all Mayans, i.e., as Pan-Mayanism. One notable Guatemalan example is Cojtí Cuxil 
(1996). 
 The process of merging ethnic groups into communities and advancing them into nations 
requires a contrasting environment, i.e., an other-ethnic society, and a local leadership. The 
tactics of the leaders are to emphasizing the uniqueness and the rightness of the groups, and, 
particularly, intensifying the subjective meaning of the community’s symbols of identity. These 
are made more relational than just personal and instrumental.  Language becomes not merely a 
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means of communication, but a priceless heritage of group culture; familiar places and historical 
sites become sacred shrines. Myths are being created and from the combined effect of these 
efforts, a unique communal identity develops, both inwardly towards the group members and 
outwardly towards the surrounding society. 
 In line with the above argument, Connor (1994:198) emphasizes that ethnic nationalism 
is a mass phenomenon. The historical accuracy of the mobilizing myths is irrelevant as 
exemplified by the Nobel prize laureate, Rigoberta Menchú in her autobiography1 that calls on a 
“collective memory”, a kind of handy data bank, when reality does not fit the needs (Stoll, 
1998). To which degree the instigators of these beliefs are true believers, does not affect the 
reality of their creation.  The essence is not the sincerity of the propagandist, but the nature of 
the mass instinct to which he or she successfully appeals to. Connor (1994:204) argues that no 
matter how they are described, the bonds within such a group - the national bonds - are 
subconscious and emotional, rather than conscious and rational, in their inspiration. While the 
outer form may be different, the non-rational core of the ethnic community is being reached and 
triggered through symbols which, in their nature, is no different - except in intensity and 
perseverance - from those used by any nation-state that needs their citizens’ affection, using 
nation-symbols (the swastika, the flag, the national football team), music (the Horst Wessel 
song, the national anthem),  and myths (the “common” past, the “founding fathers”, the lost/won 
battles), the chauvinistic slogans (“Das Deutsche Volk!”, Norway’s ex-Prime Minister Harlem 
Brundtland: “It is typically Norwegian to be excellent.”) - to mention some.  
 The propensity to perceive an ethnic division in terms of tangible differences between an 
ethnic group and its surrounding society, is often underlined by the statements and the actions of 
those most involved.  In their desire to assert their uniqueness, members of a group are apt to 
convert their most discernible and distinguishing institutions into rallying points.  However, 
national identities may survive substantial alterations in language, religion, economic status, or 
any other tangible manifestations of its culture, without loss of identity. But, as a result of the 
tendency for both the nation activist and the observer to describe ethno-psychological 
phenomena in terms of tangible manifestations, the true nature and power of the ethnic feelings 
are not probed.  Ethnic strife can only superficially be understood by studying its tangible 
elements, like language, religion and customs. What is involved in such a confrontation is a 
divergence of basic identity that manifests itself in a ‘us-them’ syndrome. The group’s 
conception of uniqueness and the urge to maintain its otherness implies that an external 
reference becomes crucial for its sense of being a nation. The group requires a referent, i.e., the 
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idea of  a ‘us’ requires a ‘them’. In this context, Us-Them for a nation play the same existential 
role as I-Thou for the identity of an individual (Buber, 1937). 
 A natural response from a government to the possibility of a threatening nation in a 
multi-ethnic country is a call for assimilation, which also was good policy in Guatemala among 
the Ladinos up to quite recently.  If the coexistence of differing cultures appears incompatible 
with continued unity and yet partition is deemed unthinkable, polices to promote homogeneity 
are the most attractive alternative. It is a mistake, however, to underestimate the resistance to 
assimilation that governments can be expected to encounter.  Many governments have 
discovered belatedly that the enmity of groups towards acculturation represented a more 
formidable adversary than they had supposed. Connor (1994:22) gives examples and concludes 
that assimilation is even more of a natural foe to self-determination than is the multinational 
state. The emotional power of ethnic nationalism, which may threaten the multinational state, 
casts serious doubt upon the probable success of  assimilation programs.  
 The Maya social identity has long been characterized by community-based allegiances 
(Warren, 1998:137).  This, the dispersed habitation pattern, and the repression and violence of 
the 1970s and early 1980s, put on hold the organizational efforts of the Maya communities in 
Guatemala. But it also helped the Mayans to counter assimilation efforts by the Ladino society.  
Another effect was that a large part of the social and political activity took place at the local or, 
at best, regional level, resulting in many groups and a high incidence of local affiliation, but 
with little or no communication across basic cleavages within the Maya community. Most group 
activities, until recently, occurred within isolated and self-contained pockets of the community - 
a situation conducive to sharp disagreements, extremist behavior and the possibility of 
disintegration (Lijphart, 1968:7,10). 
 
MAYA SELF-REALIZATION  
The current era in Guatemala of politicized ethnic resurgence is tied to the liberalization that 
followed the introduction of a (so-called) democratic constitution in 1985. The regime is best 
called a procedural democracy. With that is meant that the procedural aspects of the democratic 
regime are in place, but the application of them reflects that the democratic institutions do not 
function satisfactory, because of  a lack both of  a commitment to and experience with 
democratic procedures and practices.  A procedural democracy, therefore,  remain politically 
unstable, as was demonstrated when President Serrano in 1993 tried to take near-dictatorial 
power by a coup d’etat (McCleary, 1994).  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 1 Burgos-Debray, Elizabeth, 1984, I, Rigoberta; An Indian Woman in Guatemala.  
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 The new national policy of Guatemala that followed after 1985 was characterized by 
neoliberal economic reforms. Today, like other Latin American governments, the Guatemalan 
government is pushed by market forces and the international community to liberalize its 
regimes, hold elections, and honor basic civil rights. In response, numerous groups - Maya more 
than Ladino -  have emerged to press publicly for concerns that had no legal communication 
channels in earlier years. The number of civic organizations that were started in the city of 
Quetzaltenango during 1993-97 has tripled in comparison with the situation sixteen years 
earlier, i.e., during 1977-81 (Muni-K’at, 1997:14). But this is only the top of the iceberg. Today 
religious, pro-labor, cultural, educational, and a large number of other special-interest 
organizations, with their umbrella associations, are mushrooming at a rate which makes any 
meaningful registration impossible. Given that they all seem to have permanent staffs, offices 
and technical facilities, it would be unreasonable to assume that they are not believed to serve a 
purpose to their constituencies - in the case of the Mayans, besides other goals, a claim for 
uniqueness and equal rights within the society.   
 In Guatemala the belief - real or illusionary - is strong that the political situation will 
continue to improve and that the possibilities under the present rule will sustain the small gains 
won so far and add more down the road. Compared with the past, it seems undeniable that the 
Mayans, initially marginalized, will have a lot to gain politically under the present conditions 
where its organizations are free to promote their ideas and work for their ethno-political goals. 
This may have less to do with winning positions through democratic elections, since that option 
may carry little clout in Guatemala at the moment. But free speech and open communication for 
Maya constituencies that often are dispersed and live in remote regions, may strengthen the 
consciousness among the Mayans and align them into a political force. As described earlier, this 
is clearly the short-term goals of the upcoming Maya intelligentsia. By the same token, the will 
to repressive excesses, so often present among the Ladino elites of Guatemala, may be kept in 
check by the same conditions.  
 If democracy can be sustained in Guatemala for any length of time is an open question, 
however. Huntington (1996a) speculates if the absence of the combination of non-unique 
Western factors in countries outside the West make a Western-type democracy not sustainable 
there - identifying India and Japan as possible exceptions. More to the point, there are few 
indications that the power and ambitions of the Guatemalan military elite has been seriously 
curtailed in the era since the introduction of the new constitution of 1985. (See McCleary, 1999, 
who forwards a very different interpretation.)  The incompetence and the disastrous economic 
policies of the many military governments before 1985 that was the main reason behind the 
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need for liberalization, could easily be forgotten by the new brass of the barracks, and more so if 
the international community slackened its watch on the situation.  
 
MAYA ACTIVISM IN GUATEMALA 
None of the Mayans I spoke with denied that the liberalization of public life and the economy of 
Guatemala had had a major influence on the identity building among the Mayans, which is felt 
also in the environment this study addresses. The newness of freedom to organize, absence of 
overt oppression, and international exposure from the mid-1980s onwards, have offered fertile 
ground for political opportunities for Maya factions to promote their “nationalistic” ideas, often 
referred to as “Mayanism”. Today a volatile but enterprising situation exists within the 
indigenous communities of Guatemala. 
 Current Maya activism seeks a culture-based solution to Guatemala’s many problems. In 
a short-term perspective it works for the conservation and resurrection of elements of Maya 
culture; in a longer perspective it wants to force through governmental reforms within the 
framework of the 1985 Guatemalan constitution and international law. The control of Maya 
history and prehistory is of central importance to the movement’s cultural promotion because of 
the widely held view that “true” Maya culture consists only of those features that survived from 
the pre-colonial period.  The influence of recent centuries of European and African culture is 
seen as “contamination”, and the incorporation of non-Maya elements is supposed to be a 
weakening or a pollution of the “true” Maya culture. The Mayan languages that have remained 
largely intact throughout centuries of foreign incursions, represent a uniquely authentic cultural 
possession for their speakers. Local costumes - forced upon the indigenous population by decree 
by the colonial state - is another ethnic manifestation. The traje typico remains a principal 
symbol of female identity, which, however, has not been emphasized by the male leaders of the 
Maya movement.  Early colonial documents and Maya pre-colonial hieroglyphic writing are 
another important source on original Maya culture and provide a correction to the ethnocentrism 
imposed upon the history of Guatemala by Ladino writers  (Fisher and Brown, 1996).  
 Many Maya intellectuals promote a strategy founded on these elements. The purpose is to 
empower the indigenous population and revive and strengthen an indigenous identity. Following 
the new political wind in Guatemala after 1985, a growing number of Maya students and 
professionals are also turning to the social sciences to support their political advocacy for the 
Maya people (Watanabe, 1995:41). Their politico-scholarly agenda is aimed at regaining control 
over scholarly and popular representations of the Maya people, since any of the Maya critiques 
of the present Guatemalan Ladino state are based on historic-cultural comparisons (ibid.). 
38 
 Parts of the Maya activist movement in Guatemala has labeled their message ‘Pan-
Maya’, indicating that they have all Mayans in mind, also those in the surrounding countries, 
independent of country borders. That aspect, however, is not loudly promoted at present. The 
Pan-Maya movement seeks recognition of cultural diversity within the nation-state, a greater 
role for indigenous politics in the state-national culture, a reassessment of economic inequities, 
and a wider distribution of cultural resources such as education and literacy in indigenous 
languages.  The movement’s commitment to education represents a compelling change given an 
educational system in which 70 percent of the public schools offer only four years of classes, 92 
percent of the population over the age of fifteen has never finished the conventional six years of 
primary education, and less than half a percent of the population has been given access to a 
university. Most professional Maya activists, have been schooled in Guatemala; a handful have 
studied in the United States or Europe (Warren, 1998:37). 
 The early years of the movement, in the mid-1980s, were focused on issues of cultural 
origin and self-definition. Since then, Maya activists have focused their debates more squarely 
on questions of the best direction for Maya nation-building, elaborated specific demands on the 
state for major reforms in administration, language policy, the future role of the military, 
economic priorities, education, communication, and respect for Maya ceremonial centers 
(Fischer and Brown, 1996). Some of these were highlighted in a plebiscite (consulta popular) in 
May 1999.  The resulting ‘No’ to proposed amendments to the 1985 constitution, was widely 
seen as a setback for both the Mayanism movement and the liberalization process in Guatemala.  
 Movements that seek to mobilize around indigenous identity, focus on the contradictions 
inherent in political systems that embrace democratic egalitarianism yet, by promulgating 
monoethnic, monocultural and monolingual images of the modern nation, exclude major sectors 
of their population and the cultural heritage of these.  The political mainstream has often 
pursued assimilation as the logical way to resolve the “ethno-national” problem and ensure 
national unity, but cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily 
compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. Even many supporters of Maya 
mobilization have reservations, due to fears that calls for self-determination, in its ultimate 
conclusion, may lead to a destructive breakup of the nation-state (Warren, 1998:5).  
 Critics of indigenous movements in Guatemala question the validity of these Pan-Maya 
politics. They argue that there exists no clear demarcation between the indigenous population 
and the Ladino mainstream. In many cases, they claim, there is no transcendent concept of an 
indigenous people but rather many micro-ethnicities and community identifications. Maya 
activists, on the other hand, hope that the ideology of ‘unity within diversity’ will bring Mayans 
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powerfully into the mainstream politics and thereby give them the political tools necessary to 
address Guatemala’s serious development dilemmas.  They propose a multi-cultural model for 
participatory democracy.  Their model recognizes multiple national cultures with a mandate that 
defines collective cultural, linguistic and political rights for Maya citizens and legitimizes their 
claims for cultural and political space in the country’s educational, judicial and administrative 
systems (Warren, 1998:9, 13). The political reality of Guatemala, however, is dominated by the 
overarching Hispanic standard for nationalism that predominates in Latin America. At the same 
time, the economic aid for the indigenous poor, promoted by foreign governments under the 
ongoing Proceso de la Paz (peace process), does not seem to reach its beneficiaries. And while 
the appalling living conditions for the many are widely recognized, no national policy has been 
proposed for the alleviation of the situation. There is no lack of words about the need for a 
change, but in the end the whole seems to behave rather more like a tar pit where ideas sink 
slowly out of sight leaving everything just as it was. 
 
ETHNICITY IN QUETZALTENANGO: HAS MUCH CHANGED OVER TIME? 
Adams (1995: 395) points out that a watershed has taken place, from the 1960s to the 1990s, in 
how ethnicity is being perceived in the Guatemalan society. In 1969, one of his students did an 
extensive study on the economic, social and political activities of the “Indians” - now referred to 
as Mayans - in Quetzaltenango  (Hupp, 1969). Even though Quetzaltenango has expanded from 
a town of forty-two thousands to a city of more than a hundred thousand inhabitants in the past 
thirty years, Hupp’s observations on the major characteristics of the urban Maya population and 
what it meant to be considered a Mayan in Quetzaltenango at that time, illuminate important 
aspects that is valid also today. I will briefly highlight and comment on parts of his work.   
 Hupp (1969:11) - referring to the custom, then and now, among Quetzaltecos (any 
permanent resident of Quetzaltenango irrespective of ethnic background) - subdivides the 
Mayans into a lower, middle and upper stratum. Professionally trained Mayans were grouped 
into a separate category, “professionals”,  located between the middle and upper stratum.  
However, this manner of division represents only one possibility. Taking economic wealth as 
the criterion, Mayans and Ladinos are lumped together and ranked strictly on wealth, and in this 
case, according to Hupp, the wealthiest Mayans rank higher than most Ladinos - as today.  
 However, when access to political power acts as the divisive factor, in the 1960s the 
Maya population fell at the bottom.  This situation has changed. Today’s alcalde (mayor) of 
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Quetzaltenango, Lic. Rigoberto Quemé Chay2, is a Mayan with strong support in the Maya 
population, from the Maya organizations and his own influential cofradía (Catholic 
brotherhood). Considering that the Constitution of Guatemala gives the national government in 
Guatemala City extensive power also at the regional levels of departments and municipalities, 
and that the Ladino opposition in Quetzaltenango to Lic. Quemé‘s regime can mobilize 
significant economic and political influence, the fact that some Mayans rise to high public 
offices should not be overrated (Prensa Libre, 1999a). Hupp concluded that among Mayans, 
proportionally the middle stratum occupied the largest part rather than the lower stratum as 
might be expected, followed by those in the lower stratum, while the professional and upper 
strata represented only a minor fraction of the Maya population. The focus of Hupp’s study was 
the Maya population per se. His study, therefore, did not correlate the socio-economic 
distribution of Mayans to the socio-economic Ladino population of Quetzaltenango. In the 
discussion on ethnic discrimination in Chapter 6, I argue that the distribution of Mayans is 
shifted downward, towards a less favorable situation, in comparison with a similar distribution 
of Ladinos. Hupp emphasizes the close interaction between the urban and the much poorer rural  
population of Mayans which, for demographic reasons, is much higher than what applies to 
Ladinos (ibid: 21). Not much has changed in that situation up till today. In Chapter 6 I use this 
in support of my argument that the Mayans of Quetzaltenango as a group are worse off 
economically and socially than Ladino Quetzaltecos as a whole. 
 Hupp (1969: 21) claims that the clearest differentiation among Quetzaltenango’s Mayans 
is between that of the lower stratum and the rest. He describes the former as “simple, humble, 
backward and exploited”. These Indians were often recent migrants from Maya settlements and 
small towns in the western highlands. Their rural origin was their most notable characteristic 
and major drawback because it slowed down their ability to adjust to an urban way of life, like 
switching from agricultural work to wage employment or self-employment in some form of 
commercial activity. Hupp notes that a two-ways migration takes place between Quetzaltenango 
and the rural areas, a situation that in my interpretation slow down or hamper the adaptation of 
Mayans, as a group, to urban life.  I have no way to tell if that situation continues and, 
eventually, to which extent today.  As Hupp points out, the more fortunate of the lower stratum 
Mayans find steady employment and may move up into the ranks of the middle stratum. In his 
view, few Mayans who lived in Quetzaltenango  for a long period of time remained permanently 
                                                          
 2 There is no family relationship between Rigoberto Quemé, the mayor of Quetzaltenango,  
    and Sr. Orlando R. Quemé P., President of ADEQ, whom I will refer to later. 
 
41 
within the lower stratum, except for domestic servants.  He points out a fact that is clearly 
observable today, too, that Mayans employed as domestic servants - only women, the so-called 
muchachas -  and manual laborers, are looked down upon by Mayans and Ladinos alike.   
 According to Hupp (1969: 23), the amount of money available for business activities is 
the primary criterion used in separating the lower, middle and upper strata of Mayans. In his 
notation, the middle stratum are the small independent businessmen, artisans, and skilled 
laborers. They own bakeries, small grocery stores, tailor shops, shoe stores and other types of 
businesses. Those with more money run non- or low-mechanized workshops, and the rest works 
in small enterprises. The difference between the middle and upper stratum is primarily the larger 
amount of capital available to upper stratum Mayans who invest in several or considerably 
larger businesses rather than only one or two small- or medium-sized enterprises that 
characterizes the middle stratum business. Unlike the lower stratum Mayans who can move into 
the middle stratum fairly easily, the middle stratum Mayans seldom enter the ranks of the upper 
stratum because of the intense economic competition within their own stratum. Hupp offers no 
quantitative data that would indicate the relative size of the socio-economic strata he discusses. 
The professional stratum, following Hupp, are educated Mayans, like lawyers, primary and 
secondary school teachers, business accountants, and social workers.  They serve as a link 
between the Maya and Ladino population because of their better education and closer social 
relationships with Ladinos than other Mayans, except those in the upper stratum.  If economic 
criteria is used, the professionally trained Mayans fall into the middle stratum. Often these men 
and women have less money than the more successful middle stratum businessmen.  The 
professionally trained Mayans are employed in a professional position rather than operating an 
independent office for their professional services, except for lawyers.  If education, position and 
contact with Ladinos acts as the main criteria, Mayans in the professional stratum rank with the 
upper stratum Mayans and only money keeps them from achieving this status.  
 
COMMENTS 
In this chapter I have offered an understanding of ethnicity that presupposes a high degree of 
awareness among members of the same ethnic background if they aspire to function as a 
community or - in a political context - as a nation. The question, how to define a member of an 
ethnic community, is a complex one. I have alluded to possible approaches discussed in the 
literature.  On a macro-level the ethnic polarization in Guatemala, however, is so obvious - 
politically, culturally and economically -  that this in practice is not an obstacle. We will see as I 
start discussing the specifics of the field work of this study, that this situation is reflected at the 
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individual level among Mayans. No person I approached in Quetzaltenango had doubt about his 
own ethnic affiliation or that of his environment.  At the present, he part of the Maya population 
of Guatemala that is organized, is highly fractured with no representation either on the regional 
or the national level. Also, ethnic demands are closely linked to certain central symbols - like 
language, religion, origin, history and territory - which are seen as distinguishing the ethnic 
community from its surroundings. Political demands related to the Mayans as a disadvantaged 
part of the population, is brought forward only loosely connected to the ethnic perspective. With 
reference to the ongoing mobilization and conscious building that is going on in Guatemala 
today, discussed in the section on Maya activism, one can hypothesize that this situation will not 
last, given that the present political situation of Guatemala continues unaltered.   
---o--- 
43 
PART 2: FIELDWORK AND RESULTS 
“You see, but you don’t observe.” 
Sherlock Holmes to Dr. Watson 
 
CHAPTER THREE: 
Trotting the Streets 
  
As I started to implement the research scheme I had laid out in preparation of the fieldwork for 
this study, I ran into a number of practical problems. The solutions to these are being discussed 
in the following sections.  The contacts I established in Quetzaltenango - on one hand, the 
interviewees and, on the other, professionals from many strata whose help I called upon to 
interpret and expand upon the information I was given by the former - are identified. Also, the 
strategy for my conversations with the entrepreneurs and how this was carried out in practice, 
are discussed. 
 
WHEN THEORY MEETS REALITY 
The aforementioned definition of the informal sector forwarded by Castells and Portes 
(1989:12) as “those enterprises that avoid state regulation, such as fiscal obligations and labor 
standards, in contexts where similar activities are so regulated” is a helpful conceptual tool, but 
difficult to apply in practice. Without convenient disclosures by the owner, an improbable 
courtesy, it is difficult to determine, at least in the first round, if the enterprise under study is one 
that “avoid state regulation”. One would think it is unlikely that there exist clandestine 
enterprises in Quetzaltenango where all enterprises have been registered after a recent door-to-
door search by the authorities (Vital, 1999). However, one of the interviewees of this study, EL-
1 (the coding of names will be explained later), indeed operated as a clandestine enterprise, and 
EM-5 who had been “lost” by the municipality, were very much in that category.  All the other 
entrepreneurs who were interviewed, had been registered. The discussion will show that neither 
the existence of receipts of previous transactions nor the fact that the entrepreneur pays taxes is 
a proof that the enterprise complies with state regulations. The example of EM-5 with ten 
employees, who did not pay taxes, and EM-1 with one, who did, shows that the size of the 
enterprise is no indicator, either.  
 Numerous sources pointed out that the avoidance of state regulations take different 
forms, among them, reporting a deflated production volume, bribing the municipality 
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representative who checks the paperwork in the workshop, or taking advantage of a lax or 
incompetent municipal bureaucracy.  The gain is not only reduced tax today, but a better 
negotiating position if or when new regulations are being introduced (see discussion of the 
planned changes in the national taxation system in Chapter 7).  It was therefore decided that the 
possibility the enterprise had to juggle the taxable aspects would be used as a primary criterion 
of informality, complying with  the definition of Castells and Portes (1989), in lack of direct 
proof of evación fiscal (tax evasion). As will be shown in the discussion of the control group of 
formal enterprises, this proved to be a good measure. 
 During the study I was left with the impression - rightly or wrongly - that the Maya 
institutions that helped me initially in identifying and contacting Maya entrepreneurs, had a 
tendency, unintentionally, to guide me to the settled and well-known among them, thereby 
introducing a bias in my material.  By the same token, it was unlikely that any contacts 
established through, say, Sr. Villagran, el auditor de la municipalidad, the city’s comptroller, 
who was kind enough to respond to my requests for help, would reveal sensitive information. 
(None of Sr. Villagran’s proposals for interviewees were followed up, in part also because the 
enterprises he proposed were too large for my purpose.) To counteract a possible bias, I used the 
lists of entrepreneurs from organizations that were willing to help and picked candidates I found 
most relevant, often after some background research. Also, I used recommendations from 
independent individuals and some enterprises I found on my own by walking the streets.   
 Due to hesitancy or inability among most of the entrepreneurs to divulge details on the 
economy of their enterprise, my ambition to establish an economic “balance sheet” for the 
economy of each enterprise, as a basis for a detailed economic analysis of the operation, had to 
be discarded. 
 Initially my plan was to concentrate on enterprises with a hired work force of 1-2 to 
maximum 7-8 persons, with an emphasis on those in the higher end. Except for a larger 
production, however, I found no qualitative differences between middle-sized enterprises of, 
say, from five to seven employees and those with ten or slightly more. Often I found that the 
problems of the smaller ones were present among the larger ones, as well, but that the 
entrepreneurs of the latter better perceived the implications of those problems. The sample of 
enterprises that will be discussed in the following, therefore, includes some units with more than 
ten employees (see Table 3.1). 
 In the planning of this study it was assumed that establishing contact and trust with the 
entrepreneurs would be a time-consuming task. Just the contrary proved to be the case. While 
localizing enterprises of the right size, within the right economic activity or identifying 
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entrepreneurs of the desired ethnicity, at times could create difficulties, establishing a fruitful 
rapport with the entrepreneurs, Ladinos and Mayans alike, was easy - courtesy of the rightly 
famous hospitality of the city. In no cases did an entrepreneur decline to give an interview when 
I approached him. 
 
PUTTING ORDER TO CHAOS: PREPARING THE INTERVIEWS 
The conceptual approach used in preparing and organizing the interviews, indicating expected 
levels of priority among the tasks under the entrepreneur’s supervision, is illustrated in the 
scheme presented in Appendix B.  The entrepreneur was assumed to be fully integrated with all 
aspects of the operation of his enterprise with no intermediaries of independent authority. The 
scheme reflects the assumption that some of the entrepreneur’s tasks are more crucial for the 
well-being of the enterprise than others, i.e., the entrepreneur had to take a strong hand on 
certain aspects of the enterprise and could allow himself to be less urgent on others. This 
artificially but conceptually useful distinction, was meant to identify important functions like the 
entrepreneur’s business relations to formal or informal contractors or his supportive (ethnic) 
network, and less crucial functions, say, the daily operation of the enterprise or the economy of 
his family under stable conditions. While the work on this “model” served as a highly beneficial 
exercise in preparation for the actual interview work, identifying in advance - I believe - every 
aspect that possibly could come up in the interview, it was not fully implementable in practice 
due to the particular circumstances of the individual enterprise. It was also appreciated from 
early on that to get the interviewees’ active participation a regular questionnaire did not function 
and that a conversational form on the interview was preferable. Therefore, the approach applied 
was to use the “model”, combined with a detailing of each topic into a number of specific sub-
entries, to ensure that all aspects of a topic had been addressed.  The extent to which an entry 
was relevant to the individual entrepreneur and his willingness to release information, would 
determine how many of the sub-entries would be raised. If permission was granted by the 
interviewee, as it always was, the interview was taped and later transcribed. 
  
PERSONS CONTACTED 
The people contacted fell into two categories - the entrepreneurs and everyone else. The latter 
group consisted of professionals with background of relevance to the topics this study touched - 
among them, individual with unique practice, scholars at the main university locally and persons 
in leading positions within the municipality and at the helm of different kinds of organizations.  
While few, if any, of the perspectives I brought up with them seemed to have priority on their 
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day-to-day agenda and their views not always fit the facts at hand, their active interest in my 
work and the exchange of views I had with these persons were highly valuable in the ongoing 
analysis of my data as the study progressed.   
 
Non-Entrepreneurs  
A number of individuals, representatives of lending institutions and Maya organizations, as well 
as officers of the political structure, were contacted to help with different kinds of information, 
to identify Maya entrepreneurs who fit the criteria of this study and to ensure a proper 
introduction to them, and to expand upon information acquired in the interviews with the 
entrepreneurs. The names and affiliations of these individuals are listed in Appendix A. In all 
situations where Maya organizations were approached, the persons in charge would comply 
with my request for assistance of some kind or another. Officers of the lending institutions were 
cordial on all matters, though, with one exception, I was turned down when I requested help to 
establish contacts with their Maya clients. Lists of entrepreneurs I was able to get my hand on, 
were - more often than not - littered with errors which made the information near to worthless. 
Besides, my contact with the organizational men included a solid share of promises that were 
never honored, telephone calls that were never returned, scheduled meetings where I showed up 
as the only participant, information offered that never arrived etc. Also, it added to the unreality, 
if not the productivity, that naming of the streets and numbering of the addresses in 
Quetzaltenango are laid out according to a logic that had not kept up with an expanding city 
over time and frequently was incomprehensible to most locals and this author alike. 
 
Entrepreneurs  
The entrepreneurs interviewed in this study were promised that their names would not be made 
known to a third party. Therefore, names and addresses have been withheld, and a coding 
system is used.  EM-n (n=1, 11) refers to a Maya entrepreneur and the number he is identified 
by; EL-m (m=1,3) refers to a Ladino entrepreneur. The interview itself would normally last 30-
45 minutes. In addition, the facilities of the enterprise were visited, most often in continuation 
with the interview, allowing for a relaxed expansion and check of the information received, and 
for a subjective assessment of the prosperity of the entrepreneur.  In a few cases I returned to the 
interviewees some time later to iron out ambiguities, missing data and possible 
misunderstandings in the previous conversation. The subjective assessment took the form of a 
visual inspection of the workshop, its size, the kind and number of machines used and their age, 
etc. When possible I would also visit the living quarter of the entrepreneur and his family.  A 
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brief description of the individual entrepreneurs follows. Information I was given in the 
interviews, is referred to in the discussion in the later chapters, either in tabulated form or in the 
text itself. 
EM-1 was a male Maya, 40 years of age, had a university degree as licenciado in economy 
(comparable with a US Bachelor) and had been running his workshop - making sweaters, 
pullovers, school uniforms etc. - for the last 15-20 years.  At present he, his wife and a 
Maya employee, all three on full-time, and his son of 20 years, on part-time (after school), 
were working in the shop. It was a typical family-led enterprise operating under stable 
conditions, offering a tolerable income, but demanding long workdays. He would not 
inform me about the salary he paid his employee, a young man of around 16-18 years of 
age. He sold his products to shops in towns within a periphery of a few hours’ bus ride 
away.  He did not distinguish between Ladinos and Mayans in his business dealings, but 
was positive towards Mayanist ideas. His family economy was fully integrated with the 
economy of the shop. His household consisted of  three children, his wife and two other 
adults.  His workshop, which had attached a small sales desk, comprised of  three slow, 
20-years old, hand-driven knitting machines and a newer, electric one, 10 years old.  The 
place was cramped and gave the impression of being very much at the margin.  
EM-2 was a male Maya, 53 years of age, had completed escula secundaria (9 years), and had 
been running a enterprise based on production and sale of clothes (suits, pants, padded 
jackets) for the last 32 years. He was undoubtedly prosperous in his function. His large 
shop where all his products were sold, was centrally located in downtown Quetzaltenango.  
Neither his children nor his wife worked in his enterprise. Like all the other enterprises 
(with exception of EM-4), the enterprise was debt-free. The entrepreneur told me that 
while he was positive to pro-Maya points of view in private, this did not influence him in 
his business dealings. As he stated it, half of his working staff  of six (including himself) 
was Ladinos. 
  The reality, however, was proven to be very different when I later paid his workshop a 
surprise visit, while he was not present, and talked directly with his workers.  His 
enterprise consisted of, not six, but 13 persons (including the owner). Eight made padded 
jackets in the workshop attached to his shop, and four made suits in their homes. With the 
exception of two junior persons in the workshop - referred to as assistants - all the workers 
had a sewing machine at their disposal, including those working at home. In the latter case, 
the machines were simpler, probably hand- or foot-driven, and were paid and owned by 
the workers themselves. The salaries of the workers in the workshop were not Q800 per 
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month as I had been told by the owner, but Q600-Q700. Since making suits was a more 
demanding task, according to the worker I talked with, and the homeworkers have their 
own machines, they - all men - supposedly had a higher salary.  The age of the personnel 
working in the workshop was 15-25 years, while those working in their homes were older 
and more experienced, 25-30. The workshop was well laid out and gave the impression of 
being efficient and well organized. 
EM-3 was a male Maya, 70 years of age, had completed escula primaria (6 years), and had 
been running a well-known, stable - and now, prosperous - enterprise based on production 
of fine shoes for men, for the last 42 years. The shoes were delivered to shops in 
Guatemala City on volume-per-week contracts.  He did the more complicated work on the 
upper part of the shoes himself, using the modern machines of his workshop, and farmed 
out the rest of the work to 26 Maya workers who did their part by hand in their homes. He 
said that he was very conscious about using only Maya workers in his production, because, 
as he stated it, Mayans needed help, but he did not differentiate on ethnic ground in his 
other business dealings.  He was active in a Maya organization, Xelaju (which doubles as 
the political machine of the present Maya mayor of Quetzaltenango). A scrutiny of 
numbers he gave me, made me skeptical to part of the information I was given.  However, 
those parts of the information I have faith in, after having checked it with other sources, 
has been included in the following discussion.   
EM-4 was a male Maya, 50 years of age, with escula secondaria (6+3 years), and had been 
running an enterprise based on production of clothes (jackets, pants, etc.) for the last 20 
years. However, due to a swindle where a contractor did not pay his debt, he had to start 
over again. His enterprise employed two employees (Maya girls), his son (after school), 
and himself. He sold his production from a sales desk in his cramped, rented workshop. He 
was married with six children, all getting a university education.  He had a total debt of 
Q26,000 to a lending institution, including debt from a recent purchase of new second-
hand sewing machines, to be paid back in one year. There was a garantia hipotecaria on 
his private home (see Chapter 5 where formal lending is discussed). He did not distinguish 
on ethnicity in his business, but had a positive attitude to Mayanist ideas and strong 
opinions against what he called the exploitation of Mayans in the society. Contrary to the 
other entrepreneurs I talked with, he continued working during the interview, and gave the 
impression of being a focused and hard-working man who had fallen on hard ground.  
EM-5 was an energetic, very focused male Maya, 39 years of age, with escuela primaria (6 
years), and was married with four children. For the last 12 years he had been running an 
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enterprise making shoes for men, women and children. At present he employed 10 people, 
including his wife, five working in a house next to his, both properties w/land owned by 
him, and  the other five in their own homes. The two groups did the same kind of work, 
though the former had access to his machines. From being an employee in the shoe 
business, he had started out on his own with one machine he got from his family, which 
was working in the same economic activity. After eight years he bought his first first-hand 
machine (price Q13,000) and recently he had bought another two first-hand machines 
(price 4,000 and Q3,000), with loans from different lending organizations. At the moment 
he was without debt. He had not paid taxes for the last three years and, as the custom was, 
paid no welfare security costs for his workers. Because of what he called “an error in the 
municipality”, EM-5 had paid no taxes in the last three years and he, like the rest, paid no 
social security or insurance for his work force. Like EM-8, he did most of his economic 
transactions in cash, evading checks and other documentable means as best he could. EM-
5 drove a shiny and well-kept Mazda sedan, model 1992, owned two fair-sized lots with 
property on, including the one with his own large, comfortable house. And even when he 
labeled himself as an workaholic, by his own account he did not work more than the 
normal work-day 5½ days per week. 
EM-6 was a male Maya, 57 years of age, with escuela primaria (6 years). He was married with 
four children, 2 girls and 2 boys. For the last 25 years he had operated a carpentry, that 
employed 6 persons, all young Mayans, in addition to himself and his two sons.  He and 
the family members had sympathy for the Maya activist ideas, but these did not influence 
their business decisions.  His workshop made products of wood like chairs, tables, frames, 
etc. on ad hoc basis for medium-sized whole-sale merchants. He trained his workers in his 
workshop, but had a high turn-over; typically,  his workers stayed there only one year.  
The large workshop, somewhat disorganized, was well equipped with machinery and 
technical installations, and his family lived in a spacious new house adjacent to the yard. 
He was the only one who stated that he took up loans with his family, always only for a 
few months’ duration and interest-free. He seemed to be doing quite well. Some of the 
numeric data he gave me, were unreliable. Other parts were trustworthy and are used in 
the following discussion.    
EM-7 was a male Maya, 52 years of age, had a university education as both an chemical 
engineer and a psychologist and had been running an enterprise, producing children’s 
clothes, for the last 15 years.  He was married with five children, two from an earlier 
marriage, but none of the family members worked in his workshop. A workshop, 
50 
connected to the house of his family, employed eight women. In addition he had four more 
women working for him in their own home.  Of the twelve female employees, ten were 
Mayans.  He paid his workshop workers low wages, Q650 per month.  All his workers had 
machines at their disposal.  An unfriendly atmosphere governed the spacious, well-
organized workshop when I visited the place together with the owner.  The entrepreneur 
mentioned that he had problems with the productivity and the motivation of his workers.  
EM-8 was a very focused and dynamic Maya and was - in contrast to all the other entrepreneurs 
- a woman. She was 34 years of age and was in her second marriage, with three children.  
She had a university degree in psychology. She ran an enterprise, which, at present, 
employed 2 Maya employees and 2 members of her family, making pan tipicos (called 
roscas). The enterprise had been started by her grandparents, had been taken over by her 
parents and was now under her. Her products were transported in big crates by car, owned 
by friends who were hired for task, to public fiestas all over Guatemala.  Her clients would 
be public officials, but she would do her financial transactions in cash, not with checks. 
Her workers were paid by volume produced and their salary would oscillate between Q400 
and Q800/Q1,000, depending on the demand of the market.  For the same reason, her staff 
would sometimes increase with two more employees.  She paid a modest tax per year, 
Q1,500, no social security for her workers, and kept no paperwork of her economic 
transactions.  
EM-9 was a male Maya, 43 years of age, from Quetzaltenango, as the rest, who ended his 
schooling after five years in primaria. He was married with eight children. He had been 
making shoes (moccasins) for the last 15 years, at present together with two of his sons 
(14 and 22 years) and one adult employee in a shed behind his primitive house.  The 
employee was paid Q200-Q250 per week. At the moment he was idle because he could not 
raise money for raw material for the next batch of shoes.  He had taken up loans twice 
before with FUNDESPE, each time Q5-6,000 which he paid back over 18 months, and 
with his house as collateral.  He sold his products to vendedores in mercados at the coast. 
He paid no taxes. His main problems was the competition in his area and capital up front 
for purchasing his materials. He had one sewing machine, bought new at a price of Q1,200 
for two years ago.  His place was a miserable sight and even though his product seemed all 
right at first glance, he himself classified them as low-quality. 
EM-10 was a male Maya, 54 years of age, had studied three years at university level, and was 
running a shoe making workshop for women’s shoes with three experienced employees, 
two Mayans and one  Ladino. All the work was done by hand.  In addition to the workshop 
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was a small shop, which EM-10 tended, where he sold his production of 30 pairs of shoes 
per week.  His salaries were low, Q100-Q125 per week, but his workers had stayed with 
him for two or more years.  The enterprise was 16 years old. Before it was started, the 
owner worked as an employee himself.  The reason for working by hand was that he had 
not enough production to buy machines.  His contact with the financial institutions, 
therefore, were absent.  His main problems were both a tight market and competition. 
These drove down the price on his products, which he sold for Q40-Q50 per pair.   
EM-11 was a male Maya, 66 years of age, and had been running a workshop doing paint-work 
on cars for the last 35 years. He had finished school after escuela primaria.  He was 
married with six children, but none of them worked in his shop. He had seven employees, 
all Mayans.  The salaries he paid was higher than all other places I had visited, probably 
because of the more specialized work, and his workers stayed with him typically for years. 
Three of his workers earned Q2,000, one Q1,500 and three Q1,000. He was the only one I 
talked with, who paid work insurance for his workers. One of his workers had a licenciado 
degree in business administration, but earned more money doing car work than in his other 
profession.  Some of his machinery, primarily compressors, were costly, up to Q50,000 
new.  Some of the jobs he was doing, paint and bodywork on cars, would imply a price tag 
for the final job of up to Q40,000 and above.  His workshop looked unorganized and of 
low productivity, but his economy sounded solid. His main problem, he said, was alcohol 
misuse among his workers.   
EL-1 was a male Ladino, 46 years of age, married with three children who owned an enterprise 
making shoes for woman. The enterprise employed four workers and himself. The 
workers’ salaries were set according to each worker’s production with Q10 per pair of 
shoes. His weekly production was 24-30 pair of shoes per week, but each person’s output 
varied greatly due to variable workday. He claimed his profit per pair of shoes was around 
Q6-Q8 (the same EM-5 had claimed).  And he meant that the cost of materials per pair of 
shoes could sum up to Q35.  His workshop, where only one worker was active when I 
visited it, had some machines, but not the fancy “edge-cutting ones” for the hide EM-3 and 
EM-5 proudly had shown me in their workshops. He meant the market was variable with 
nine good and three bad months of sale. Ethnicity played no role in his business practice 
and was of no importance to him privately.     
EL-2 was a male Ladino, 27 years of age, unmarried,  who owned an auto workshop for paint 
and mechanical jobs together with his father. He, his brother and father worked in the 
workshop, together with two employees, both Ladinos, which looked very much like EM-
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11’s car shop enterprise.  As with EM-11, the salaries were high, Q400-Q500 per week, 
and the workers stayed with the enterprise typically for years. His education was Bachiller 
Industrial, i.e., graduated at the level of escuela diversificada (see Table 6.2).  He had 
started to work in the workshop as young boy.  He had no ethnic preferences in his 
business dealings and did not find the topic of ethnicity important.  
EL-3 was a male Ladino, 47 years of age and Licenciado in accounting from the university.  His 
enterprise which he had operated for fifteen years, made bridal dresses and was sold in his 
two shops in downtown Quetzaltenango together with other female clothes he both from 
other producers. He had seven employees, three working in his bridal dress factory and 
four in his shops.  They were part Ladinos and part Mayans. Ethnicity had no importance 
to him, neither in his business nor privately.  He paid “minimum “ salary (Q600) to his 
workers, with exception of the manager of his other shop, who got Q1000.  He basically 
had no problems in running his shop. Seasonal variation was experienced towards the end 
of the year.  
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The Entrepreneurs - A Perspective 
Table 3.1   
A synopsis of  information on the entrepreneurs  
and their enterprises 
 
1                   2                 3                             4               5                  6                       7     
#    Age         Education                Enterprise    No of           Family              Activity 
                          operative   workers,      working in    sector  
                                             (yr.)      incl. owner    enterprise                           .                                             
 
Clothes 
EM-1 40 Licenciado, econ. 15-20 3½ E + 1½ Sweaters 
EM-2+ 53 Secondaria* 32 13 E only Clothes 
EM-4 50 Secondaria 20 3½ E + ½ Clothes 
EM-7+ 52 Chem. engineer 15 13 E only Clothes 
  and psychologist 
EL-3+ 47 Licenciado (Account.) 15  8 E only   Bridal dress
      prod./shops 
Shoes 
EM-3+ 70 Primaria 42 27 E only Shoes 
EM-5+ 39 Primaria 12 11 E + 1 Shoes 
EM-9 43 5 years of primaria 15 3½ E+1½ Shoes 
EM-10 54 3 years at university 16 3½ E (=½)/ Shoes/  
      small shop 
EL-1 46 Primaria 15 5 E only Shoes 
 
Carpentry 
EM-6 57 Primaria 25   9 E+2 Carpentry 
 
Food 
EM-8 34 Psychologist *** 5 E+2 Food** 
 
Car repair 
EM-11 66 Primaria 35  8 E only Car paint 
EL-2 27 Bachiller Industrial 10 5 E+2 Car paint 
.                                                           . 
/  The owner seemed to spend most (all?) of his time in the shop and not in the  
 production of his workshop. 
*  See Table 6.2 for a description of the basic educational system of Guatemala 
+  Indicates a highly successful entrepreneur 
**  Rosacas (pan tipico) 
***  Took over enterprise operated by parents and grandparents 
Comments: E stands for entrepreneur. The sign of ½ in column 6 indicates part-time worker. 
 
The information on the entrepreneurs and their enterprises presented in the section above, is 
compiled and grouped in Table 3.1 according to the activity sector the individual enterprise 
belongs to. Information that stands out, has been highlighted. The entrepreneurs were sampled 
from five different areas of economic activity, with the majority from clothes and shoe 
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production. The latter result was not intentionally, but it reflects the strong positions of these 
activities in Quetzaltenango. Besides representing different economic activities, the sample also 
exemplifies different managerial schemes used by the entrepreneurs (column 7), i.e., a 
productive enterprise with or without a shop etc. This part will be discussed in Chapter 5 in 
relation to productivity factors that may influence the enterprises. 
 Table 3.1 identifies the entrepreneurs with a code as described above (column 1).  
Column 2 gives the age of the entrepreneurs. Column 3 lists the education of the each 
entrepreneur. In the following columns are given the number of years the enterprise has been in 
operation, the number of workers including the owner, the number of family member employed 
in the activity, and finally the activity sector of the enterprise.  
 One observation of Table 3.1 that stands out is the wide spread of educational 
background among the entrepreneurs and the large proportion of entrepreneurs with high 
education, see column 3. (For a description of the Guatemalan school system, see Table 6.2.) 
The observation is summed up in Table 3.2 and will be discussed later. Continuing the 
discussion of the data in Table 3.1, its column 2 shows that the majority of the entrepreneurs, 
including both Mayans and Ladinos, are between 40 and 70 years of age. The two youngest, 
EM-8 and EL-2, had both recently taken over the ownership of their enterprise from their 
parents. In the latter case, the father was still part-owner. Ignoring these two cases, all the 
entrepreneurs themselves had started their enterprise and had run it for a considerable number of 
years - in average 20 years (Table 3.1, column 4). This fact probably explains the high 
proportion of success stories in my data.  
 The sign of ½ in Table 3.1, column  6, indicates contribution of part-time work from a 
family member, in all cases one of the children doing half-day work in the enterprise after 
school. That information discloses a strong correlation between the lack of economic success of 
the enterprise and the need for putting the children to work part-time outside school hours. This 
becomes clear when one considers the cases of EM-1, EM-4 and EM-9 who all are at the low 
end of the greasy pole. EM-1, in addition, draws on his wife.  The same does EM-3, but not out 
of necessity.  Ignoring EM-1, EM-4 and EM-9, among the rest of the entrepreneurs seven run 
their enterprise without help from their family and four employ one or more adult relatives full-
time.   
 I will discuss the aspect of education among the entrepreneurs, shown in column 2 of 
Table 3.. This also shows my subjective evaluation of the economic success of the individual 
entrepreneur based on my visual inspection of the workshop and, when possible, the 
entrepreneur’s living quarter.  Obviously successful entrepreneurs have been marked with a plus 
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sign  in column 1 of Table 3.1 and other tables with a similar lay-out.  This evaluation is slightly 
more detailed in  Table 4.1.   
 
Table 3.2  
Educational level and economic success of   
the interviewees. 
 
ETHNICITY                   EDUCATION   
.   Primaria Secundaria Diversificada University        .               
 
Mayans 4 + 1* 2  3 + 1*  
Highly successful 2 1 1 
 
Ladinos 1  1 1 
Highly successful    1 
.                                                   __.       
 * Not completed the education 
 COMMENT: An overview of the Guatemalan school system is given in Table 6.2. 
 
Among the eleven Maya entrepreneurs that were interviewed, nearly half had terminated their 
formal education with escuela primaria (or less), but three had graduated with a university 
degree at the level of Licenciado. In addition, one (EM-10) had spent three years at the 
university without graduating with a degree. Among the three Ladinos, a similar diversity ruled. 
Referring to Table 3.2, however, the data show that there is no obvious correlation between the 
individuals’ education and their success as an entrepreneur. Two of the entrepreneurs who 
produce shoes, EM-3 and EM-5, have the lowest education among the interviewees, primaria (6 
years), but do very well. And so does EM-2 in his sector, also with a short formal education 
(secundaria, 8 years).  In contrast, one of the two entrepreneurs who enjoy the smallest gain on 
their effort in the clothes activity, i.e., EM-1, is among those with the longest education, i.e. 
being a Licenciado. If the length of the entrepreneur’s practice is introduced, using Table 3.1 
(column 4), it is no indicator of economic success, either - except for the fact that the enterprise 
is still in operation.   
 The above-mentioned comments, however, are only one part of the conclusion that can 
be extracted from Table 3.2. The data indicate indirectly, though on very limited data, that those 
who have a long education has an advantage. Since very few Guatemalans acquire a university 
degree  and there is no reason to believe that university graduates disproportionally should 
establish productive enterprises in the informal sector, then Table 3.2 indeed show that 
entrepreneurs with a distinctly higher education have a definitely higher success rate. That 




The discussion on methodology above should indicate that the identification of potential 
interviewees was not an easy task, a fact which raises the question of representativity of my 
sample. As mentioned, Vital (1999) had carried out a mapping of all productive enterprises in 
the municipality of Quetzaltenango with five or fewer workers. His data, however, were in the 
process of being processed and in his survey he did not distinguish between Ladinos and Maya 
entrepreneurs. Some of the information of Table 3.1 lends itself to the assumption that the 
sample is not representative.  For example, the length of time the enterprises had been operative 
were long, and the proportion of successful units among them were high. However, given the 
qualitative nature of this study, it will be clear during the discussion of the findings that none of 




Earnings and Capital Accumulation in the Informal Sector 
 
 In Chapter 1 I discussed some aspects of the informal sector that have been debated in the 
academic literature over the last decade, among them the question whether or not capital 
accumulation takes place in the informal sector and the wage structure of various informal 
activity sectors. In this chapter I will present those of my findings that address these two topics. 
I start out with discussing the salary structure of workers. Secondly, I use production data that I 
acquired from the entrepreneurs and estimate their take-home earnings in those cases where I 
had sufficient data. Finally, using the earnings of the owners of some of the enterprises and 
combining these with the size of the activity (measured in number of employees) and the total 
number of productive enterprises in Quetzaltenango, I estimate the total annual capital 
accumulation in the informal sector of the region.   
  
SALARIES OF INFORMAL WORKERS 
Table 4.1 comprises information on a number of aspects of the enterprises in the sample.    The 
entrepreneurs have been listed in a way that conforms with the set-up of Table 3.1, and 
information that stands out has been highlighted. The content of the table will briefly be 
described before the next main topics of this section - wages in the informal sector - is discussed 
in a wider context. 
 Table 4.1, column 2, shows salary paid to workshop workers by the enterprise. EM-1 was 
not willing to identify the salary of his young apprentice. EM-2 mentioned that he paid those of 
his workers, who did their work in their own home, Q1,000-1,200 per week. However, since the 
homeworkers, without exception, are paid by the units produced and may be working more than 
the regular 44 hours per week that is typical for workshop workers, their salaries may not be 
comparable with the rest.  This part of the work force, therefore, has not been included in the 
table. Column 3 indicates the nature of the entrepreneur’s relationship with the authorities. It is 
very relaxed for all with exception of two that had no contact. For those who had, the liaison 
meant that their accounting papers on produced goods were controlled a few times per year.  
 The question of column 4 was included to check the validity, with respect to Guatemala, 
of the claim made in Rakowski (1994) that many international and national institutions offer 
financial and technical help to microenterprises in the informal sector. As the table indicates, 
none of the entrepreneurs in this study had been approached or heard about such initiatives.  
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Table 4.1  
Miscellaneous aspects of the  
enterprises contacted 
 
 1                    2                    3              4               5                   6                          7  
#             Workshop       Contact    Offers of     Market           Most       Standard of 
          salary/mth*          with      external   condition       important         enterprise 
            (quetzal)      authorities     help      over years       problem          (my assessment) 
 
Clothes 
EM-1 No data  Relaxed None Stable Get employees Strained 
EM-2+ 600-700/  Relaxed None Stable Get employees Very comfort. 
EM-4 800  Relaxed None Stable Competition Very Strained 
EM-7+ 650  Relaxed None Variable Bad work ethics Comfortable 
       among workers   
EL-3+ 600  Relaxed None Stable None Very comfort. 
  
Shoes 
EM-3+ 1,000-1,200? Relaxed None Stable Get employees Very comfort. 
EM-5+ 850-1,000  Absent None Stable Get employees Very comfort. 
EM-9 800-1,000  Absent None Very var. Capital, Very miserable 
       competition 
EM-10   400-500  Relaxed None Variable Competition Tolerable 
EL-1 No data  Absent None Seasonal None  Comfortable 
 
Carpentry 
EM-6 1120?  Relaxed None Variable None Comfortable 
 
Food 
EM-8 400-800  Relaxed None Very var. None Comfortable 
 
Car repair 
EM-11  1,000-2,000 Relaxed None Stable Alcohol misuse Comfortable 
       among workers   
EL-2 1,200-2,000 Relaxed None      Stable          None             Comfortable 
.                                      . 
* 44 hours per week ** See the following text   ? Reason for doubt (**) 
/  Influence of seasonal sale variations on salary. The salary refer to workshop workers only.  
 For homeworkers, see text. 
+ Indicates a highly successful entrepreneur, as in Table 3.1. 
 
Column 5 shows how the entrepreneur had felt the market situation over the last few years.  It is 
worth noting that the large majority of the entrepreneurs found the market situation for their 
products stable and quite satisfactory. In my opinion, most of those who raised grievances when 
they were prodded, most likely belong to that category too. Exception has to be made for EM-9 
who was in a semi-permanent bad economical situation because he could not raise funds to buy 
leather for his shoe production and EM-4 who carried a significant debt due to a fraudulent 
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business relationship. Others, due to the kind of production they did, experienced a variable 
market situation (EM-8). 
 Column 6 indicates what the entrepreneur experienced as his main problem (without 
being prodded by me).  Even though only four entrepreneurs explicitly mentioned the problem 
of finding employees as their main annoyance, a large majority brought it up as a prevailing 
headache.  To which extent this was due to a tight labor market in general, unreasonable 
demands by the employer for previous relevant practice, salary offers below the expectations of 
the job seekers, or a combination of these, I was not able to determine. The hard-pressed 
entrepreneurs, i.e., particularly EM-4 and EM-10, not to mention EM-9 who was out of business 
when we met, complained about the competition from other producers as their main problem. I 
will return to their situation when I discuss productivity factors in Chapter 5. The complaint of 
EM-7, bad work ethics among his workers, tells more about how he looked upon and treated his 
workers than about the workers themselves.  He ran what most likely could be called a 
sweatshop, paid miserly wages and had a tense relationship to his workers, who all were 
women, while he himself was doing quite well economically.  
 Column 7 indicates how the entrepreneur’s general economic situation and material 
standard subjectively was judged by me. This information has been translated into a sign ‘+’ in 
column 1 of all the tables with the same lay-out as Table 4.1 and was referred to in the 
discussion of the data of Table 3.2. Interesting to observe was that there was a close correlation 
between the degree of self-confidence - and at times, proudness - expressed by the owner in his 
encounter with me and my assessment of the success of his enterprise. It is typical that EM-4 
who was not in a good economical situation, was the only one who worked intensely while I 
carried out the interview. With exception of EM-3 who had a tendency to inflate the image of 
himself, I increasingly allowed the conduct of the entrepreneur, when he introduced me to 
matters I could assess independently, to influence my confidence in other information he gave 
me, which not so easily could be verified. In the following I will discuss how my numbers on 
salaries as given in Table 4.1 stand up against other data that have been reported. The size of the 
sample of my study is too small to establish a general conclusion on the wages in the informal 
sector of the city of Quetzaltenango. Also, my numbers has a spread which, I believe, is in part 
due to conscious desinformation at the hand of the entrepreneur and in part - more important - 
due to seasonal variations as a result of oscillations in market demand. However, it will be 
shown that my data on salaries are solid enough to allow for  qualitative generalizations. 
 An analysis of the data of Table 4.1, column 2, shows that there is a clustering of values 
between a low monthly salary of Q650 (refer EM-7) and a high salary into the interval of Q850-
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Q1,000. The values of EM-3 and EM-6 are excluded for reasons given in the text  It is worth 
comparing the salary level found in my data with the salaries of workers in 269 formal 
industries in the Region VI of Guatemala, reported by Vital (1997:23). Vital calculates that 43.6 
percent of these workers earned Q401-Q600, 25.7 percent Q600-Q800, 14.1 percent Q801-
Q1,000, 7.1 percent Q1,001-Q1,200, 4.1 percent Q1,201-Q1,400, and 5.3 percent Q1,401-
Q2,600 per month.  This comprises the full work force, meaning that nobody earned above 
Q2,600 per month.  With a supposed salary compensation of half the annual inflation of  8-10 
percent per year the last two years, I will use a value of 5 percent per year, a large part of my 
salary data compares well with the first and largest salary bracket in Vital’s data. One may 
conclude that on this very limited data - all precautions considered - that the labor salaries of the 
informal sector in Quetaltenango are comparable with labor salaries of the formal sector of the 
region. It is worth noting that a number of studies listed by De Oliveira and Roberts (1994:58), 
mentioned in Chapter 1, conclude that in Mexico by the 1970s there were only marginal wage 
differences between informal and formal workers.  
 There is quite a good overlap between my data in Table 4.1 and the independent data on 
salaries in the informal sector of Quetzaltenango given in Table 4.2 (courtesy of Lic. Rossana 
Fernández), strengthening the over-all confidence in my results. Inquires I did supported the 
information I had been given by Lic. Rossana Fernández. If my data in the high end, those in the 
bracket of Q850-Q1,000, should reflect high values due to seasonal-dependent wages, 
something I will discuss in connection with the take-home earnings of EM-2, the average salary 
over the year for these values would be lower and results in a near-perfect match between the 
wage values of Tables 4.2 and 4.1 on an annual basis. Unfortunately, the information if this is 
the case, was not available to me. 
 One may speculate if a contributing factor in closing the gap between the formal and the 
informal labor cost in Quetzaltenango is a tight labor market, something most of the 
entrepreneurs in this study complained about. However, since the unemployment in Guatemala 
is high - numbers in the range of 25-30 percent and above have been quoted to me and Q’uo’ 
Kumatz-Menmagua (1999:27) states that 47.3 percent of the Guatemalan workers are 
unemployed or under-employed - a buyer’s market rules, implying that the labor market is not 
determined by supply and demand. In addition to low salaries, workers in the informal sector 
face the ever-present threat of job insecurity. 
 The discussion on the take-home earnings of entrepreneur EM-2 that follows, will bring 
up the question whether or not seasonal fluctuations in sale of the enterprise’s products have 
influence on the salary of informal workers. This study will conclude that is does. In my 
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interview with EM-2, he gave considerable higher values for the salaries he paid his workshop 
workers than what the workers themselves told me when I paid the workshop a surprise visit 
without the presence of EM-2. I have explained the discrepancy in the information I was given 
at this occasion by proposing that EM-2 pays sale- or seasonally-adjusted wages and that the 
two parties informed on the salary in the workshop with reference to different times of the year. 
I found no reason for why the EM-2’s workshop workers should give me numbers for their 
salaries that was higher than what they received. However, I believe that it is quite likely that 
EM-2 may have been tempted “to look good” in the eyes of the interviewer and inflate his 
numbers for that purpose.  
 That informal salaries should be linked to the demand of the market are not unexpected 
when the idea first is born. From the employer’s point of view that scheme may be seen as a 
logical extension of tying the salary of the worker to the worker’s productivity, particularly in 
the context of the merciless and exploitative economic climate that rules in the informal sector. 
Unfortunately, the academic literature leaves the impression that fixed salaries is the rule. The 
reason may be that the way the uninformed interviewers phrase their questions, as I did myself 
initially during the fieldwork of this study, determines the outcome of the inquire.  
 Trying out my new insight in later interviews, I got support for my assumption that 
season-dependent salaries indeed were used. For example,  EM-8 made clear that she paid 
salaries according to the production of her enterprise, i.e., in response to the market demand. 
She paid as low as Q400 per month in low-activity months and a high of Q800-Q1,000 in busy 
months. In addition she would respond to swings in the demand of the market by hiring and 
firing personnel, while keeping a permanent core of family members on her payroll.  My sample 
is not large enough to offer an iron-clad conclusion on how wide-spread the use of sale-
dependent wages is, but the beautiful logic of the scheme, seen from the informal employer’ 
standpoint, would indicate that it probably is wide-spread 
 The discussion of this section transmits two strong messages: first, in spite of the Maya 
entrepreneur’s attraction to the ideas of a Maya identity, something I will document in Chapter 
6, there exists no ethnic solidarity between the Maya entrepreneur and the Maya worker in 
business matters. The Maya worker is uncompassionately taken advantage of by his Maya - and, 
supposedly, also his Ladino - master in the form of low wages, hard work discipline and job 
insecurity.  And, secondly, the entrepreneur who uses sale or seasonally adjusted wages, lets the 
workers feel the full impact of  the seasonal fluctuations either by reductions in salary or by lay-
off - or both. My impression was that this situation is more the rule than the exception, both 
laterally (among different economic activities) and vertically (both small and large enterprises).   
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 To quote salaries in the informal sector as, say, the top and bottom earning paid at a set 
time within a certain economic activity,  does not make sense if the information does not 
identify to which extent external factors make the salary  bracket oscillate during the year. Due 
to lack of capital and therefore the abhorrence of tying up capital unnecessary, the practice of 
producing for storage in the low season, was not much used in the informal sector of Guatemala. 
 It was mentioned earlier that Wormald and Rozas (1996) had reported from Chile that 
garment workers earned the least in the informal sector. A close look at the salary numbers of 
Table 4.1 indicates that one may draw the same conclusion for Guatemala, ignoring the seasonal 
aspect discussed above. The clothes producing entrepreneurs (EM-2, EM-7 and EL-3) 
dominates the low end of the reported salaries, together with EM-8 who, however, paid salaries 
from Q400 to Q800 (and sometimes more) and EM-10 who had low productivity in his 
enterprise and therefore(?) paid salaries well below his fellow shoe entrepreneurs. EM-4, paying 
salaries of Q800, is the only one of the clothes entrepreneurs who is at the level of the shoe 
producers - with the aforementioned comment on EM-10 in mind.   
 I will later show that while the clothes activity pays the lowest salaries, it is also the 
activity sector where the take-home earnings for its entrepreneurs are distinctly the highest 
among the five sectors that were sampled.  
 As a backdrop for the discussion on salaries in the informal sector and a comparison 
between wages in the formal and the informal sector, an overview of salaries in different formal 
positions in the region of Quetzaltenango is given in Table 4.2 which follows.  
 All the entries in Table 4.2 refer to the formal sector, with exception of the first. Positions 
in banks are attractive, not the least because of the fringe benefits, but superior positions in 
banks are traditionally paid low in comparison with similar ranked governmental jobs.  The 
table shows that the Government takes well cares of its employees, offering them good salaries, 
pension and long vacations. The difference between salaries for teachers in private and public 
schools is glaring.   As one would expect, the salaries in the informal sector are the lowest, 
though, this study has recorded salaries even lower than those reported here.  
 
EARNINGS AMONG INFORMAL ENTREPRENEURS 
The entrepreneurs contacted in this study gave no direct indications of their own personal take-
home earnings. However, using the production data that I got from the entrepreneur and 
combining these with other information, gave a reliable basis to offer estimates of the 
profitability of some of the enterprises. Data I got from five of the entrepreneurs were extensive 
and coherent enough, or could be controlled by other sources, to estimate their annual take-
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home earnings. The calculations are given in the following subsections. With reference to the 
term take-home earnings it is emphasized that expenses like cost of housing, electricity, taxes 
etc. have been ignored in the calculations. With exception of taxes, none of these numbers are 
known. The reason for excluding the one that could have been a significant expenditure, the cost 
of housing, is that all the interviewees worked in their own housing and had no significant debt 
(with exception of EM-4, on both counts), meaning that their housing already had been paid for. 
The other expenses are deemed to small to have any impact on the results.  The calculations 
which follow, lean strongly towards a conservative estimate of the take-home earnings. The 
entrepreneurs’ information has been used, but in some cases the estimates build on ‘common 
sense’ assumptions whose full relevance to the individual case could not be verified. 
 
Table 4.2 
Examples of salaries in Quetzaltenango in mid-year 1999,  
quetzals/month (Source: Lic. Rossana Fernández). 
*  Workers in the informal sector Q600 - Q800 
 No benefits. Salary dependent on the individual’s productivity. 
 May depend on seasonal variations in the demand of the market. 
*  Clerks in banks Q1,200 - Q1,400 
 Two weeks’ paid vacation 
*  Bank superiors Q2,000 - Q3,000 
 Traditionally, a restricted salary 
*   Teachers, public schools Q1,400 - Q1,800 
 Health service offered and 2 months’ vacation 
*  Clerks: municipality/government Q800 - Q1,200 
 Work hours 8:00-12:00 and 2:00-4:30 
*  Superiors in the government Q2,000 - Q6,000 
 The upper level may supervise 30-40 persons 
*  Policeman (Policia Civil) Q1,500 - Q2,000 
*  Police superiors around Q3,000 
*  University professors (regular) Q2,500 - Q3,000 
 Licenciado (i.e. a US Bachelor) or a Master 
*  Doctors and dentists, government  around Q6,000 
 Professionals will have private practice on the side.  
* Parliament representative Q20,000 - 24,000 
.  . 
COMMENT: The rate of the quetzal at mid-1999  was Q6.70 to a US dollar.) 
  
Take-Home Earnings Of EM-1 (Low-Quality Sweaters)   
An estimate of the monthly take-home earnings of entrepreneur EM-1 and his wife combined, 
indicates a net gain (after labor and material cost of their products) of Q3,389  (= $464) per 
month, equivalent to an hourly salary of Q9.63 per hour in a 44-hours workweek. On an annual 
basis, the take-home earnings is Q40,668 (=$5,571). These are: EM-1 has no more than three of 
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his four knitting machines in operation at any one time; the workshop works at 50 percent 
efficiency in a 44-hours workweek; only three of the 3½ workers are effective; it takes one hour 
or less to make one sweater (source: EM-1); the hired hand gets a salary of Q650 per month; the 
average sales price for the sweaters in the shop is Q90 (source: EM-1); the material cost is 15 
percent of the shop price; and the entrepreneur receives 20 percent of the shop price after 
material cost (Lic. Fernández’s estimate).   
 The numbers imply a production of 66 sweaters per week, each of a gain, before labor 
cost, of Q15.30. That the above assumptions indeed indicate a  conservative estimate,  is shown 
by the fact that EM-1’s gain on the hired hand is not more than 107 percent of the hand’s salary. 
EM-1’s economic situation is better than marginal, as Table 4.2 shows, but he generates no 
economic surplus. 
 
Take-Home Earnings Of EM-2 (Padded Jackets/Suits)  
EM-2’s workshop had 8 workers, including two assistants, who made only padded jackets. 
Assuming, as in the calculation on EM-1’s operation, that the staff of  (effectively) 6 workers 
are productive only half the time, each making a jacket every two hours (I was told it varies 
between one and 1½ hour depending on the design) during a workweek of 44 hours, the weekly 
production will be 66 jackets.  The range of the shop price for the jackets is Q180 - Q250, 
depending on the quality of the material used (I will use Q200), which gives a gross sales value 
per week of Q13,200. From this has to be subtracted the material cost per jacket (range: Q25 -
50; I will use a high average cost of Q45 to include other possible costs, giving a weekly 
material cost of Q2,970) and the salary of the worker  (salaries are Q600-Q700 per month; using 
an average of Q670, the weekly cost of the total staff  of 8 persons is Q1,340). This estimation 
concludes that the owner’s take-home earnings per week from his workshop is Q8,890 on an 
average production of 66 padded jackets per week, after salary and material costs.  From the 
sale of an average jacket, the workers will get Q20 and the owner Q135. Even when the market 
demand, in the low season, would not allow the owner to maintain a sale of more than, say, one 
half of that, i.e., 33 jackets per week, while keeping his work force, he still would carry home 
Q3,775 per week.  In this case, the workers, assuming a fixed salary, will take out of each jacket 
sold, Q41, and the owner’s gain per jacket drops to Q114. 
 The discrepancy between the information given by EM-2 and by the workers on the 
salary of the latter,  may be explained by the possibility that, perhaps, the salaries are depending 
on the variations in the market demand, and that the parties  gave the salary with reference to 
different times of the year - EM-2 with the possible motivation of looking good in the 
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interviewer’s eyes.  The time of my second visit to EM-2’s enterprise, in the middle of the 
summer in Quetzaltenango, was obviously low season for padded jackets. Supporting my 
assumption of a demand-dependent production, the worker I talked with, said that the time 
before Christmas was very busy. That is the time when the temperatures may dip below freezing 
and padded jackets are back in vogue, though they are useful around the year due to 
Quetzaltenango’s location at 2,300 meters.  
 From another workshop that also produced padded jackets, I was told that a worker 
would make 12-14 jackets per week and earn Q20 per jacket, giving a salary of Q1,040 per 
month in average in the case of 13 jackets per week.  That is a productivity higher than implied 
by the example above, where the six (effective) workers make only 11 jackets each per week in 
the high season, and even have the support of two assistants Using that salary scheme on EM-
2’s workshop instead of fixed salaries, EM-2 weekly take-home earnings in high season (66 
jackets) would be Q8,575, and in low season (33 jackets) Q4,120. It is assumed that EM-2 pays 
the two assistants out of his gain. The workers’ salaries will swing from Q1,040 in the high 
season to Q520 in the low season. These last estimates differ with, respectively, -3.5 and +9.1 
percent from the numbers calculated by the other salary scheme and is close enough to support 
the previous estimation. To get a conservative estimate of  EM-2’s annual take-home earnings, I 
will use the first numbers.   
 Assuming that EM-2 has four months (16 weeks) with high sale and eight (36 weeks) 
with low, his take-home earnings in a year from the workshop alone, is Q278,140 - equivalent to 
$38,101 (Q7.30 per $, as of June/July 1999).  As indicated, this is a highly conservative 
estimate, but it builds on a number of assumptions which can not be verified. Particularly the 
assumption that EM-2 is able to sell his production, play in. However, even with considerable 
errors in the assumptions used, it is obvious that there is room for a significant capital 
accumulation in workshops of EM-2’s kind.   
 The four workers who work for EM-2 and make suits in their homes - all Maya men, 25-
30 years of age - are paid, similar to the workshop workers, salaries according to their 
productivity and their specialized skills. They probably put in longer workdays and earn more 
than the average workshop worker; I will use a monthly pay of Q1,000 per person. The shop 
price of a suit is Q600-Q1,200 (I will use Q800 per suit), depending on the material used, and 
the material cost could be from Q150 up to Q3-400 (I will use Q300 per suit). It takes 1-1½ days 
to make a suit (I will use two days).  Using these numbers, the work team of four produces 10 
suits per week with a total shop price of Q8,000. Subtracting weekly material cost (Q3,000) and 
salaries (Q1,000), the take-home earnings for the owner for this activity is another Q4,000. In 
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the low season, with a production of, say, 6.67 suits per week, assuming that suits are less 
seasonal dependent than out-door jackets and that EM-2 keeps his staff at fixed salaries, the 
weekly take-home earnings from this part is reduced to Q2,329. Using the same scheme as 
applied to his workshop, i.e., that the owner has four months of high sale and nine with low sale 
where the production drops to two-third, the annual take-home earnings from this branch of his 
enterprise would amount to annually Q138,528 - equivalent to $18,976.  The precautions 
addressing his workshop earning applies here as well, and even more so since the data on this 
part is even more inaccurate.  The total annual gain of EM-2’s enterprise sums to $57,077. 
 The numbers above show that the cost of raw materials, not wage outlays, even in the low 
season, is the largest operational expenditure of this enterprise, in contrast to the general 
conclusion made by Watanabe (1983:178). 
 
Take-Home Earnings Of EM-5 (Fine Shoes)  
As in the case of EM-2, the hypothetical income of  the enterprise will be calculated based on 
the known production numbers.  Sale numbers are not known. The workers are paid per unit and 
most are paid  up towards Q1,000 per month, depending on their performance. One worker is 
paid as low as Q850. The enterprise has a stable production of 125 pair of shoes per week, 
which are sold in mid-sized shops in Quetzaltenango. The price EM-5 gets for his shoes is, in 
average, Q80 per pair. He mentioned that the shop price was Q140 for men’s shoes, less for 
children’s shoes.  The mix of men’s, women’s and children’s shoes is not known. If it takes ten 
persons to produce 500 pairs of shoes per month, and each worker is paid, say, in average Q950 
per month, the worker gets Q19 out of each pair sold.  (This matches the information of EM-5; 
he mentioned Q20 on top of his head.) The material cost varies greatly, from  Q50-60 for 
regular all-leather men’s shoes, and downwards for quality shoes for women and children, 
which are smaller and therefore require less material. I will use an average material cost per pair 
of shoes of Q45. In conclusion, of the average shop price of Q140 for a pair of shoes, the shop 
takes Q60 (43%), the worker takes Q19 (13.6%), and EM-5 takes Q16 (11.4%). Compared with 
EM-2’s profit level, this is pitiful. From the information, it can be shown that each pair of shoes 
requires 3.2 man-hours and that the hourly salary of a worker is Q5.94 (=$0.81). 
 This gives EM-5 and his wife a gross take-home earnings - after salary and material cost - 
of Q2,000 per week, equivalent to an annual income of $14,247. Since EM-5 stated that he 
experienced a stable market, no seasonal variations in sale are accounted for. The precautions 
called for earlier in assessing these data applies here, as well. As was the case with my estimate 
on the take-home earnings in EM-2’s enterprise, one has to conclude that an opportunity exist 
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for accumulating capital.  
  
Take-Home Earnings Of EM-10 (Low-Quality Women Shoes)   
The seasonal fluctuations of the sale of EM-10’s production of women’s shoes are not shown, 
but the average production over the year is 30 pair of shoes per week with a sales price of 
between Q40 and Q50 (I will use Q45).  In the following it is assumed that the production of 
EM-10’s workshop is handled effectively by 3 workers, while  EM-10 himself tends the shop. 
Assuming a normal workweek of 44 hours, the gross sales value is Q1,350, and each pair 
requires 4.4 hours to make. EM-10 paid salaries between Q100 and Q125 per week to his 
workers; I will use a salary total per week of Q350 since the staff consisted of one young man, 
presumably less experienced, and two middle-aged workers. The price of raw material of each 
pair of shoes is set to Q14. From these numbers EM-10’s average weekly take-home earnings is 
Q580, i.e., per month Q2,320 - on an annual basis Q27,840 (=$3,814).  Giving EM-10 a salary 
equal to his workers (Q125 per week), each person (now including EM-10), in average, 
contributes to the gain of EM-10 with an amount of Q114, i.e., 96 percent of their salary. In 
practice, the number is, probably, somewhat lower since nothing of EM-10’s time in the 
production has been accounted for, making the other workers seem more efficient. Assuming 
that EM-10’s family have no other incomes, EM-10’s statement that he can not afford to invest 
in machinery, make sense. 
 EM-10 was constrained by a number of external factors. One of them was that any 
increase in production, probably, could not be sold  in his present situation. His market niche 
was saturated. Secondly, his products could not compete with those of either EM-3 or EM-5 due 
to significant lower quality both in construction and material. 
 
Take-Home Earnings Of EL-3 (Ceremonial Dresses And Shop Sale)   
EL-3’s work force consisted of four workers, besides himself, serving customers in his two 
shops, and three workers who made bridal and other ceremonial dresses on full time in his 
workshop.  The production time of a bridal dress was stipulated to one day (I will use 1½ day), 
its price was on the average Q1,500, and the price of material was around Q500.  EL-3’s 
workers were paid Q150 per week. Assuming 50 percent productivity of the three workshop 
workers, El-3’s weekly take-home earnings on his workshop activity in high season, after 
salaries and material, is Q4,550. Assuming that his low season is characterized with a drop in 
demand of 50 percent, the weekly take-home earnings then would be Q2,050. Assuming 4 
month (16 weeks) of high season and 8 months (36 weeks) of low season, EL-3’s take-home 
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earnings from his workshop on an annual basis would be Q146,600 (=$20,082). 
 There is no way to estimate the value of EL-3’s sale of the female clothes he buy from 
our-of-town producers, but there is no reason to believe that he sells less of these products, 
measured in money value,  than the value of EM-2’s sale of padded jackets.  EL-3’s two shops 
have an equal or better location than the one of EM-2, his shops have a larger variety of 
products which should indicate a better protection against seasonal variations, and the size of his 
sales staff, five persons including himself, signals a high activity in the shops.  The value of 
EM-2’s workshop production, after material and salaries, was on an annual basis, adjusted for 
seasonal variations, Q278,140. Considering that the shop which manages the sale - in this case 
EL-3’s shop - reaps the same 43 percent EM-5 had to pay the shops to have his things sold, EL-
3 may have a gross take-home earnings of around Q119,600 from his retail sales of other 
producers’ products. From this has to be subtracted the salaries over the year to his one 
shopkeeper (Q1,000 per month) and three shop clerks (each getting Q600 per month) - i.e., an 
annual salary cost of Q33,600 -  giving an estimated annual take-home earnings of  Q86,000 
from his two shops. In total, EL-3’s take-home earnings from his enterprise, workshop 
production and retail sale combined, may be in the range of Q232,600 (=$31,863). Both parts 
have been adjusted for seasonal variations, the retail sale indirectly, through the use of EM-2’s 
data.  
 
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION? YOU MUST BE KIDDING!  
Previous researchers who have studied capital accumulation in the informal sector, but 
concluded that it is absent or is of little significance, may have been fooled by the fact that there 
exist very few, if any, outer signs of prosperity in the informal sector.  Successful entrepreneurs 
may have an above-average house standard with a computer and more than normal household 
machinery, and even a sexy car, like EM-3, but none of it will be provocative flashy. Seen from 
the street outside, nothing will indicate a situation of prosperity.  In the following will be used 
some of the estimations of the entrepreneurs’ take-home earnings to analyze the potential for 
capital accumulation in the informal sector of Quetzaltenango. 
 
What is hidden in the Mattresses?   
In itself, nothing of what has been said above can explain what happens to the economic surplus 
accumulated over years in some enterprises.  The academic literature offer, at best, only 
speculations. I had only limited success in getting specific answers to my pointed questions on 
where the obviously successful entrepreneurs invested their surplus. Even my hypothetical 
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questions were shrewdly circumvented, or so I had to believe. However, some of the better-offs 
were amused by the topic and  became quite helpful when their own activity was put in the 
background.  From what I saw in the different enterprises I visited, it was obvious that value 
was generated above the level needed  to maintain the entrepreneur and his family. Two 
examples will be given in addition to those which have been addressed in the subsections above.  
 EM-6 had operated his carpentry workshop for 25 years and started out alone, with “two 
empty hands”. Over the years he built up his staff; after five years he had three employees, and 
slowly he had been able to buy machines. Quite recently he had done major extensions on his 
family’s large and comfortable house that was part of his yard. I asked him what it would cost 
him to replace the installations and machines in his workshop today, and he proposed Q75,000 - 
not including the real estate of his property.  I asked him if the value of his workshop had 
increased in the last three years and he said yes, referring to the upgrading which regularly went 
on. Another entrepreneur, EL-1, would claim that he earned only Q6-Q8 per pair of shoes his 
enterprise produced, on a production of 24-30 pairs per week, indicating a monthly gain as 
employer of around Q864, above his hypothetical workshop salary which I put at or near the 
level of that of his employees’. Indicating that there was more to his economic activity than 
what met the eye, he easily admitted that he had built a fairly spacious two-store concrete 
building for his workshop and family of five for his earnings from the enterprise over the fifteen 
years it had operated. 
 Building on a number of first- and second-hand sources, among the latter, Lic. de Jerez 
and Lic. Fernández, the following picture of how an economic surplus may be administrated, 
emerges. First, profit in the informal market does only to a modest extent go into consumption.  
There are reasons for this. One is to evade a possible unfavorable attention from the authorities 
and the environment in general; another factor, probably more important, is that consumption is 
not a governing attitude in these parts of the society. Second, a small part may be kept in bank 
accounts, less with savings in mind, primarily to facilitate financial transactions.  Third, a 
considerable part will go into expanding the workshop, replacing and upgrading old machines, 
and adding new ones. Supposedly, that is were the fruit of EM-5’s capital accumulation 
primarily will be invested.  And the work and living quarter will also get their shares, as the 
cases of EM-5, EM-6 and EM-8 all exemplified. The entrepreneurs who maintain a solid 
success over time, may, at one time or another, either diversify into new enterprises which can 
benefit from their core activity, and/or buy real estate. The latter may serve as collateral for 
future deals, as an insurance for the future, or as a long-term speculation if it is invested in plots 
in a suburb with growth potential. If the real estate is in the form of housing, it may be rented 
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out and earn interest on the invested capital.  This option was EL-3’s favorite. Land and real 
estate investments in the countryside is not registered and is therefore, at present, a safe way to 
hide a surplus. The situation is different in urban areas, like Quetzaltenango, but the chance that 
the authorities ever will get their act together and link a workable register on land- and property 
owners to a taxation scheme is slim. Another option for making windfall money grow, may be 
exemplified by the preferences of EL-2, who owned a workshop for cars together with his 
father. He would buy crashed cars and rebuild them for a substantial profit. The logic which 
governs the management of a surplus, is a logic with the purpose of securing the present and 
improving the future. The short-term pleasures always have to give in to the long-term gains. 
Given the memories of possible hardship in earlier years and the social conditions of the 
surrounding society, this makes sense. 
 
Taking Command of the elusive Factor: Defining a Capital Accumulation Model 
The results of this study make clear that capital accumulation - here understood as that part of 
the entrepreneur’s take-home earnings that is above the maintenance cost of his family and the 
equipment of his workshop and the cost of the production  -  indeed takes place in the informal 
sector of Quetzaltenango. But how large is the accumulation? And how many enterprises 
contribute? 
 Considering the standard of EM-1’s and EM-4’s working conditions, it is unlikely that 
the economy of their enterprises gave room for more than maintaining their economic situation. 
The situations of EM-2, EM-5 and EL-3 are a totally different ball game as estimates of their 
take-home earnings earlier indicated. 
 The capital accumulation is largest in the large enterprises, but the largest contribution to 
the total capital accumulation is not necessarily from the group of the largest enterprises, since 
they are few in number. By the same token, the contribution from the small or medium-sized 
enterprises - in this context, meaning those with, say, from 4 to 7 workers - is not insignificant. 
Referring to EM-8’s activity that oscillates between having a work force of five and seven 
workers, it generates a surplus which is part of the over-all capital accumulation. EM-8’s 
situation is supposed to generate capital because she saw possibilities of enough profit to buy a 
house of her own in the near future and run her enterprise from there.   
 To assess the total annual capital accumulation in the informal sector of Quetzaltenango, 
some assumptions will be made. They are summed up in Table 4.3, that follows, or given in the 
text. It will be assumed that only productive enterprises of four and more workers generate a 
surplus. This implies that the first three workers of any enterprise, do not contribute to the 
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capital accumulation. Enterprises with more than 13 workers (inclusive the owner), i.e., the size 
of EM-2’s enterprise, will not be included. Vital (1999) mentioned that there exist 1785 
productive microenterprises in Quetzaltenango with five or less workers. I will assume that all 
of them are part of the informal sector. Combining this with Sr. Quemé‘s estimate, quoted 
earlier, that only five percent of the enterprises have more than 5 workers, that applies to 94 
enterprises. In total, there exist 1879 (= 1785 + 94) productive enterprises in the city of 
Quetzaltenango.  
Table 4.3   
Assumptions of the model for estimating capital  
accumulation per year in the informal sector of Quetzaltenango 
 
a) Enterprises with a working staff of three or fewer workers (including the owner) do not 
contribute to the over-all capital accumulation.  
 
b) Enterprises with a working staff of four and more workers generate each a surplus which 
increases linearly with each extra worker employed in the enterprise. 
 
c) Only three entrepreneurs of production in Quetzaltenanango generate a surplus equal to or 
larger than the one of EM-2. 
 
d) The number of enterprises with more than four workers tapers off geometrically (factor k = 
2.72) as the number of workers in the enterprise increases. The value of  k is determined by 
the number of enterprises in Quetzaltenango with more than 5 workers, i.e., 94  [source: Sr. 
Quemé and Vital (1999)]. 
 
e) The assumption of a geometric tapering-off of the number of enterprises as function of an 
increasing work force, up to a maximum of 13, has been extended to include the bracket of 
enterprises of 4-5 workers**. 
.                . 
*  That figure is, in part, determined  by the situation of EM-1 and EM-10, both with 3½ 
workers, who will need more manpower in their production to get out of their economic 
“subsistence trap”.   
**  To simplify the calculations, the enterprises have been lumped into “employment brackets” 
of  4-5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-11, and 12-13 workers (including the owner), i.e., ([2n, 2n+1], n=2,..,6) 
 
Estimation of annual Capital Accumulation  
Table 4.4 gives an overview of the entrepreneurs’ take-home earnings as calculated above and 
lists the numbers used to determine the linear relationships mentioned in Table 4.3, pt. a). 
 The table shows one singular point which does not fit my model , i.e., the total annual 
take-home earnings of EL-3, case a]. The reason is that my estimation of EL-3’s take-home 
earnings gives a very high value relative to the number of workers employed in that enterprise.  
Extrapolating the value, $5,098, at employment bracket (4,5) to bracket (12,13) would give an 




Summary of the entrepreneurs’ take-home earnings. 
 
#                      Workers  Cap. acc.        Total Annual        Adj. Ann.      Adjustment value 
         (incl. owner)      work force         take-home         take-home    for the model linear  
                                       earnings*          earnings*          relationship* 
.                                   (minus 20%)                                 . 
 
EM-1 3½ 0 5,571 -- -- 
EM-2 13 10 57,077 45,662 45,662/10/5 
EM-5 11 8 14,247 11,398 11,398/8/4 
EM-10 4 1 3,814 -- -- 
a]  EL-3  8 5 31,863 25,490 25,490/5/1** 
b]  EL-3 (4) (1) (20.082) (16,066) 16,066/4/1***
                         . 
* All values in $ 
* * Full enterprise: singular point with value $5,098 in employment bracket (4,5).  
*** Enterprise minus commerce part: singular point with value $4,011 
        in employment bracket (4,5). 
 
The reason is EL-3’s unique mixture of independent commerce (where he sell other producers’ 
products in his two shops at a good gain) and the production and sale of highly profitable 
products (made by the small work force in his own workshop).  Taking another tack, i.e., 
subtracting EL-3’s purely commercial activity and analyzing only his workshop of four 
(including the owner) connected to his shops, does not remove the singularity of El-3’s situation 
as case b] in Table 4.4 shows. His very favorable take-home earnings per worker in his 
workshop, puts him widely apart from, say, EM-1 and EM-10 - as a comparison of the three 
entrepreneurs’ annual take-home earnings in the table will show. 
 Table 4.5 gives two estimates of the annual capital accumulation in the formal sector of 
Quetzaltenango according to the model defined above.  One is based on the annual take-home 
earnings of EM-2’s enterprise (equal to $45,662, after subtracting 20 percent for unaccounted 
expenses), the other on EM-5’s annual take-home earnings ($11,398, having subtracted 20 
percent).  The reason for using two estimates is that it was shown that EM-5 and EM-2 have 
very different profitabilities, i.e., their take-home earnings per worker do not fit the same linear 
relationship used in the model.  
 The number of workers in each employment bracket has been calculated as number of 
enterprises in the given employment brackets - given by a geometric decreasing series - 
multiplied by the median of workers in the appropriate employment bracket ([2n + 0.3], 
n=2,...,6). Here is used that k=2.72 for ([2n, 2n+1], n=2,..,6) is equivalent to sqrt (k)=1.65 for 
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([n, n+1], n=4,...,12). The capital accumulation of each employment bracket is determined as the 
product of the number of workers within each bracket, multiplied with what each worker in the 
respective bracket contributes with to the total take-home earnings. The take-home earnings for 
each worker within each of the set employment bracket, is determined for the two cases shown. 
The total accumulation in the informal sector is then calculated by adding over all the brackets, 
n=2,...,6.  The results are shown in Table 4.5. 
 The upper sum in Table 4.5 gives the accumulation at the high profitability case (EM-2) 
and the lower one the accumulation at low profitability (the EM-5 case). In lack of better 
information, an averaging of the two numbers has been chosen, giving an estimated total annual 
capital accumulation of the informal sector of Quetzaltenango of  $1,523,201. 
 The capital has been accumulated by 258 out of 1879 (= 1785 + 94) productive 
enterprises with a work force of 1,320 workers.  In average, each capital accumulating worker 
generates an added value of $1,154. Assuming an average salary of Q850 per month among the 
workers in the capital accumulating part of the informal sector, i.e., on an annual basis 
equivalent to a salary of Q10,200 (=$1,397), each capital accumulating worker, in average, 
generate a surplus value equal to 82.6 percent of his salary. Since the value generation takes 
place in the most productive part of the informal enterprises, one must conclude that this is 
indeed a modest result.   
 No comparison with published data has been done, since, to this author’s knowledge, 
similar estimations of annual capital accumulation in the informal sector have not been done 
before. A limited number of sensitivity runs have been done on some of the model assumptions, 
with results that cluster between 1.35 and 1.65 million dollars.  More work has to be done here, 
but this is not crucial since more important parameters dominate the estimation.  Particularly, a 
relaxing of the quite conservative assessment of the ratio between the length of the good and the 
bad season of the year and a sensitive reassessment of the unaccounted-for expenses of the 
model, would easily increase the estimate of the annual capital accumulation with 25-30 
percent.  Another factor to assess, is the implication that the model is dominated by the 
profitability data of clothes and shoe production. Both activities are extensive in 
Quetzaltenango, and therefore possible quite profitable, relatively speaking, a factor which call 
into question their representability for the many other and smaller activities contributing to the 
overall result.  However, the findings indicate that capital accumulation takes place, that it is 
possible to assess it and that it will takes place in other economic activities, as well, given that 
these represent a fair share of the local informal economy. 
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Table 4.5  
Total annual capital accumulation and annual capital  
accumulation as function of size of work force of enterprises. 
 
.                                           .             EMPLOYMENT BRACKETS                               . 
No of workers in work force : 2,3        4, 5        6, 7  8, 9          10, 11         12, 13. 
 
No of enterprises (k=2.72) 0 164.2 60.4 22.2 8.2 3 
No of workers (using median)  706.1 308.5 184.3 84.5 36.9 
Total number of cap. accum. enterprises: 258 
Total number of cap. accum. workers: 1,320 
 
Estimate w/EM-2: 
Take-home earnings/employee*** 0 913 1,826 2,740 3,653 4,566* 
Accumulation per empl. bracket ($)  644,669 563,321 504,982 308,679 168,485 
Total: $2,190,136  
  
Estimate w/EM-5: 
Take-home earnings/employee*** 0 357 714 1,071 1,428** 1,785 
Accumulation per empl. bracket ($)  252,078 220,269 197,385 120,666 65,867 
Total: $856,265 
.           . 
*   Adjusted to EM-2’s take-home earnings, subtracted 20 percent for unaccounted-for 
 expenses.    
**  Adjusted to EM-5’s take-home earnings, subtracted 20 percent for unaccounted-for 
 expenses.  
*** For part of the work force larger than 3    
   
COMMENTS 
This chapter has discussed the data on wages paid by the enterprises included in this study. Even 
though the sample was small, comparison with other more authoritative data from the region 
gives strong indication that the data are representative. The data indicate that the garment sector 
offer the lowest salaries among the five activity sectors of this study and that workers’ salaries 
fluctuate with the demand of the market as well as with the productivity of the individual 
worker. Estimates were made of the annual take-home earnings for some of the entrepreneurs. 
In lack of data, some reasonable assumptions were made, particularly on the productivity of the 
workers of the enterprise and the extent of  seasonal variations on the number of units produced 
by the enterprises. Some of the estimates of the entrepreneurs’ take-home earnings were used to 
estimate the annual capital accumulation among productive enterprises in Quetzaltenango. The 
model being used, builds on a number of assumptions that are clearly identified and open for 
debate.  The genuinely new contribution this approach offers to the research on informal 
economies, is that  it has been shown that it is possible to estimate the capital accumulation 
taking place in the informal sector, using very limited data.  The assumptions of the model used 
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have been clearly stated and are open for debate. It is hoped that the capital estimation model 
forwarded here will be followed up by others such that the idea and its assumptions can be 





Zooming in on the Informal Sector 
 
The discussion in the previous chapter on aspects of the informal sector that are addressed by 
my findings, will continue and be completed here. I will detail a number of topics that has only 
cursory been approached in the academic literature before, prominently among them is the 
question to which extent operators in the informal sector use the formal lending institutions. 
Other topics addressed are the questions to which extent the public taxes productive enterprises 
in the informal sector and which factors influence the productivity of the informal productive 
enterprises.  
 
LENDING CONDITIONS IN QUETZALTENANGO 
Surprisingly, the cacophony of different ways to raise loans and the difficulties in succeeding, 
that the literature reports upon, was not reflected in the findings of this study.  
 
Lending Pattern  
Table 5.1 reports on some of the financial and economic aspects of the enterprises contacted in 
this study. Column 2 indicates how the economy of the enterprise was organized relative to the 
economy of the entrepreneur’s family - kept separate or mixed. Column 3 reports if the 
extended family was called upon when loans were needed. Column 4 shows what kind of 
financial institutions were used, alternatively if financial needs were covered internally, i.e., 
from the profit of the enterprise or if lending was used at all. Column 5 gives the “official” debt 
of the enterprise. Column 6 reports the total amount paid in taxes to the municipality. And 
column 7 reports if the enterprise offered any social benefits to its workers.  
 I will discuss the data of Table 5.1 in the sections that follow. I will emphasize the 
financial aspects only, primarily the relationship between the enterprise and the public lending 
institutions referred to as the national NGOs.  Contrary to public and private banks and the 
traditional lending institutions, these organizations specializes on loans to small enterprises and 
make no distinction between formal and informal units. In Guatemala, they came into play for 





Table 5.1   
Financial aspects of the enterprises  
 
   1              2                   3                        4                       5                     6                     7 
   #        Fam. Econ./     Family             Financial           Debt at            Taxes/yr          Benefits 
              enterprise         used          institution used         date estimate  for            
  economy        w/loan               w/loan             (quetzal)          (quetzal)         workers     
 
Clothes 
EM-1 Mixed No National NGO* 0 250-300 None 
EM-2+ Mixed No National NGO 0 3,000-4,000 None 
EM-4 Mixed No National NGO 26,000 10% of prod.? None 
EM-7+ Separate No National NGO 0 (Data lost) None 
EL-3+ Mixed No Internal financing  0 10,000 None 
 
Shoes 
EM-3+ Mixed No Bank? 0 5,000 None 
EM-5+ Mixed No National NGO 0 0 None 
EM-9 Mixed No National NGO 0 0 None 
EM-10 Mixed No No lending 0 1,500 None 
EL-1 Mixed Yes National NGO 12,000 0 None  
 
Carpentry 
EM-6 Separate Yes No public lending 0 10% of prod.? None 
 
Food 
EM-8 Mixed No National NGO 0 1,500 None 
 
Car repair 
EM-11 Separate No National NGO 0 10,000 Yes 
EL-2 Mixed No No lending 0 4,000-4,500 n/d  
.                                  .           
*  Institutions like ADEPH, FUNDAP, FUNDESPE, cooperativas or other “low-cost”    
lending solutions (as alternative to banks). 
?  Doubtful  
 
As mentioned earlier, Tokman and Klein (1996) indicate that tough lending conditions on 
formal loans may prevent informals from using this opportunity. Guatemala would be such a 
case since the “low-cost” lending institutions (defined in Table 5.1) in mid-1999 had a interest 
lending rate of around 20% p.a., well above the annual inflation rate but much lower than other 
public lending organizations (Prosigua, 1998). The extensive use of formal lending institutions 
by informal entrepreneurs in Quetzaltenango, as exemplified by the data of Table 5.1,  shows 
that the situation Tokman and Klein observed, is not valid in the area of this study.  A large 
majority of my interviewees was familiar with the national NGOs and had frequently used the 
national NGOs themselves; some had taken up to 3 loans over the last 8-10 years. However, 
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they were all well aware that formal lending was costly. When they took up loan - normally in 
the range of  Q5,000 to Q12-15,000 - they paid back as fast as they could, usually within 8-10 
months depending of the amount, even when the loan matured over much longer time.  From 
Table 5.1, column 5, it is worth noting that in spite of that, all the entrepreneurs were without 
debt, with two exceptions, One of them was EM-4 who, as mentioned, had been unlucky in his 
business dealings and EL-1 who had a tolerable debt of Q12,000 he thought he would have no 
problem in repaying within a year’s time. 
 My impression that formal lending was very much part of the financial strategy of 
operators in the informal sector, was confirmed during my frequent visits to the offices of 
ADEPH, one of the middle-sized national NGOs one of my interviewees was using, while I 
tried to get access to their Maya entrepreneurial clients. I was surprised about the size of the 
clientele I met in the reception - humble people worn down by a long life’s hard work and 
obviously of small means, applying for loans or making down-payments on loans they had 
received.    
 The alternative for the most successful entrepreneurs was to finance their needs partly or 
fully from the profit of their enterprise; EL-3 and EM-2 seemed to be the only two permanently 
in that favorable category. The well-off entrepreneurs were openly reluctant to lend money, 
partly because of the cost, but, probably more important, because they had to put up their real 
estate property as collateral - indicating that they were not blue-eyed naive that their successful 
business activity would grow into Heaven. If they could cover their needs from the surplus 
generated within their enterprise, they would use a mixture of loan and profit or delay the 
investment. The purpose of contemplating a loan seemed to be, first and foremost, purchase of 
machinery, new units or an upgrade of what the workshop had at the moment.  Secondly, 
purchase of raw material for their products was often mentioned as a reason.  Medium grade 
leather for shoes would cost around Q1,500-Q1,700 a bale and was often imported, indicating a 
time delay and therefore implied tied-up capital since the order always had to be paid up front.  I 
was my impression that only surplus from the enterprises, never loans, would be used for 
upgrading the private living quarters, but even then such matters had a low priority. The only 
one who had access to loans with his family was EM-6;  he had no need for the NGOs.  EM-4 
was deep in debt because of  an unfortunate business transaction where he had not been paid for 
a large delivery, and EM-10 evaded loans due to a low-productivity workshop and an tight 
market situation for his products. EM-3’s claim that he was using the more expensive lending 
alternative, bank, was not trustworthy.  
 Tokman and Klein’s (1996) observation, referred to above, is seemingly hard rock 
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common sense - “Do not borrow when the price on money is high!”. My experiences with the 
operators in the informal sector indicate that they are far more refined than this and most know 
the possible gain of every centavo. It is not the price of money that counts, but the gain on the 
extra produced units which is crucial. According to my background research, EL-1 gambled 
over years at the rim of economic disaster, but ended up as a well-off man, by local criteria, 
today owning property and no debt. 
 My data indicate that the situation in Quetzaltenango also was found to be very different. 
from what  De Oliveira and Roberts (1994) reported from a pilot study carried out in Mexico 
City in 1987-88.  They conclude that the informal sector was one with few links to the formal 
finance sector and with little appreciable capital. However, as mentioned, most of the 
entrepreneurs I interviewed had experiences with the financial institutions, were well informed 
about the market prices on loans and, obviously, kept the option of lending on hold without 
rejecting it.  
 The use of banks and bank accounts - both checking and savings accounts - were 
common among all the entrepreneurs, but only for short-term payment transactions.  A 
surprisingly high number of the entrepreneurs were quite open about the fact that even when 
they had bank accounts, they preferred to work with cash.  While this undoubtedly can be 
explained, in part, as an effort to prevent bad checks, it may be part of the general strategy in the 
informal sector to keep as much as possible of one’s economic transactions non-traceable. EM-8 
who delivered large orders of pan tipico over all of Guatemala, stated that she always worked 
with cash and would not accept checks, even when she worked with city officials. Given that 
her friends who took hand of the transport of her products for her had to return back to 
Quetzaltenango, supposedly often with large sum of money in their pockets, indicates that the 
advantages of working with cash are deemed considerable.  
 It has already been indicated that the lending pattern reported by Prosigua (1998) from 
Guatemala City, with data from 1997, shown in Table 1.1, was very different from the pattern 
observed in Quetzaltenango. First, none of the entrepreneurs in Quetzaltenango had taken up 
loans to get started, even when they initially struggled for years with their economy. Secondly, 
savings were not a financing source among the interviewees of this study, contrary to what 
Prosigua (1998) reports. All the interviewees claimed that they had started out with the bare 
minimum, with exception of EM-5 who had been given a sewing machine from his family that 
worked in the same trade. And, third, loans from family and friends, that play a major role in the 
start-up phase of the enterprises and even more so during the operational phase, according to 
PROSIGUA’s findings, were absent in Quetzaltenango. Only EM-6 had that as his most 
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important - in fact, the only - financing source.   
  
Formal lending Conditions  
To get an understanding of the conditions in the lending market in Quetzaltenango, I contacted 
some of the financial institutions in Quetzaltenango.   For comparison with the data that follow, 
it should be mentioned that the effective interest on a saving account in the private Banco Uno, 
Quetzaltenango,  in June 1999, was 7.6 percent for an amount of Q1,500-10,000, 9.2 percent for 
Q10,000-50,000, 10.3 percent for Q50,000-100,000, and up to 11.3 percent for amounts above.  
The interests of a regular loan in Banco Industrial, Quetzaltenango, which required collateral in 
real estate, were 28 percent p.a. (as of June 1999).  This was the norm among the private banks. 
 The lending institutions (private or state banks, cooperativas like COOSADECO and 
national NGOs like FUNDAP, ADEPH and FUNDESPE) required one of the following kinds of 
guarantees for their loans, in decreasing order of priority: 
Garantia Hipotecaria, i.e., private property is put up as security for the loan, either in 
public registered form (version: Formal) or as a non-registered  version worked out 
by lawyers (version: Publica).  
Garantia Fiduciaria, i.e., the security is in the salaries of employed persons  who have 
guaranteed for the loan on the behalf of the borrower. 
Garantia Prendoria, i.e., t he security is in machines and other equipment of the 
borrower’s enterprise.  This was the option least used, probably because the banks 
would not be bothered by spending time on off-loading second-hand goods of small 
value, in case a loan goes bad, in addition to the costs of time-consuming 
administrative procedures. 
 As of June 1999 there were 22 formal private lending institutions catering to small 
enterprises of all kinds in and around Quetzaltenango, indicating that there is a significant 
market for this kind of services - another indicator that there is a close contact between small 
enterprises, which are mostly located in the informal sector due to their size, and the financial 
institutions. For example, the organization FUNDAP, directs its offers to both small and large 
enterprises and charges around 22 percent per year on its loans.  FUNDESPE, of the same 
category as FUNDAP, also with a focus on small-loan entrepreneurs, charges the same. 
FUNDESPE, gives loans of minimum Q1,000.  There is no minimum for the lending time of the 
smallest loans, but in practice 1-2 months will do, with a maximum of 36 months. The lending 
institutions require, as a rule, garantia hipotecaria, except for very small loans (Q1,000), and 
charge the same interest for small as for large loans. The organizations that offer the least 
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expensive loans are the cooperativas (cooperatives) that give loans to small enterprises and 
activities within agriculture, manufacture and commerce, but only to their members who 
maintain their membership by small regular savings or deposits. One example of the latter 
category is the coopertiva COOSADECO with 37,000 depositors nationwide. COOSADECO 
gives small loans (minimum Q1,000) at 15 percent per year on the basis of a saving account 
balance of minimum Q1,000 over 4 weeks. Larger loans can be up to Q18,000 at 18 percent p.a. 
and  require a garantia fiduciaria. Big loans, up to a maximum if Q100,000, also at 18 percent 
p.a., can be amortized over maximum five years. If the debtor falls behind in his payments, the 
interest rate will increase and a penalty will be imposed, as experienced by EM-4, who paid 24 
percent on his COOSADECO loan.  Only as a remedy of last resort will the garantias 
hipotecaria or fiduciaria be activated to counteract a default on the loan (source: COOSADECO 
staff). Except for very small, short-term loans, around Q1,000, all loans required collateral in the 
entrepreneur’s property. Only in exceptional cases would the lending institution accept other 
types of guarantees. 
 It is difficult to pinpoint why there exist so large variations among the different lending 
institutions and that the interest rates are so high, given that the inflation rate of 1997 and 1998 
was only - to the best of my sources - 8-10 percent. In my conversations with banking officials, 
they claimed that the risk on this kind of loans was high and had its price. It needs to be 
mentioned that the banks had a profit margin of 10 percent and above(!) and are not well 
equipped for handling loans of the small amounts needed by the informal sector. However, 
Guatemala has experienced a period some years back where lending institutions that were not 
guaranteed by the state, like the cooperativas, collapsed and left not only the small depositors 
with a loss, but also the lenders. The lending contracts normally state that the debtor does not 
have ownership to the property bought for the loan until the loan is fully paid back. A insolvent 
lending organization may put unexpected obligations on the borrower, who might be a threat to 
his enterprise. 
 
TAXES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
From the data of this study one can conclude that the tax burden imposed on the small 
enterprises is not an obstacle for capital accumulation in the informal sector. Obviously 
profitable enterprises, like those of EM-2 and EM-3, paid taxes - regional and national 
combined - of, respectively, Q3,000-Q4,000 and Q5,000, which is below the shop price value of 
one week’s production (source: EM-2, EM-3). EM-11 claimed that his taxes were Q10,000 per 
year, but EL-2 who ran a similar workshop to EM-11’s, stated that he paid only Q300-Q400 per 
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month, equivalent to around Q4,200 per year  - much on the same level as the other profitable 
enterprises. Among their portfolio of jobs, both EM-11 and EL-2 would sometimes have jobs 
with a high final cost price tag, up towards Q40,000, which, however, would require only 3-4 
months of work for one person. The small quasi-family enterprise of entrepreneur EM-1, whose 
take-home earnings per month was estimated above to Q5,571 for the two adults combined, paid 
only Q250-Q300 per year (source: EM-1). The only person who complained about taxes was 
EM-8 who paid Q1,500 per year. Given the fact that her business part of  the year increased 
from five to seven persons on full time, her taxes were probably a small expense.  
 EM-6 claimed, similar to EM-4, that he paid taxes in the form of 10 percent of their bulk 
sale. Sr. Villagran, the municipal comptroller of Quetzaltenango, denied the existence of such a 
tax, while another well informed source stated that it existed but was not effective (source: Lic. 
de Jerez).  The control by the municipality is, in general, very lax. Some entrepreneurs would 
say that they were controlled a few times per year, others that they were controlled more often 
and then not at all for years.  EM-5 had lost contact with the municipality all together. The only 
entrepreneur who seemed to have been weighted and found too light for paying taxes, for good 
reasons, was EM-9. EL-3 claimed to pay Q10,000 per year, the same as EM-11. However, he 
seemed very relaxed about it and pointed out, with a broad smile, that the municipality 
controller, on his semi-annual visit, did a very superficial job by looking only at the receipts and 
other paper work he was shown. No background checks were ever made. When asked, all the 
entrepreneurs in this study denied that they paid bribes to the municipality controllers to soften 
the tax blow, but strong evidence indicates that this is not an uncommon practice (sources: Lic. 
de Jerez, Lic. Fernández). The numbers above, seen in light of the need for the new national 
state institution, SAT, which will be discussed in Chapter 7, exemplifies not only the 
incompetence of the authorities, but also explains one of the major reasons behind the crisis in 
public revenues and important sectors like the public welfare insurance schemes Mesa Lago 
(1991) touches upon with address also to Guatemala, as part of her general discussion of Latin 
America on that topic.  
 Table 5.1, column 2, show that the large majority of the enterprises had an economy 
mixed in with the economy of the entrepreneur’s family.  It emphasizes the earlier conclusion 
that taxes or the public authorities are more a nuisance than a burden since even complex shops 
with up to 12 employees (EM-2) or the multi-faceted activity of EL-3 had no incentive or 
pressure from the outside to organize the business for the purpose of improved financial 
transparency.  Those who kept separate accounting (EM-7, EM-6 and EM-11) probably did this 
for personal reasons only. EM-7 was into his second marriage and made clear that he wanted to 
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keep parts of his life sheltered from his new wife’s view, and EM-6 may have had some of his 
needs rooted in the fact that his eldest son was pestering him with his ambitions to take over the 
ownership of the enterprise.  
 Table 5.1, column 7, shows that none of the entrepreneurs I talked with met any of the 
obligations towards their workers as they were required to according to the public regulations. (I 
will detail those in Chapter 7.) The one exception was EM-11 who had an accident insurance for 
his workers, something he was obliged to according to the code of the department of 
Quetzaltenango. This must be seen in relation to the definition of the informal sector by Castells 
and Portes (1989) and my discussion of the problems in using it in the practice (Chapter 3). I 
will return to the matter of public regulation of the department of Quetzaltenango and the 
Guatemalan state in relation to my discussion of the control group of formal enterprises. 
  
PRODUCTIVITY FACTORS   
The profitability of enterprises in the informal sector is increased in different ways.  One is by 
evading taxes, another is by keeping salaries of the workers down. However, as has been shown 
in the analysis of EM-2 and EM-5’s economies above, taxes and the cost of labor play a limited 
part in the economic pattern of the successful units. 
 The variety in levels of success among the entrepreneurs sampled in this study, calls for 
an explanation. For example, the backwardness of the entrepreneurs EM-1 and EM-4, in 
comparison with, say, EM-2, also a clothes producer, is striking. One possibility could be that 
the former use less effective machines which, together with other managerial dispositions,  
reduce their productivity. The case of EM-1’s slow, hand-driven, old-fashioned machines, 
which were the backbone of his enterprise, supports, in part, that hypothesis.  From that follows, 
that even when EM-1 in the past had more employees,  as he told me, and may then have 
enjoyed an economic surplus, he failed to invest in high-productivity machinery. Another 
observation is that EM-1 and EM-4 are uniquely characterized by the fact that they have the 
lowest number of employees among the entrepreneurs working in the clothes trade, each only 
2½ persons.  Failing to increase their productivity, it seems as if their staffs never became large 
enough to produce sufficient surplus to create an economic momentum for success. Another 
striking observation from the estimations above was the difference in productivity between the 
two entrepreneurs, EM-3 and EM-5. A worker in the enterprise of EM-5 used 3.2 hours to make 
a pair of shoes, while in EM-3’s enterprise the production time was 4 hours. It is hypothesized 
that one of the reasons for the discrepancy may be differences in management schemes they use. 
In the following I will comment upon some of the factors that seem to determine the 
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 A comparison between the enterprise of EM-2 (clothes) with those of EM-3 and EM-5 (shoes), 
may indicate that production of clothes in large quantities in the informal sector is more 
machine-intensive than shoe production in large quantities. In EM-2’s work scheme, all the 
workers (the assistant workers not included) had their own machine, and so had the home 
workers. The same pattern was repeated in all the workshops making clothes, including those of  
EM-1, EM-4 and EM-7.  Thereby value added per unit was  higher, profit per unit was higher, 
and less workers were needed to maintain a certain profitability level. EM-2 reaps the advantage 
of this situation, first, by producing a share of high-priced units, i.e., suits, in addition to cheaper 
run-of-the-mill padded jackets. And, secondly, he increases his favorable situation hugely by 
selling his products in his own shop, thereby pocketing the gain himself at more steps as his 
products move along towards the consumer, from bulk production to retail sale.  
 In the case of shoe production - taking place in the workshops of EM-3, EM-5 and EM-9 
- the pattern was consistently different but coherent within the trade. In the case of  EM-5, 
where production numbers are available, two factors stand out. First, the part of EM-5’s  work 
force working in his workshop, had access to machines, while the homeworkers worked by 
hand. In the case of EM-3 who hired only homeworkers and did the machine work on the total 
production alone in his workshop, none of his work force had access to machines.   
 Presumably, it may be easier to mechanize the clothes trade than the shoe production 
trade. Mechanizing the handwork in the shoe trade may demand more expensive machines than 
those that are dime-a-dozen in the clothes trade - actually, the price is Q1,000-Q1,500 for the 
simplest clothes sewing model - and the shoe trade at present can afford, but that is only part of 
the story. The productivity of the shoe trade will be kept at bay until the degree of 
mechanization is increased substantially, either by raising the necessary capital for advanced 
machinery or by modifying the product such that it adapts to mechanized processing with less 
advanced machines.  EM-5’s expressed ambition to have a much larger and fully mechanized 
work force, seems to indicate that he sees capital as the obstacle, not the technology.  That the 
high mechanization in the informal clothes trade pays off, can be seen from the estimated take-
home earnings of EM-2 (clothing manufacture) compared with that of EM-5 (shoe production) - 
even though there may be intrinsic differences between the two trades which influence the 
difference in profitability. Each member of EM-2’s work force of thirteen (including the owner) 
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in average contributes with $4,391 to EM-2’s take-home earnings, while EM-5’s work force of 
eleven (including EM-5) in average contributes with only $1,298 - a ratio of  3.38. Entrepreneur 
EM-5 embodied the soul of the true Weberian capitalist when he stated his ambition of 
increasing his work force to twenty persons and equipping them all with machines. 
 One may argue that the clothing manufacture, perhaps, is offering higher profit, in 
general, than the shoe trade, thereby reducing the impact of technology as claimed by the 
discussion above.  A simple comparison among operators within the shoe trade itself, say, 
between the productivity of EM-5 and EM-3, will indicate that that argument is not valid and 
that there is possibilities for large productivity increases. EM-3 claimed that his workshop 
produced a pair of shoes in four hours. The calculations worked out on the individual 
entrepreneurs above, indicated, however, that the time spent in EM-5’s workshop was only 3.2 
hours per pair of shoes. It is interesting to note that the productivity of EM-3 is not much higher 
than the one of EM-8. The latter worked under miserable conditions, together with his staff of 
2½ workers, using only one foot-driven sewing machine and without access to, say, the time-
saving hide-cutting machines of Japanese make both EM-3 and EM-5 most proudly showed me 
they had in their workshops.  EM-9’s production was 36 pair of shoes per week. Assuming his 
work force of, in total, 3½ persons work normal workweek of 44 hours, EM-9 would need a 
production time of 4.3 hours for each pair of shoes, very close to EM-3’s level. The conclusion 
is that EM-5’s enterprise is highly profitable, not because of his time-saving machines (all under 
EM-5’s personal control) or of high productivity among his workers, just the opposite, but 
because the scheme of his enterprise is based on a large number of sweating workers.   
 A last example of the impact of technology is the case of EM-10. The productivity of 
EM-9’s enterprise is better than that of EM-10 whose staff of  effectively three persons (EM-10 
seemed to tend the sales desk on near full-time) spent 4.4 hours per pair of shoes. All worked by 
hand. In reality, their productivity is probably even lower since their shoes were simpler than 
those of EM-3 and EM-5, more comparable with EM-9’s products, and EM-10 may add a 
helping hand in the production without having been counted for among the contributors.  
 In my discussion on what the academic literature had to say about the financing 
opportunities in the informal sector, I contemplated the possibility that formal enterprises might 
raise the capital necessary to start an informal workshop that would handle part of the 
production and do it cheaper than the formal unit. In the case of the homeworkers of EM-2’s 
enterprise, those who made suits, they had all bought their own machines, probably simple foot-
driven ones.  The price I mention above, Q1,000-1,500 ($137-$205) for the simplest model, was 
quoted to me by workers in EM-2’s workshop. This is a considerable, but tolerable expense for 
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a homeworker since the investment will serve him well over many years. Given that situation, 
there is probably no incentive for a formal enterprise to finance an informal workshop if this is 
the only argument.  
  
Management Schemes   
All the most successful entrepreneurs - EM-2, EM-3, EM-5, EM-7 and EL-3 - used a 
combination of homeworkers, workshop workers and/or sale shop in their enterprises.  One 
advantage of the  scheme of using homeworkers, is that the homeworkers add to the profit 
without much investment and risk for the entrepreneur. The turn-over of invested capital in the 
raw material to the homeworkers is fast. The entrepreneur hands over the necessary material and 
get back value-added products with no obligations besides compensation for the work done. EL-
1 told, however, that the disadvantage was that the homeworkers often did shoddy work, not 
easily detected, which was prevented in the workshop due to better supervision. My calculations 
on the shoe activity, indicate that production in the workshop with access to machinery, as in 
EM-5’s case, is the most profitable scheme.  The reason that homeworking is widely used by the 
larger enterprises, could be the lack of space in the workshops. The workshops of all the 
entrepreneurs who used homeworkers - EM-2, EM-3, EM-5 and EM-7 - were jammed, perhaps 
with exception of EM-5’s place.  A more likely reason, however, is evasion of public safety and 
work place regulations, see discussion in the section in Chapter 7 on the control group of formal 
enterprises. 
 EL-3, like EM-2, used a combination of workshop and a sale shop where the production 
of specialized products - in the case of EL-3, bridal dresses and other ceremonial dresses for 
women and girls - were sold. Actually, he had two sale shops. But where EM-2, in addition to 
his workshop, had homeworkers, EL-3 had added a commerce-only activity whereby he bought 
the products of out-of-town producers - women sweaters, padded jackets and the like - and sold 
them in his shops. Here he possibly had a profit margin of around 75 percent - if what the retail 
shops added to their cost price on EM-5’s products is an indication.  The discussion following 
Table 4.4 indicate that - measured by number of employees - EL-3 is so definitively the most 
successful among the interviewees. The broader selection of goods in his shop also indicates 
that he weathers seasonal and other fluctuations in the market better than the rest.  
 
Production By Scale   
The calculations on the entrepreneurs’ take-home earnings indicate that the overriding factor for 
success in the informal sector is a production volume of scale. That can be gained by high 
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productivity, but, as stated above, low productivity is not a hindrance to success, as the case of 
EM-3 exemplified.  While EM-4 and EM-9 expressed frustration with the competition and the 
problems of selling their products, no such complaints were raised by any of the more 
successful entrepreneurs. They probably had paid as much attention to developing and 
maintaining their sales network as they had in building up their workshops. They all gave the 
impression of managing this part effortless, in spite of the fact that they handled a much larger 
sales volume than EM-4 and EM-9. Also, contrary to EM-9, none of them had economic 
liquidity problems.  In most cases, as I was informed, costly investments were  financed straight 
out of the profit of the production. One major reason why production of scale is important, is 
that large production volumes reduce the impact of  the cost of reaching the customer. Those 
who choose not to add a potential lucrative, but risky addition to their empire, i.e., a shop - and 
all had decided against it, except EM-2 - paid heavily for the service to have their products sold 
through retailers. In EM-5’s case, the shops pocketed in average 43 percent of  the shop price of 
his shoes (Q7,500 per week), i.e., three and a half time more than EM-5 and his wife got out of 
their combined efforts.  One has to admire the baroque beauty of the exploitative system of 
Guatemala where the many lives off the few that produce the trickle of products that keep the 
society going. 
 
Other factors   
The ease by which some entrepreneurs who did not have their own shop - notably EM-3, EM-5 
and  EM-8 - handled the sale of their products to the customers, either directly (EM-8) or using 
retailers as middlemen - is striking, when compared with others - notably EM-4, EM-9 and EL-
1. The latter, probably, spent days peddling their goods in shops and mercados in faraway 
places. 
 The seemingly elegance of some of the consumer goods, being produced under 
sometimes miserable working conditions - particularly certain categories of shoes and clothes, 
which have been focused upon in this study - is striking. One fascinating factor worth noting is 
that the informal entrepreneur is under the same pressure to adapt to the changing tastes of the 
market place as the large formal factories and the fancy boutiques in Paris and New York.  The 
interviewees would freely admit that they copied from haute coiture advertisements in recent 
English-speaking magazines and even showed me some of them. Some would claim that they 
used a combination of borrowed ideas and their own imagination.   
 One observation from this study is that there does not seem to exist incentives for 
switching from jammed workshops and homeworking to costly, man-hour saving machinery 
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because, with salaries as low as reported in this study, they represent only a small fraction of the 
cost of the final product. 
 
COMMENTS 
Contrary to what has been reported in the literature, the productive entrepreneurs in the informal 
sector of Quetzaltenango had a fairly close contact with the financial institutions and used them 
relatively frequently. Most lending took place with the so-called national NGOs and 
cooperatives. In limited degree did loans from family play a role. For the most successful ones, 
using the profit of their enterprise instead of loans were quite common. My data also indicate 
that the use of bank services, like having checking and saving accounts, was quite common. The 
taxes in the informal sector of Quetzaltenango are modest, measured relative to the value of the 
production of the individual enterprise.  It was clear that a significant tax evasion took place, but 
my data offer no indication of the size of this.  Among the enterprises visited as part of this 
study, different management schemes were in effect. I have commented upon these, identified 
possible advantages and disadvantages with those I observed, and discussed them together with 
other productivity factors that may influence the success (or failure) of an informal productive 
enterprise.  
 As a commentary to the take-home earnings of, say, EM-1, it is worth mentioning that a 
family of two adults and four to five small children, living in urban Quetzaltenango, in theory, 
will need a minimum of Q2,300 to cover all its basic needs. If the family lives in a rented home, 
it will need another Q600-Q700. As Table 1.1 should indicate, a large part of the population will 
live on a total income well below this, probably within the range of Q1,500-Q2,000 per month. 
These families make ends meet in the way Ward (1986) described: by cutting down on nutrition, 
by leaving out fruit and meat, cutting out extras, let the clothes last longer and buy cheaper 
clothes, and skip medication and the call for a doctor when the children get sick.  But this time it 
is not one family or some families; the imposed reduction in living standard applies to large 
parts of the urban population, something I observed when I shared the daily menu with a 
sequence of lower class families this summer as their paying house guest. 
 The organizational scheme of out-farming part of the production to smaller production 
units or individuals, was observed in many of the enterprises contacted by this study - it was 
present in the enterprises of EM-2, EM-3 and EM-5. But the interrelationships were all within 
the informal sector. I saw no sign of a cooperation between informal enterprises or 
homeworkers and a typical formal production unit. It was hypothesized initially that the lack of 
a significant number of small and medium sized formal enterprises in the city of Quetzaltenango 
89 
was an indication that such interrelationship does not take place.  Whatever the reason is for this 
low level of interrelation, my observations seem to contradict the hypothesis made by Moser 
(1978) that a maturing informal sector as one obviously has in Quetzaltenango, will be 
increasingly more dependent on the formal sector.  
 Is the situation more difficult today than earlier for upcoming entrepreneurs? 
Entrepreneur EM-2 mentioned that he after twelve years of operating his enterprise without 
machines, got loans in the governmental Banco BANDESA (around 1970), at reasonable rates, 
5-6 percent p.a. This financial opportunity for small entrepreneurs was terminated recently, 
partly due to large losses on loans, low profit and need for the capital in other sectors, but also 
as a result of the privatization policy which has swept over Guatemala the last few years. 
Instead, the scheme of national NGOs and cooperatives has been introduced and have taken 
over the lending business with the small enterprises. Together or as an effect of that, interest 
rates on lending have gone up significantly.  As mentioned above, cooperatives represent the 
cheapest end of the lending market, but access to cooperatives is normally the result, not the 





Ethnic Networks in Quetzaltenango 
  
The two previous chapters discussed the first of the two main foci of this study, i.e., the 
productive enterprises in the informal sector. In this chapter the other focus, the impact of 
ethnicity on entrepreneurship in the informal sector, will be addressed.  The discussion will 
expand upon the analysis of ethnicity presented in Chapter 2, but specifically look at the 
situation in Quetzaltenango itself with respect to productive enterprises in the informal sector.  
The two overarching hypotheses on ethnicity in the informal sector of Guatemala that was 
raised in the Introduction will be assessed and tested up against the results of my fieldwork.  
  
WHAT KIND OF ETHNIC NETWORKS EXIST? 
An ethnic network exists among entrepreneurs of the same ethnicity if the entrepreneurs use 
some type of support, instrumental and/or expressive, from the ethnic community of which they 
are  members in the formation, management and maintenance of their enterprises. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, Connor (1994:40) defines an ethnic community as “a social group that shares a 
common ideology, common institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity” [my 
emphasis]. In this study, I will define a person as belonging to the Maya community if he 
himself feels he belongs there.  As the fieldwork of this study disclosed, individuals in 
Quetzaltenango, without exception, have a clear idea of which ethnic camp they belong to.  
 Early it was argued that the source for understanding entrepreneurial behavior lay in the 
social structure of societies and the value structures that they produce (Weber, 1978; 
Schumpeter, 1934). Weber also introduced the notions of the boundedness and the maintenance 
of enforceable trust within social networks. This platform is incorporated in some current 
theoretical frameworks whose main idea is that entrepreneurship is socially embedded, and not 
strictly economic or the function of the psychological make-up of individuals (Butler and 
Greene,  1997). 
 Because of the lack of information on entrepreneurship and social networks within 
indigenous environments in Latin America, I have found it necessary to address that topic 
indirectly, by using the academic literature on ethnic entrepreneurship among immigrants to the 
United States. The only area in which sociologists who focus on the United States have given 
serious attention to self-employment is among immigrants (Bonacich and Model, 1980; Portes 
and Bach, 1985; Portes and Stepick, 1993; Zhou, 1992; Min, 1988).  Using the literature, I will 
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suggest that there exist both similarities and differences between immigrants to the United 
States and the Maya community of Quetzaltenango.  For example, on one hand, while 
immigrants to the United States were a minority, except in the enclave they were living, Mayans 
in Quetzaltenango represent a majority population in the city. They also seem to dominate the 
petty trade in the city’s mercados. On the other hand, a large part of Quetzaltenango’s Maya 
population at one time or another was migrants to the city.  Also, the racism towards Mayans 
that prevails in Guatemala, make them outsiders in their larger social environment as the 
immigrant was in his - a crucial background for the decision to try one’s luck as an entrepreneur 
(Greene and Butler, 1999). Push-pull theories of migration, which have guided that research, are 
concerned with economic, social and political factors that force people to leave their native 
habitat and seek opportunities in more promising land (Portes and Bach, 1985).  While country 
borders are crossed by immigrants, the large number of migrants who came from the rural to the 
urban areas of the Latin American countries from the 1940s onwards stayed within their 
country. Their experiences when they arrived to the cities, may not have been significantly 
different from those of immigrants to the United States. 
 There are primarily three explanations as to why entrepreneurial communities are created 
and the question of whether these represent a survival strategy or a true vehicle for social 
mobility (Zhou, 1999).  These are the middleman minority theory, the ethnic market niche 
theory and the enclave-economy theory . The enclave-economy theory seems to be the one 
which best fit the case of Mayans working in the informal sector of Quetzaltenango. It will be 
discussed briefly.   
 On the one hand, the enclave-economy theory conceptualizes the enclave as an ethnic 
labor market distinct from the larger labor market, where immigrants are provided with potential 
benefits, such as opportunities for self-employment and social advancement. On the other hand, 
it perceives the enclave as an integrated cultural entity maintained by bounded solidarity and 
enforceable trust - a form of social capital necessary for ethnic entrepreneurship.  Within the 
enclave, the entrepreneurs and workers are organized around the symbols of a common ethnic 
background, familiar cultural environment, and densely knit networks. Undoubtedly, this 
applies to large parts of the Maya population of Quetzaltenango.   
 A key feature of enclave economy is the co-ethnicity of entrepreneurs and workers. 
Determining the extent to which this aspect applied to Quetzaltenango was one of the goals of 
this study. An ethnic enclave is defined as a spatial concentration of ethnic firms or workshops 
with a wide variety of economic activities. The economic aspects of the enclave provides co-
ethnic members with privileged access to a particular supply of raw material or finished goods, 
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to jobs, some which may require certain skills, and to a low-wage, reliable co-ethnic work force. 
Economic activities in the enclave can include trade, productive workshops and community-
based services.  Although ethnic entrepreneurship may basically be motivated by self-interests, 
it cannot be successful without its roots in the ethnic community bounded by group solidarity 
and enforcement capacity of the community.  These two aspects enable employers to demand 
greater discipline and effort from co-ethnic workers, who, in turn, receive preferential treatment 
from owners in terms of job offers and job-related support. Although ethnic enclaves may be 
short-lived and may not last beyond the second generation, they create unique opportunity 
structures to enable group members to incorporate themselves into mainstream society, and 
thus, is an effective alternative mobility path compensating for lingering labor market 
disadvantage (Portes and Zhou, 1992). 
 Butler and Greene (1997) argue that immigration networks permit the reduction of social, 
economic and emotional costs associated with migration.  Portes and Bach (1985:342) claim 
that it is the absence of a normalized relationship to the society that compels immigrant 
entrepreneurs to rely upon the economic potential of ethnic solidarity. One may assume that this 
aspect applies to Maya entrepreneurs as well. Ethnic bonds can be activated, under 
circumstances characteristic of the ethnic group, for example, to provide initial capital for 
business ventures. And they can help erect barriers around the community to protect its market 
activities from outside competition. Portes and Bach (1985)  found that dense networks of 
contact within the immigrant community performed as a buffer toward the outer world by 
routinely functioning also as a source of employment, information about events and social 
support. It is important to note that ethnicity modifies the character of the class relationship, i.e., 
capital and labor, within the enclave. 
 The foundation of all business is based on maintenance and generation of financial 
capital. One of the questions studied in the literature is how immigrant ethnic groups develop 
and maintain a capital base (Butler and Greene, 1997). This subject will be addressed more 
closely in the section on financing opportunities. With reference to the earlier discussion, is 
worth mentioning that many authors assume, erroneously as we will see, that capital 
accumulation does not take place in the informal sector. Bates (1985) in a study of Blacks in the 
United States, suggested that the nature of ethnic minority entrepreneurship was a result of 
limited access to financial capital, education and training and society’s perceptions of 
appropriate roles for minorities. He underlines that entrepreneurship is not only a survival 
strategy, but also a reaction to the feeling of the individual of being an outsider of kind or 
having traumatic experiences. (Dr. J.S. Butler at the University of Texas at Austin forwarded the 
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same view, private communication). Bates’ observations may be transferable to Guatemala 
where a racist and economic exploitative hierarchy is imposed upon the relationship between the 
Ladinos and the Mayans. 
 Portes and Bach’s (1985) study of Mexican and Cuban immigrants to the United States 
indicated that inter-ethnic relationships did not decline as a consequence of the adaptation 
process, even when the contact with the locals increased. The numerical ratio between Mayans 
and Ladinos in Quetzaltenango is roughly 60-40. For this reason, the pressure on the Mayans to 
adapt to Ladino values and environment in Quetzaltenango is probably far lower than in Portes 
and Bach’s case. Given the attitudes of the ethnic groups towards each other, one could 
hypothesize that an attitude prevails in the Guatemalan society that keep the interaction between 
Ladinos and Mayans - at least in part of the population - at a minimum, indicating that the social 
interaction among the Mayans is not modified by a high presence of Ladinos. A working 
hypothesis for this study was that relationships within the Maya community represent an 
enduring and substantial, but not exclusive, component of the social networks of the Mayans 
over time. 
 It can be argued that the success of running ethnic enterprises depends more upon non-
financial resources and the kind of strategies employed by the business owners than upon loans 
from formal or informal sources (Butler and Greene, 1997). Building upon the previous 
discussion, that assumption will be applied in this study - expanded upon by what Waldinger et 
al. (1990) note. They claim that  successful strategies are related to the intersection of 
opportunities and group characteristics, as ethnic entrepreneurs adjust to the resources of their 
group which are available to them. One of these is the use of labor from same-ethnic 
community. By the same token, family members play a crucial role in ethnic enterprises, not the 
least because this labor most often is unpaid. Butler and Greene (1997) refer to a number of 
studies in support of that point. 
 
INTERVIEWS WITH THE ENTREPRENEURS 
Among the entrepreneurs, there were eleven Mayans and three Ladinos. The Mayans were each 
asked about their ethnicity, their attitude to Maya nationalism as it is outlined in Chapter 2, the 
ratio of Mayans to Ladinos among their employees and if they discriminated in favor of Mayans 
in their employment of workers or in their relations to business contacts. And they were asked if 
they used their Maya acquaintances and friends, i.e., their ethnic network, to promote their 
enterprise. Each theme was followed up with a short discussion to exclude possible 
misunderstandings in question or answer.   
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 The three entrepreneurs in the Ladino control group were asked, more neutrally, how 
they looked upon ethnicity, to which extent this played a role in their life and if they 
discriminated ethnically in employment. The answers are given in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1   
The entrepreneur’s preferences with respect to ethnicity.  
 
1                        2                     3                       4                       5                         6                 7 
#    Own        Pro   Active in Hired Mayans Discrimin. Discrimin. 
                Ethnicity        own-ethnic       own-ethnic  in total hired              in                in 
.        attitude          organization     work force*     employment    business 
 
Clothes 
EM-1 Maya Yes No 1 out of 1 No No 
EM-2+ Maya Yes No 12 out of 12 No No 
EM-4 Maya Yes No 2 out of 2 No No 
EM-7+ Maya Yes No 10 out of 12 No No 
EL-3+ Ladino -  - Mixture, 7 empl. No No 
 
Shoes 
EM-3+ Maya Yes Yes 26 out of 26 Yes No 
EM-5+ Maya Neutral No 9 out of 9 No No 
EM-9 Maya Yes No 1 of 1 No No 
EM-10 Maya Yes No 2 of 3 No No 
EL-1 Ladino -  - 3 out of 4 No No 
 
Carpentry 
EM-6 Maya Yes No 6 out of 6 No No 
 
Food 
EM-8 Maya Yes No 2 out of 2 No No 
 
Car repair 
EM-11 Maya Yes No  7 out of  7 No  No 
EL-2 Ladino - - 0 out of 2 No No 
.                          .              
  * Family members not included 
 
In Table 6.1, column 2, the entrepreneur’s ethnicity is given, as the entrepreneur identified 
himself when I asked. Column 3 shows the answers to the question - directed only to the 
Mayans - if they had sympathy with the Maya nationalistic values as they are outlined in 
Chapter 2. Column 4 shows if the Mayans were organizationally active in Maya organizations 
or causes. Column 5, directed to Maya and Ladino entrepreneurs alike, indicates how many 
Mayans were employed out of the total work force of the enterprise. Column 6 and 7 shows the 
answer to my questions if the entrepreneur discriminates in favor of his own ethnicity in 
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employment and in his business dealings towards customers, contractors or suppliers. 
 In line with my general impression from previous visits to Quetzaltenango, none of the 
entrepreneurs I contacted, neither Maya nor Ladino, had any doubt about his ethnicity in 
response to my question related to column 2. In relation to my question on pro-Maya attitude, 
all the Maya entrepreneurs were familiar with what I here call “Maya nationalism” and - with 
one exception - all were in favor of the ideas. I exemplified what I meant with my question, but 
none of the Maya entrepreneurs were in doubt what I meant.  The one exception was EM-5 who 
labeled himself as “neutral” to the topic, it simple did not interest him and he did not find it of 
importance.  Only EM-3 among the Maya entrepreneurs was active in a Maya organization. 
 Column 5 shows a striking feature; that, by far, the large majority of employees in the 
low-salaried informal sector I contacted, were Maya. I will comment on this in my detailed 
discussion of the two hypotheses that follow.  
 In spite of their interest in the Maya causes, all the Maya entrepreneurs - and similarly, 
the Ladinos - were clear in their denial to my questions if they in any way discriminated, one 
way or the other, on ethnicity in employment and in their business dealings.  With respect to the 
Maya entrepreneurs, they stated that their interest in the Maya causes had no influence in their 
professional life, while the Ladino entrepreneurs, without exception, stated that they had no 
interest in ethnic causes and that ethnicity played no role in their life neither professionally nor 
privately.  
 Not listed as a specific question in Table 6.1, but a topic I raised with all the Maya 
entrepreneurs and most all the Mayans I had “formal” contact with as part of this study, was if 
there existed productive economic activities in the informal sector where Maya entrepreneurs 
were favored, which they preferred or which they by circumstances ended up in or evaded. The 
answer was solidly negative; everyone I brought it up with would deny that segregation on these 
premises took place.   
 I will bring up a different but associated topic in the discussion of the following section, 
i.e., if and to which extent ethnic segregation takes place with respect to non-productive, 
commercial activities.  
  
DISCUSSION OF THE ETHNIC HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY  
This study was initiated with the purpose of mapping the situation of Maya entrepreneurs in the 
informal sector and, more specifically, determine if ethnicity plays a role in the success and 
failure of indigenous entrepreneurs. Two hypotheses, that were presented and detailed were 
forwarded for testing.  These were, first, that Maya entrepreneurs may work primarily in certain 
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economic activities and not in others (hypothesis #1). And, secondly, that they may have to use 
their ethnic social network to maintain and promote their enterprise (hypothesis #2).  
 
 
Hypothesis #1: On Ethnic Segregation  
 This study was not extensive enough to determine definitively if ethnic segregation takes 
place in the informal sector of Guatemala. However, a number of sources contacted as part of 
the fieldwork of the study, indicated that this is indeed the case, but in an unexpected way.  The 
staff of  S.E.A. (Sociedad El Adelanto, an apolitical Maya organization) and the entrepreneurs 
EM-2 and EM-3 stated that the general low educational level among Mayans was a major 
obstacle to them in establishing successful small enterprises, not meaning that not some have 
succeed. It is interesting to assess that view in comparison with the data presented in Table 7.1 
above. There I concluded that while my data did not identify any correlation between success as 
a productive entrepreneur and length of education, they indirectly made clear that high 
education was a definite advantage. 
 In my later conversations with Sr. Ouemé, president of ADEQ (Asociación De 
Empresarios De Quetzaltenango), he expressed agreement with the view that the Mayans 
educationalwise were at a disadvantage in comparison with the Ladinos. He  related the general 
lower educational standard among Mayans with what he saw as a lack of technical insight 
among Mayans and, by implication, relatively fewer Mayans than Ladinos started and 
succeeded as entrepreneurs of productive enterprises.  In his view, technical competence is a 
crucial factor in economic activities where machinery is needed to produce volume and thereby 
break away from a subsistence level. Also, the kind of machines - old-fashioned, of high age 
and user-unfriendly - most often used by the least resourceful out of economic necessity, put 
technical demands on the operator. As I understood the argument, however, it did not apply only 
to the hands-on technical aspects, but addressed also the managerial intricacies related to 
steering an enterprise successfully in a competitive market. It seems intuitively obvious that the 
educational level in a community correlates positively with the ability of the community to 
produce entrepreneurs with skills necessary to succeed. While the direct information of my data 
do not support that assumption, the indirect interpretation of my data does, when I compare the 
size of the recruitment pool of entrepreneurs of low education (primaria, secundaria) with that 
of high (university). 
 Entrepreneur EM-2 emphasized two additional disadvantages the Maya entrepreneur in 
spe may face. First, the problems in raising capital. A person with no track record, minimal 
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education, and - most important - limited or no ability to offer collateral for the loan, will be at a 
disadvantage in his dealings with the lending institutions. This situation characterizes relatively 
more Mayans than Ladinos according to my sources, because of the socioeconomic conditions 
of Guatemala since Mayans, as a group, do not have the same economic resources as Ladinos. 
And, secondly, a general climate exists among the Mayans where individualistic, 
entrepreneurial attitudes are not encouraged. The last statement is vague and was ridiculed by 
some Mayans I discussed it with, among them EM-5. However, I interpret it within the context 
of Warren’s (1998:137) view that the Maya social identity has long been characterized by 
community-based allegiances that, supposedly, constrain certain individualistic attitudes which 
are desirable among entrepreneurs. According to EM-2, whose views were supported by Sr. 
Ouemé and EM-3, both aspects put Mayans at a disadvantage. In lack of hard data which 
address these arguments, I tend to believe that all three arguments have some merit. One effect 
would be a significantly smaller recruiting base for Mayans with the competence and the 
attitudes required to start productive enterprises and succeed.  A second effect could be a lower 
competence among those Mayans who did succeed in starting an enterprise, that could be 
reflected in a lower productivity of their activity and thereby making them less competitive. 
That may prevent the enterprise from generating enough economic momentum, keeping it 
stagnant or even making it fail. Vital (1997:49) exemplifies indirectly such a situation. His 
studies of the formal industrial sector  of Region VI of Guatemala conclude that the proportion 
of the labor force that does not have the necessary formal qualifications for their job, oscillates 
between 74 and 85 percent. He argues that this may, over time, be reflected in a reduced 
productivity that may hurt the region’s industry. 
 According to the staff at S.E.A., whose view was supported by EM-3 and Quemé, 
potential Maya entrepreneurs in the informal sector would - if they were scared off from or did 
not succeed in starting a small enterprise of production - prefer to make a living related to petty 
commerce. This, however, offers, generally speaking, neither the same opportunities for 
expansion nor the same earning potential as a successful or a moderately successful small 
enterprise based on production.  The competition among the commerciantes is fierce; it is near 
to impossible to establish a cozy, semi-secure niche as sometimes happens among enterprises of 
production, refer, say, the activity of EL-3 with ceremonial dresses. That means that an 
enterprise of commerce with many employees ends up only as a security against failing sales 
among some, not an opportunity for increased economic gain for the commercial entrepreneur 
and expansion of his enterprise. This situation is documented in a report by Q’uq’ Kumatz-
Menmagu (1999). Its numbers show that while the percentage of the categories “poor” and 
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“extremely poor” (se definitions in Introduction) among that part of the economic active 
population that work within the activity of services/enterprises, were 42 and 25, respectively, 
the numbers for the activity of  commerce were as high as 88 and 69 (ibid.: 22). I was informed 
that perhaps as many as 70 percent of the microenterprises in Quetzaltenango were involved in 
different kinds of petty full-time commerce, by far the most run by Mayans (source: Sr. Ouemé 
and Sr. Villagran). Also, it was pointed out that the largest part of the commerce sector consists 
of marginal single-person or small family businesses. That assessment is, in part, supported by 
the fact that, on one hand, typical informal enterprises are considerably smaller (measured in 
workers employed) than typical formal ones, and, on the other hand,  the number of formal 
enterprises is relatively high when the work force of the enterprise is low but tapers off 
extremely rapidly as the work force increases past a certain threshold. Vital (1997:23) put that 
threshold at 19 workers for formal enterprises in region VI of Guatemala.  Data on the 
ethnicities of the comerciantes in Quetzaltenango do not exist. However, Q’uq’ Kumatz-
Menmagua (1999:27) refers to a study from 1993 that had estimated that 80 percent of  the 
13,000 ventas callejeras (street sellers) in Guatemala City - a city with a relatively far lower 
Maya population than Quetzaltenango - were Mayans. 
 The earlier discussion, see particularly Chapter 5, did not distinguish between enterprises 
of commerce and enterprises of production. However, this is an important distinction because of 
the significant difference in growth potential between the two categories and the different 
entrepreneurial qualifications they call for, as discussed above. It is emphasized that the 
intention of this study was to focus on enterprises of production only.  The indication received 
as part of this fieldwork, that the alternative to an enterprise of production is not necessarily no 
enterprise, but possibly an enterprise of commerce, is important and need to be investigated 
more closely in the future.  
 It was mentioned that the opportunity to get loans may be a crucial determent in the 
success of an enterprise. I made efforts trying to determine if there existed veiled discrimination 
against the Mayans, based on their ethnicity, within the financial sector when they tried to raise 
loans. I found no traces of that. If discrimination is present, it most likely is present in the form 
of a subjective application of  “neutral” technical criteria for credit worthiness since approval of 
larger loans is, without exception, linked to the availability of sufficient collateral. The demand 
for collateral by the lending institutions will put less resourceful lenders at a disadvantage. 
However, nearly all the interviewees of this study had been able to take up loans, using their 
property as security. Two entrepreneurs had never taken up loans - EM-6 because he borrowed 
from his family, and EM-10 because he could not afford to. The successful entrepreneurs were 
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all in the favorable situation that they could finance their needs from the surplus of their 
operation 
 Officially the Guatemalan society does not distinguish between people based on their 
ethnicity. This is probably a heritage from the time when assimilation of the Mayans was 
official policy, i.e., back in the 1960s and earlier, though the political reasoning behind a 
cautious practice on this matter is obvious. When I asked for help to identify Maya 
entrepreneurs for this study,  the head of FUNDAP, Ing. Gándara, claimed that his institution 
did not keep information on its clients’ ethnicity on file, and contradicted himself shortly after 
by saying that they could not release that information. No other non-Maya institution or persons 
in high offices I approached claimed to have such limitation in their data. Some would promise 
to give me what I wanted but requested a “formally correct” application procedure - before they 
turned me down (ADEPH). Others would repeatedly promise to give me what I wanted, but 
never deliver (TIMACH, ADEQ). One institution would clandestinely comply and give me a list 
within the hour as a personal “hush-hush” favor. People make no secret of their ethnicity which 
they are very conscious about, and the environment seldom have difficulties to identify people 
as either Ladinos or Mayans. That ethnic stratification exist in Guatemala is exemplified by the 
near-total absence of Mayans from the political, cultural and economic arenas at the national 
and regional levels, and in the media, and the fact that negative attitudes towards and prejudices 
against Mayans, as a group, run deep among many Ladinos. 
 Given the answers of the entrepreneurs, discussed in relation to the interview answers 
presented in Table 6.1, this study will conclude that it found no evidence in support of 
hypothesis #1, i.e., that external circumstances steered Maya entrepreneurs into certain 
productive enterprises and prevented him from others. The same goes for Ladino entrepreneurs.  
However, there is circumstantial evidence that potential Maya entrepreneurs, for reasons 
imbedded in the social structure, particularly related to the possibilities for getting adequate 
education, are steered away from the entrepreneurial sector of production and into the less 
promising entrepreneurial sector of commerce. 
 
Hypothesis #2:  On the use of Ethnic Networks    
 Table 6.1 shows that there was a very high degree of conformity in the answers from the 
different Maya entrepreneurs to my questions related to ethnicity.  All the Maya entrepreneurs, 
with only one exception (EM-5), had pro-Maya attitudes as they have been described in Chapter 
2. Some were only leaning in favor of these views, but others got excited about them when the 
topic was raised (among them EM-3, EM-4). One was organizationally involved for the 
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promotion of the cause (EM-3).  The one dissident, EM-5, was not negative. He only found the 
ideas “no son  importante”.   Everyone, however, had a clear idea of his or her ethnicity.  All the 
Maya entrepreneurs, including those who stated they were neutral to the Mayanist ideas, had 
Maya wives and gave the impression that the alternative, a Ladino wife, was out of the question. 
Similarly, all the Ladino entrepreneurs had a same-ethnic wife. 
 S.E.A. claimed that Mayans often would make ethnic preferences in favor of other 
Mayans in their business dealings. There is no support for that statement in my data.  Just the 
opposite, all the Maya entrepreneurs made very clear that pro-Maya views had no influence on 
their business decisions or their relationship to customers, suppliers of raw material or 
contractors they delivered their products to. Entrepreneur EM-3 is an exception, in part. He 
made a point of his use of Maya-only workers in his production, stating that “Los ladinos tienen 
dinero y educación”, indicating that Mayans deserved his help because of their lack of 
resources.  However, one may cynically speculate if not the fact - verified by this study - that 
Mayans represent a large pool of the cheapest labor, also has influenced EM-3’s decision to use 
Mayans only. 
 In spite of the fact that the entrepreneurs themselves made clear that they did not 
discriminated in favor of Mayans when they hired workers (with exception of EM-3), Table 6.1 
shows that all the Maya enterprises were staffed with Mayans only. There is only one exception. 
EM-7 paid his workers at the low end of the salary scale my data reported, and he hired women 
only. The presence of two female Ladino workers in his work force, is most likely an indication 
of the low salaries paid to unskilled female workers of both ethnicities.  
 My data on the work force of the Ladino enterprises seem to indicate a somewhat 
different picture. However, the difference is not significant since my data here are not equally 
solid. EL-3 would describe the ratio of ethnicities of his work force only as a “mixture”, and 
EL-2’s enterprise is, together with EM-11’s, the one which pay the highest salaries in my 
sample.  That leaves the enterprise of EL-1, which had a small work force with a composition 
not radically different from those of the Maya enterprises. 
 Table 6.1 shows that out of  81 workers hired to mostly low paid jobs in Maya enterprises 
in the informal sector (members of the entrepreneur’s family not included), 79 were Mayans. 
(The two Ladino females in EM-7’s workshop, who represent the difference, is commented 
upon above.) This dominance by Mayans in the low-salary end of the spectrum is out of balance 
with the statement made in the Introduction, that forty percent of the population of 
Quetzaltenango are Ladinos. From the data one has to conclude that economic, not ethnic 
criteria dominate the low-salary labor market, that Maya labor is synonymous with a pool of the 
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cheapest labor, and that the entrepreneurs hire accordingly.  This was pointed out by EM-6 who 
actually mentioned that Mayans dominate the cheap work market. The statement of my data, 
however, is stronger; it says that the Mayans are the cheap labor market. This conclusion is 
strengthened by the fact that EM-1 and EM-4, who had the best reasons to watch their expenses, 
both used Mayans only.  This trend is reflected in other parts of the Guatemalan society, as well. 
It is quite common that middle- and low middle-class families, of both ethnicities, have a young, 
subservient female house help (15-18 years of age) to do the heavy work in the house. The help, 
the so-called muchacha, is - in my experience - always of Maya ethnicity from a rural area 
nearby. My inquires disclosed that they earned Q10-Q12 (approx. $1.50) and three meals a day, 
for a 10-12 hours’ workday 5 or 6 days a week. Normally, they would eat by themselves, under 
cramped conditions, and not be a part of the family’s interactions - a privilege the pets of the 
family would be granted.   
 My conclusion, that Mayans serve as a cheap pool of labor in the informal sector, is 
supported by a report by World Bank (1995). Here the ratios of salaries of non-Maya workers to 
salaries of Maya workers in a number of economic activities, are reported.  The difference, in 
percent, goes from high 170 percent for administration personnel and 150 percent for sales 
persons to 48 percent for labor. In agriculture, where Maya labor has a near-monopoly, the 
percentage is 73. Only in the activities of transport (-20 percent) and office work (-2.5 percent) 
are Mayans paid more than their non-Maya counterpart. 
 EM-3 claimed to pay salaries of  Q250-Q300 per week to his workers, i.e., Q1,000-
Q1,200 per month. There are reasons to doubt the truthfulness of his information. EM-5, who 
worked in the same economic activity as EM-3, in shoe production, mentioned that he paid 
maximum Q1,000 and some were paid as low as Q850, depending on the worker’s productivity. 
In the section where EM-5’s take-home earnings was estimated, it was argued that the 
productivity of his enterprise is higher than the productivity of EM-3’s. That means that EM-5, 
not EM-3, should be the one who paid the highest salaries. 
  My data indicate that salaries in the range of Q800-Q1,000 per month was the norm in 
the shoe activity, though some were lacking behind due to lower productivity (source: EM-5). 
This is particularly obvious in the case of EM-10 who pay salaries well below the other shoe 
entrepreneurs, but also have no machines to offer his workers. However, EM-10’s lower 
productivity can not fully describe his lower salary. The workers at EM-2’s workshop, in the 
clothes activity, claimed that they were paid only Q600-Q700 per month for a 44 hours’ week.  
All in all, the number on salaries in the informal sector determined by this study, considering the 
above comments, are not out of tune with the information on salaries in the informal sector I got 
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from Lic. Rossana Fernández and which is presented in Table 1.1. I have no explanation to the 
difference in my data between the shoe and clothes activity, and even less so, considering that 
the clothes activity seems to be more profitable based on my estimates of the take-home 
earnings of the entrepreneurs of this study.  I mentioned earlier, when I discussed the literature 
reporting on informal incomes, that Wormald and Rozas (1996) also reported that garment 
workers received the lowest salaries within the economic activities they sampled. My data show 
that all the workshops making shoes had only male employees. Among the workshops making 
clothes, one employed only women, while the rest had male workers. One may speculate if 
clothing manufacture traditionally is a more “female” occupation, and that this could be the 
reason behind the lower salaries. 
 Given the information at hand, this study will conclude that Maya entrepreneurs clearly 
do not use their ethnic networks to promote their enterprises. That is in contradiction to what 
one would have expected from the discussion introducing this chapter.  A few ideas on the 
reason for that situation are offered. The fieldwork which implied conversations with a fair 
number of Mayans on a wide range of the socioeconomic ladder, made clear that there indeed 
exist a positive, though sometimes guarded, attitude to  Mayanism as an ideology. It is present, 
though less pronounced, also among the economically well-offs, than among the officers of 
Maya organizations and Mayans living under tighter economic circumstances.  (Entrepreneur 
EM-3 is an exception.) One explanation why these pro-Maya views have not been translated 
into active business practice, could be that Mayanism until today has been presented as a 
cultural, not a political idea. Another explanation could be that a pragmatic view prevails 
among Maya business people, i.e., the Maya communities are still marginalized in the 
Guatemalan society,  in spite of some progress over the last decade and the success of some, that 
they have more to loose than to gain with a pro-Maya stand which could be interpreted as 
provocative by the society at large. However, in lack of an political ideology and a solidarity 
among the Mayans themselves that can challenge the market-oriented considerations of Maya 
entrepreneurs, unskilled Maya workers will not be less exploited by their own kind than by the 
Ladino society at large. 
 
Does Discrimination exist?   
Luckily, a national election is coming up in Guatemala within three months and therefore the 
Guatemalan newspaper Prensa Libre, which has the custom to treat Mayans as near to non-
existent and extremely seldom, say, carries pictures of or refer to them, like the rest of the 
Guatemalan media, answers that question with an article labeled “Aún hay discriminación; 
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Problematica! Los indígenas son mayoría de la población, pero viven come minoría” 
(August 1, 1999, p. 4-5).  And then it offers a smattering of statistics to drive home its points.  
The article points out that over the years, due to what - with subtlety - is called diversas 
circumstancias, nothing has been  done for the Mayans in the areas of health, education and 
economy; the Mayans are not considered when national policies are established; racism is 
present within the Ladino-dominated political parties; the Congress and its apparatus are 
organized such that they function against representation for the Mayans; and in a comparison 
with Ladinos they fall clearly behind when the national pie is distributed. The article sums up 
the promises of the future in no less smoother words than those of the seven presidential 
candidates - all Ladinos - who promote their causes in preparation for the election of  November 
7, 1999: 
En sus programas de gobierno, los siete candidatos a la Presidencia se han 
conprometido a impulsar políticas un verdadero proyecto de Nación, donde indígenas 
y ladinos convivan en armonía, sin distinción de raza, costumbres o religión, y donde 
tengan las mismas oportunidades de desarrollo. 
 
 No data on the impact of ethnicity in the city of Quetzaltenango, of value for this study, 
exist. Using internationally measures for the degree of underdevelopment of the Department of 
Quetzaltenango, one such measure - the mortality rate at birth (defined as death of the newborn 
within the first 28 days after birth out of every 100,000) - was 138 and another - the infantile 
mortality rate (defined as death of the child after the first 28 days and within the first five years 
out of every 1,000 born) - was 53 (Jefatura, 1997). The same numbers for the Guatemalan 
nation as a whole, in 1998, were 96 and 35 (Prensa Libre, 1999b). The Department of 
Quetzaltenango, has a total population of 503,857 inhabitants, with a proportion of Mayans of 
60.7 percent  and a rural population - mostly Mayans - of 60.2 percent (INE, 1994). Towards 
that background, both measures indicate a high degree of underdevelopment, which hit Mayans 
by far the hardest because they, as a group, are the least resourceful and dominate in the rural 
areas where the  conditions are worst. It can be argued that life in the rural areas is different 
from life in the urban areas and that Mayans in the city of Quetzaltenango do considerably 
better than the Mayans in the rural areas. They do, but it worth noting that while 43 percent of 
homes in the rural areas experience “extreme” poverty (see definitions in Introduction), the 
same number for the urban areas is still 26 percent (Q’uq’ Kumatz-Menmagua, 1999:23). 
Mayans are loosing out in a socioeconomic comparison with Ladinos also in the urban areas and 
carries, as a group, the mark of whatever detrimental effect that implies. Because of the 
demographic situation in Guatemala and the ongoing migration to the urban areas, the rural 
areas are the areas from which a large part of the next generation of urban Mayans will be 
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recruited. By the same token, the next generation of urban Ladinos will be recruited 
disproportionately from the urban areas which can offer more and better resources to its next 
generation than what the rural areas can. The situation in the rural areas can indirectly be 
exemplified by the facts that the main causes of death in the population of the Department of 
Quetzaltenango - a situation dominated by the rural conditions - are intestinal parasites due to 
the use of polluted water (16.8 percent), respiratory infections (10.7 percent) and 
bronchopneumonia (9.5 percent), (INE, 1997) - all typical “third world” symptoms. Also, 
malnutrition in the region is a serious factor, but varies according to the population group and is 
less crucial in the urban areas where, as stated, Ladino presence is more pronounced. This is not 
a denial of the fact that Mayans have become influential and some have reached to the highest 
level of the local society. The mayor of Quetzaltenago, Roberto Quemé Chay, is a Maya.  But, 
much like the effect of capillary pressure, which will pull liquid up the conduit from the water 
table below - less and less the higher one gets - some Mayans do rise on the social ladder, but 
most are left behind, like the main liquid body - at the bottom of the column.   
 Turning to educational aspects, Table 6.2 shows the number of students inscribed in the 
educational system at different educational levels in urban and rural regions of the Department 
of Quetzaltenango in 1996. In addition, the table gives a presentation of the educational system 
of Guatemala. The table shows the small number of students who continue their education after 
primaria, both in the rural and urban areas, but particularly in the rural areas where education 
for most people ends with primaria.   
 Table 6.2 also shows that the proportion of the population under education is practically 
twice as high in the urban than in the rural areas. The rate of illiteracy among adults in the 
Department of Quetzaltenango is estimated to 32 percent (CONALFA, 1997). The possibility, in 
a national context, that a Maya child will complete six years of escuela primaria is only 27 
percent (Q’uq’ Kumatz-Menmagua, 1999:22). However, the proportion of Maya children who 
are of age but do not show up in school, is 66.5 percent (ibid.: 23).  
 What the effects of a short and inefficient schooling implies may be hard to document, 
but the following example is illuminating. In an up-market shop in Quetaltenango the otherwise 
intelligent looking and well dressed clerk of some 20+ years of age, used his calculator to sum 
my two purchases of, respectively, Q5.00 and Q9.85. In my charming, direct way I asked him if 
he really needed a calculator for that operation. The gentleman looked upon me in surprise and 
said: “Si, no soy un Einstein!”.  One aspect of that story is the obvious lack of basic skills; 




Students inscribed in the basic educational system 
of the Department of Quetzaltenango, 1996 (SIE, 1996). The table  
gives also a description of the school system of Guatemala. 
 
SCHOOL LEVEL DURATION URBAN RURAL TOTAL  
.              years     Students Students  Students 
 
Pàrvulos (pre-school), 6 yrs.   1  5,956 1,975 7,931 
Primaria (7-12 yrs) 6 43,288 59,285 102,573 
Primaria Adultos (more advanced) 6 1,736 327 2,063 
Secondaria o Bàsico (13-15 yrs.) 3 16,269 1,567 17,836 
Diversificada (Specialization  2-3 11,665 132 11,79 
   and pre-university)*, 16-17/18 yrs. 
University** (no data) 
TOTAL    79,914 63,289 142,200 
Percentage of all students (%)   55.5 44.5 100.0 
--------------- 
Population (1994)   200,727 303,130 503,857    
Percentage of population in school (approx.)*** 39.8 20.9   100.0 
.      . 
*  This level terminates with a degreee of bachillerato in, say, Ciencias y Letras,   
      Industrial, Maestro de Education Primaria (all requiring min. two years), or in  
 Secretaria Bilingüe/Commercial (requiring min. three years).  
** This level offers - in increasing level of sophistication - degrees of Licenciado, 
  Maestro Universitaria, Doctor or Master. 
***   Census data from two different years are being mixed in lack of coherent data. The error   
 being introduced is deemed insignificant.         
  
In my conversation with adult Ladinos, no topic seemed to be more important than more 
education for themselves and, if they had a family, university education for their children. 
Similar aspirations were strongly present among the Mayans, too, but, in my impression, 
seemingly mostly among the upcoming and already well-settled Mayans. A disproportionate 
larger number of Mayans, in comparison with Ladinos, are caught up in less resourceful 
circumstances. They may need their children for the economic maintenance of their family and 
this situation is reflected in the lack of ambitions on behalf of their children with respect to 
higher education. In my conversations with a professor at CUNOC (Universidad de San 
Carlos), whose family I stayed with, he told me that at the level of university the screening of 
students was extremely high - due to lack of funds, the conflict between the need for working 
and time for studying and academic motivation. In classes of, say, 500 students at the start, it 
was not seldom that only 3-5 graduated.  The fact that 79 out of 81 workers, employed in low-
paid jobs in Maya enterprises contacted in this study, were young Mayans in the age between, 
roughly, 16 and 25, may be a strong indication of the ruling mentality and governing 
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circumstances among the not-so-well-off Maya families. But the problem is not only between 
Mayans and Ladinos, but among Mayans themselves. Q’uq’ Kumatz-Menmagua (1999:24) 
refers to a study from 1989 which shows the average number of years in school for different 
ethnic groups. The K’iche’ Mayans score the lowest with 2.9 years, while Mam and Q’eqchi’ 
Mayans in the other end averages 3.7 years. The Ladinos averages 6.2 years and, in addition, is 
the one group that, relatively speaking, increases its school participation the most, closely 
followed by Mam Mayans, both with numbers twice those of K’iche’ Mayans.   
 In lack of hard data on the situation specifically for the city of Quetzaltenango itself, it 
will be argued - using the circumstantial data at hand - that Mayans, as a group, indeed are 
disadvantaged in the city of Quetzaltenango. 
  
COMMENTS 
Many people I contacted expressed strong opinions in favor of the assumption that Mayans 
ended up with enterprises of commerce if they failed to establish themselves with an enterprise 
of production. The scope of this study excluded an investigation of that assessment and whether 
the same phenomenon was present among Ladinos and, eventually, to which degree. Trotting 
the streets of Quetzaltenango and observing the petty commerce in the city center and in the 
mercados, conducted overwhelmingly by Mayans, it is tempted to conclude that Ladinos play, 
relatively speaking, a distinct minority role in the petty commerce.  
 As mentioned above, none of the two proposed hypotheses based, on ethnicity, stood up 
to scrutiny. However, on ethnicity itself, there was a marked different stand among the Ladino 
and the Mayans. While all the Mayans entrepreneurs, outside their business function, had a 
stand from low-keyed to strong in favor of pro-Maya ideas, the Ladino entrepreneurs, under 
similar circumstances,  would  declare that ethnicity was not an issue. 
 The overarching but vaguely defined  question of this study - if ethnicity plays a role in 
the success and failure of Maya entrepreneurs - can not be answered conclusively within the 
scope of this study and, probably not by the methodology applied. Too many interrelated factors 
play into the answer, not the least the influence of structural factors that were discussed earlier. 
This study did not compare the problems of entrepreneurs of the two ethnic categories in 
establishing productive enterprises, but there is circumstantial evidence that, as a group, the 
Mayans suffer under a disadvantage - the effects of a lower education level. This aspect, 
however, is not reflected in my data. Nor did my data indicate if Mayans have more problems in 
acquiring loans from the formal financial institutions than Ladinos. The universal - and 
therefore “ethnicity-blind” - demand for collateral for all loans except the smallest ones, should 
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imply that Maya entrepreneurs are not disadvantaged openly. In much the same way it will be 
concluded that Mayans and Ladinos alike face the same problems of raising capital, the high 
cost of capital, the threat of garantia hipotecaria when lending, and the competition in the 
market.  These conclusions, however, do not take into account neither the effects of any possible 
structural bias against Mayans in the Guatemalan society nor the effects of the socioeconomic 
differences between the two populations, for example, in the form of  ownership to property and 







In the previous chapters I completed my discussion of the two overarching foci of my study, the 
informal sector and ethnicity.  In the following sections I will put the conclusions of those 
discussions into a larger perspective. First, I address the question on what makes the informal 
sector informal in the first place by comparing how formal and informal enterprises fulfill the 
requirements of public regulations in Quetzaltenango. And, secondly, I compare the practice and 
business attitudes of Maya entrepreneurs with those of Ladino entrepreneurs in a control group 
that underwent the same interviewing process. New legislation and political initiatives that will 
take effect in year 2000 and may have an effect on the informal sector of Guatemala, are being 
discussed. Finally, a summary of the findings of this study  and a brief list of possible follow-up 
initiatives, are given. 
 
DISCUSSION ON CONTROL GROUPS 
The Ladinos  
Three Ladino entrepreneurs - identified with code EL-m, m=1,3 - were interviewed as a 
reference on the conclusions drawn from the interviews with the Mayans.  The main difference 
between the two groups of  entrepreneurs was that while ethnicity played an important role 
among the Mayans in their private life, but only there, ethnicity was of no importance among 
the Ladinos, neither privately nor in the entrepreneurial function (se Table 6.1). EM-3 is, in part, 
an exception and has been commented upon earlier. EL-2’s enterprise was the only one that did 
not employ Mayans, contrary to the one of EM-11 which was in the same line of work and had 
only Mayans. However, with only two positions open for non-family members in EM-11’s 
enterprise, the observation is not significant. Ignoring that aspect, there were a number of 
striking similarities between the attitudes of EM-11 and EL-2. Both emphasized the need for 
specialized workers in their operation, both mentioned that it took well over a year to train a 
man to a satisfactory standard, both paid well above the normal salary range of the informal 
sector as determined by this study, and both reported that their workers stayed with them for 
years. The salaries are high, probably, not only because of the extraordinary demands on the 
workers, but, perhaps, because of the more affluent clientele of this category of enterprises. 
There are also striking similarities between the activities of EM-2 and EL-3. Both work in the 
clothes sector and operate diverse and highly prosperous enterprises, that include both the 
109 
production and the retail sale of the products. In addition, EL-3 would buy products of other 
entrepreneurs and sell them in his two shops. Both pay the lowest possible salaries.  This study 
concludes that that salary bracket is dominated by Mayans. Other enterprises pay low and hire 
non-Mayan workers, like EM-6.  EL-2 paid no interest to ethnicity. It may be a coincidence that 
he had low-salaried Ladinos in his work force and not only Mayans. His case does not 
undermine the over-all impression that Mayans dominate the low-salary end of the work force 
of the informal market.  
 EL-2 and EL-3 may give the impression that Ladinos do extraordinary well in 
comparison with Maya entrepreneurs, in general. This study concludes, however, that the shoe 
production activity offer a lower profitability than the clothes production activity, and EL-1, 
who has both a shoe production and a shoe shop, is one example that Ladinos may struggle as 
hard as the Mayans to keep afloat. This study forwards as one of its conclusions that the main 
difference between Maya and Ladino entrepreneurs is not in the operation of an established 
productive enterprise, but in the difficulties in establishing the enterprise, with a possible 
relative higher failure rate among Mayans than Ladinos and a relative higher number of Mayans 
trying their luck in the less profitable commercial sector as a result.  A closer scrutiny of these 
aspects was outside the scope of this study.   
 In Chapter 3 it was observed that the level of education among the Ladino and Maya 
entrepreneurs was surprisingly high, given the low probability of getting a university education 
in Guatemala. This warns that there is a bias in my data. Four our of eleven Maya entrepreneurs 
had received education at university level, and three of these had been rewarded a degree.  
Among the Ladinos the situation was even more spectacular; two out of three had been 
rewarded a university degree.  It is tempting to speculate whether initialization of productive 
enterprises caters primarily to entrepreneurs of high education, and the few successful 
entrepreneurs with low education are exceptions, but my data are not extensive enough to draw 
a conclusion one way or the other. 
 
Formal Enterprises   
To have a better basis for determining the extent and degree of the informal sector, i.e.,  which 
rules are being bent or ignored by informal entrepreneurs in their promotion of their enterprises, 
three large, formal enterprises in Quetzaltenango were contacted.  These were Fabrica de 
Cantel (textile production), Fabrica El Zeppelin (clothing manufacture) and Cerveceria 
National S.A. (brewery).  The gerente general (the CEO) of the first company rejected 
personally my request, sent in writing, with reference to company policy and conditions he 
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would not divulge over the phone. The second company had to discuss my request at the highest 
level, as I was told, “for political reasons” and to determine which topics - for example, the 
workers’ salaries - would not be answered if I addressed them. At the end, my request, also here, 
was rejected by top management. Under stealth I managed to interview one of their managers in 
charge, but was not allowed a tour of the factory. And the third company, the largest and most 
affluent of them all - alcohol and monopoly make a delightful combination - scheduled a 
meeting on the spot. 
 From my conversation with the representative of El Zeppelin, I was told that rules for 
pension, social security, sickness, maturity, and insurance towards accidents at work are applied 
differently in the different departments of Guatemala. Nationwide, the first topic is handled by a 
semi-state organization; the rest, by the national state organization IGSS (Instituto 
Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social). Within the department of Quetzaltenango, all enterprises of 
five and more employees have to register with IGSS. Further, there are regulations with respect 
to accidents at work, but not on social security, with exception of maternity. The department of 
Quetzaltenango has no regulation or legislation in effect on retirement, and the public 
employees are fired when they come of age.   
 Like some enterprises, El Zeppelin enforces special arrangements in addition to the 
public regulations of the department.  Its workers pay 2.5 percent off their salaries and will get a 
pension equivalent to 30-40 percent of their salary at retirement. El Zeppelin have also four 
doctors, including two medical specialists and a dentist, who offer medical treatment to the 
workers and their children under the age of 20.  According to the representative, there exist a 
trade union within the factory which negotiate directly with the factory owners on social matters 
of the workers’ direct concern and on salaries once a year.  The workweek of 6 workdays, is 44 
hours with a minimum salary of Q21.68 per day - giving a monthly salary of around Q520.  All 
workers (operativos) are paid initially at that level, but their basic pay will be adjusted annually, 
depending on their productivity. In addition, they will get a bonus (bonificación) of Q0.30 per 
hour, which can increase to Q1.20 over x number of years, and incentives which may add 15-
20+ percent to the basic salary. In the department of Quetzaltenango, there exist regulations on 
working conditions and safety for the workers at the work place and, in addition, El Zeppelin 
had its own. 
 Cerveceria National S.A. is a highly automated plant of high, modern standard with a 
production of 2.5 million liters of beer per year (one product, lager, only), but with only 170 
employees. Five of these had a degree at university level and, in practice, supervised the whole 
production. The factory had a medical station, free for the employees, but would pay all 
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expenses if assistance from outside was necessary. The family of the employee was included in 
the medical service, children to the age of twenty. It offered, more or less, the same benefits as 
El Zeppelin.  It had an internal labor union, which was not part of any national organization. The 
workers would have en education at minimum escuela secundaria, but many had completed 
escuela diversificada. Starting salary would be Q1,000 with an annual adjusted bonus only. No 
incentives (except promotions) were offered, since the factory’s high level of automatization 
required mostly cleaning and other less demanding tasks from the unskilled staff.  The 
information I got was more limited than what the representative of El Zeppelin offered, but by 
and large verified what I had been told there.  
 Only one of the aspects of this comparison between the informal and formal enterprises 
will be discussed here. I have earlier raised question by the prevailing use of homeworkers, even 
when conditions indicate that this work scheme is less productive than doing the production at 
one site. The public regulation for working and safety standards for the work environment of the 
enterprises, of course, do not apply to workers who are not physically present, i.e., the 
homeworkers. Homeworking, therefore, may be a way of legally circumventing the public 
regulations. However, even when homeworkers are excluded, by far the largest part of the 
enterprises contacted in this study had five or more employees. The lax attitude of the 
authorities is exemplified by the fact that all the enterprises are registered with the municipality 
(with exception of EL-1) which also collect taxes from all (except EM-5). And, still,  there is no 
official reaction to the fact that the large majority of the entrepreneurs quite openly ignore the 
law of the land. 
 
THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN TRANSITION  
It was mentioned earlier that saving on overheads, such as fiscal and social security obligations 
and expenses on the safety standard of the working environment, becomes an important part of 
the survival strategies in the informal sector. The data of this study make clear that saving on 
these “overheads” is driven less by the need for survival than lust for economic gain. I was told 
that the evación fiscal (tax evasion) which characterizes - and defines - the informal sector, was 
rampant.  One form this may take is that entrepreneurs may never report their true production 
numbers to the tax authorities. They will give inflated numbers, thereby reducing the tax burden. 
In my conversations with the comptroller (el auditor) of the city of Quetzaltenango, Lic. Carlos 
Villagran, he put the typical reported production numbers at 50 percent of the true value of a 
small enterprise. Others among my sources were more pessimistic - or realistic - and put the 
number in the range of 30-40 percent, though lower values may not be uncommon. One 
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informal entrepreneur of commerce I discussed the topic with claimed there was a balance point 
between the gain by reporting a low tax base and the chance of succeeding, and the effect of the 
inevitable fine if one got caught. The latter would, most likely, destroy the enterprise if the act 
was too provocative. He, himself, reported 40 percent of his total taxable activity.  Paying bribes 
to municipality officials to reduce their tax burden, is another prevailing strategy, though none 
of the interviewees would admit to it.  
 I was faced with conflicting views on which taxation schemes actually were in effect. 
Two out of fourteen entrepreneurs would claim that they had to pay 10 percent in taxes on the 
sales value of their (official) production; some had never heard about that tax; other 
entrepreneurs denied its existence; the official in charge, Sr. Villagran, was unfamiliar with it; 
and a reliable source, Lic. de Jerez, with her specialty on business administration and years’ 
experience in the municipality administration working specifically with microenterprises, stated 
that indeed it was on the book but not widely applied. The example, with its cloudy message, 
probably exemplifies the nature of the municipality’s taxation practice very well.  
 From this study it is obvious that a not insignificant capital accumulation takes place in 
the informal sector of Quetzaltenango. One would have thought that the owner of a small but 
successful informal enterprise, which had been increasingly visible to the authorities, would 
prefer to pay a larger part of the most glaring shortcomings in his fiscal obligations, to protect 
himself. If this happened, his enterprise would - according to Castells and Portes’ definition - 
become increasingly “formal”, without any real change in its economic basis. Correspondingly, 
with the “loss” of a successful enterprise, the capital accumulation in the informal sector has 
been reduced, formally.  This is not what happens in Quetzaltenango. The combination of a lax 
or incompetent public tax collection apparatus, combined with a clever use of deflated 
production numbers or other strategies to the same ends, have created a situation where taxation 
of the informal enterprises is near to non-existent - as the numbers above should indicate.  That 
cozy situation may not last.  
 A new national taxation scheme is presently being introduced in Guatemala. The purpose 
is to enhance the state’s tax revenue from small and medium businesses, to counteract tax 
evasion and the associated wide-spread corruption, and to ensure that all enterprises are being 
registered and their operational stock is on file. I was told that in 1998-99 nation-wide, around 
20,000 staff of the previous state taxation bureau had lost their jobs and a new state/private 
organization, SAT (Superintendéncia de Administración Tributária), is presently being 
established with foreign assistance. In Quetzaltenango, a large group of highly paid - and 
supposedly unbribable - employees is presently being trained for the new task. The new national 
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policy and its organization are planned to go into effect in January 2000. Messages which 
announces new rules to ensure public insight in business transactions - like the use of receipts 
(even in buses and mercados) and an updated account of warehouse stock and transactions at all 
time - has already been widely distributed. It is too early to say if this will have a profound and 
lasting effect on the Guatemalan informal sector or if it is only another political Latin American 
“campaign”, a side-show to larger political events in the nation, with no ripples left behind on 
the society after some time. 
 The municipality of Quetzaltenango, however, is also mobilizing to get its share of what 
is looked upon as the public pie. Unconnected to the efforts under SAT, it has recently used the 
local university resources and carried out investigations to determine the burden of small 
enterprises on the public services, with a future regional taxation scheme in mind. As 
mentioned, quarter-to-quarter, house-to-house surveys have been carried out to identify 
enterprises of all kinds and sizes (Vital, 1999). 
 
COMMENTS 
The investigation of the conditions among Ladino entrepreneurs does not in any way weaken 
the conclusions drawn from the study of the Maya entrepreneurs. Further, the visits to the 
informal companies gave a solid background to assess where the informal enterprises cut 
economic corners to reduce costs, also those which are proven to be highly profitable. EM-8 
was the only one with accident insurance for his workers. This means that those working in 
enterprises with five or more workers, contacted by this study, did not have the benefits required 
by the public regulations, like pay during maternity leave or insurance for accidents at the work 
place.  In addition, they will not have the benefits formal enterprises are legislated to pay their 
workers, i.e., bonuses in relation to Christmas, two weeks’ vacation, birthday etc., which in total 
will amount to close to sixteen months’ of salary for twelve months of work. The reflection in 
the aforementioned discussion of this chapter on the reasons behind the extensive use of 
homeworkers, can not be substantiated to a final conclusion based on the data of this study.  
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The findings and conclusions of this study are summed up in the following overview. The 
precautions and the limitations  on data and observations mentioned earlier, apply.   
 
On entrepreneurs’ take-home earnings (Chapter 4) 
* The study has estimated the take-home earnings for five of the interviewed entrepreneurs 
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with enterprises within different economic activities and work forces varying from 3½ to 13 
workers (including the owner). The estimates varied from $3,814 for the smallest enterprise 
to $57,077 for the largest. However, the data indicate that size, measured by number of 
workers, is not the only and - in some cases - perhaps, not even the most important factor for 
the degree of economic success of the enterprise.  
 
On informal salaries (Chapter 4) 
* There is a clustering in my data which indicate that the salaries for a worker in the informal 
sector are between a (low) monthly salary of Q650 and a (high) salary bracket of Q850-
Q1,000.  
* A similar situation as the one reported by Wormald and Rozas (1996) on Chile, that garment 
workers had the lowest salaries in the informal sector, is found in this study, too, with 
respect to the informal sector of Guatemala. 
*  On limited data - all precautions considered - the study indicates that the labor salaries of the 
informal sector in Quetaltenango are comparable with labor salaries of the formal sector of 
the region VI of Guatemala.  
* The study concludes that there exists no ethnic solidarity between the Maya entrepreneur and 
the Maya worker; the Maya worker is mercilessly taken advantage of by his Maya - and 
probably also his Ladino - Master in the form of low wages. The entrepreneur who uses 
seasonally adjusted wages, lets the Maya worker feel the full impact of  the seasonal 
fluctuations either by reductions in salary or by lay-offs - or both. 
* There are strong indications that wages determined by the worker’s productivity and 
seasonal conditions in the market - not fixed salaries - is more the rule than the exception, 
both laterally (among different economic activities) and vertically (for both small and large 
enterprises).   
* The study concludes that to give the salaries in the informal sector as, say, the top and 
bottom wage paid at a set time within a certain economic activity,  does not make sense if the 
information  not also identify to which extent external factors make  the salary  bracket 
oscillate over the year. 
 
On capital accumulation (Chapter 4)  
* Using the first-hand and second-hand sources the study offers an explanation to where a 
surplus in the informal market is being invested. 
* A model to estimate the annual capital accumulation in the informal sector of the city of 
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Quetzaltenango is forwarded. 
* The study estimates the capital accumulation in the city of Quetzaltenango to $1,523,201 per 
year.  The capital has been accumulated by 258 out of 1879 productive enterprises with a 
work force of 1,320 workers.  In average, each capital accumulating worker generates an 
added value of $1,154. To this author’s knowledge,  a similar estimation has previously not 
been reported before. 
 
On taxes (Chapter 5) 
* This study make clear that the tax burden imposed on the small informal enterprises is too 
small than to be more than a nuisance. It is not an obstacle for capital accumulation. 
 
On productivity (Chapter 5) 
* A comparison between the enterprises of the clothes economic activity and the shoe activity 
may indicate that production of clothes in large quantities in the informal sector is more 
machine-intensive than shoe production in large quantities.  Using the data at hand, there 
seems to exist larger variation in productivity among shoe enterprises than among clothes 
enterprises.  
* The management schemes used by different entrepreneurs - the combination of workshops, 
homeworkers,  workshop attached to sales shop, and the degree of pure commerce - may 
give an explanation of the degree of success the individual entrepreneur experiences. 
 
On lending conditions (Chapter 5) 
* Typical loans in the informal sector by informal entrepreneurs, were in the range from 
Q5,000 to Q15,000 of a duration from 8 to 18 months. The interest rates recorded by this 
study was a low 18 percent p.a. in the cooperativas which offer loans only to its members 
and a high interest of 28 percent in the private banks. Most lenders would use the national 
lending institutions (NGOs) which offer loans from Q1,000 and up at interests of 20-22 
percent. All institutions would require collateral, except for the smallest loans at Q1,000. 
* While the informal entrepreneurs were cautious about the high interests and the threat of 
offering their property as collateral for loans, this study reports that taking up loans is not an 
infrequent event in the life of an informal enterprise.   




On hypothesis #1 (Chapter 6) 
* This study concludes that it found no evidence in support of hypothesis #1, i.e., that external 
circumstances steered Maya entrepreneurs into certain productive enterprises and prevented 
him from others. The same goes for Ladino entrepreneurs.  However, there is circumstantial 
evidence that potential Maya entrepreneurs, for reasons imbedded in the social structure, 
particularly related to the possibilities for getting adequate education, are steered away from 
the entrepreneurial sector of production and into the less promising entrepreneurial sector of 
commerce. 
* A lower competence among those Mayans who did succeed in starting an enterprise, could 
be reflected in a lower productivity of their activity and thereby making them less 
competitive. This may prevent the enterprise from generating enough economic momentum, 
keeping it stagnant or even making it fail.  
* The distinction between enterprises of commerce and enterprises of production is important 
because of the significant difference in growth potential between the two categories and the 
different entrepreneurial qualifications they call for. 
* I found no indications that there existed veiled discrimination against Mayans, based on their 
ethnicity, within the financial sector when they tried to raise loans. 
 
On hypothesis #2 (Chapter 6) 
* The study concludes that it found no evidence in support of hypothesis #2, i.e., Maya 
entrepreneurs clearly do not use their ethnic business networks to promote their enterprises. 
* This study concludes that Mayans represent a large pool of the cheapest labor within the 
informal sector. 
 
On ethnic discrimination (Chapter 6) 
* In lack of hard data on the situation specifically for the city of Quetzaltenango itself, it will 
be argued - using the circumstantial data at hand - that Mayans, as a group, indeed are 
disadvantaged in the city of Quetzaltenango. 
 
The future of the informal sector (Chapter 7) 
* The study reports that regulative and fiscal initiatives being planned both on the national and 




On the control groups (Chapter 7) 
* The information on the Ladino control group did not in any way contradicts the information 
acquired from the Maya entrepreneurs. On the contrary, in some respect, it both strengthened 
and nuanced the over-all findings. 
* It has been shown that homeworking is the least economic management form. It is proposed 
that the widespread use of homeworkers in the larger enterprises, is a way of legally 
circumventing the public regulations on safety and standards at the work place, as well as 
some other regulations, which, in the Department of Quetzaltenango, apply to enterprises of 
five or more employees.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Putting the findings of this study into a larger context, a few recommendations for future studies 
are forwarded. 
* The economic modeling pioneered in this study needs to be followed up such that the 
assumptions of the model used can be generalized for wider use. 
* Very little is known about the fabric of the informal urban commercial entrepreneurship. That 
applies to aspects like the motivation behind the establishment of the small commercial 
enterprises, the structure of earnings, the relation to municipality authorities, the role of 
ethnicity, the use and effect of formal financial institutions, the impact of ethnicity and 
significance for the regional economy. Particularly, the extent of the economic centralization in 
the sector and the interrelationship between the individual retailers and the networks of credit, 
marketing, and supply activities behind, are not understood. 
* Very little work has been done specifically on the rural informal sector and even less on rural 
entrepreneurship, in spite of the fact that many authors hypothesize that the rural sector is 
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PART 1: NON-ENTREPRENEURS: 
 
Sr. Juan Carlos Lau, Director Departamental, FUNDESPE, 15 Av. “A” 3-33, zona 1, 
Quetzaltenango. 
Sr. Juan Everardo Chuc Xum, Gerente General, TIMACH, 9a calle 4-11, zona 9, La Cuchilla, 
  Quetzaltenango. 
Licenciada Rossana Fernández (accountant), Proyecto Lingüistico “Santa Maria Spanish 
School”, or Calle B22-75, zona 3, colonia Minerva (ph. 761-6445), Quetzaltenango. 
Ing. Gándara, Gerente General, FUNDAP, 17a Av.  4-25, zona 3, Quetzaltenango. 
Sra. Irene de León, COOSADECO R.L.,  13 Av, 7 calle, zona 1, Quetzaltenango. 
Sr. Alfredo Cupil López, Presidente, Sociedad El Adelanto (S.E.A.), Quetzaltenango. 
Staff at MUNI K’AT, 16 Av. 4-53, zona 1, Quetzaltenango. 
Office of Licenciado Rigoberto Quemé Chay, Palacio Municipalidad, Quetzaltenango.  
Licenciado Rigoberto Quemé Chay, Alcalde Municipal, Palacio Municipalidad, 
Quetzaltenango.  
Sr. Orlando R. Quemé P., Presidente, ADEQ, Quetzaltenango. 
Sr. Ulises Quijiuix, Gerente de la Sociedad El Adelanto (S.E.A.), Quetzaltenango.  
Ms. Dagny Skarwan, Coordinator of ONGs Cuenca Alta del Río Samalá Project, 
Quetzaltenango. 
Licenciado Carlos Villagran, Auditor de la Muncipalidad, Palacio Muncipalidad, 
Quetzaltenango. 
Licenciado Eduardo R. Vital Peralta, Centro Universitario de Occidente (CUNOC), 
Quetzaltenango. 
Licenciada Alondy Maribel Cruz Vela de Jerez, Administrador de Empresas, 5a Ave. 5-34, zona 
6, Quetzaltenango. 
Licenciado Juan José Tañchez, Encargado de la Oficina de Recursos Humanos, Fabrica El 
Zeppelin, 4a Calle 15-38, zona 3, Quetzaltenango 
Licenciado Marco Miguel Robles, Gerente General, Fabrica de Cantel S.A., Cantel, 
Quetzaltenango 
Licenciada Macdoni Ovando, Encargada de la Oficina de Relaciones Publicas, Cerveceria 
National, Calle Rodolfo Robles 20-31, zona 1, Quetzaltenango 
 
 
PART 2:  ENTREPRENEURS INTERVIEWED 
 
The personal information of the entrepreneurs is confidential and has  
been made available to the thesis supervisor only. 
 
EM and EL indicate Maya and Ladino entrepreneurs, respectively. 
 
EM-1  Clothes production/ 
  sale desk 
EM-2  Clothes production/ 
  shop sale 
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EM-3  Fine shoe 
  production 
EM-4  Clothes production 
EM-5  Shoe production 
EM-6  Carpentry 
EM-7  Children’s clothes 
EM-8  Food 
EM-9  Shoe production 
EM-10  Shoe production 
EM-11  Paint/bodywork 
  on autos 
EL-1  Shoe production 
EL-2  Paint/mechanical  
   work on autos 
EL-3  Ceremonial dress 
  production/ shops 




       APPENDIX B 
 
A MODEL: 
THE ENTREPRENEURS’S WORKING ENVIRONMENT  
 
 
A. First Question Group 
 
The entrepreneur is a Maya - in case of the control group, a Ladino - and may be either male or 
female.  The entrepreneur, most likely, will have a family that partly or in full lives off the 
enterprise and participates in the activities of the enterprise.  The entrepreneur’s personal 
background will be mapped.  
 
The enterprise will be in one of a few selected economic activities. The work force will be, in 
part, the family of the entrepreneur, and, in part, a mixture of Ladinos and Mayans. The 
operational economy of the enterprise and the type and value of investments (machinery, 
installations, tools) will be determined. The size of the operation and the managerial scheme 
being used, including possible cooperation with formal enterprises, will be determined.   
 
Ethnic network: The entrepreneur may use his same-ethnic network to extract market protection 
and/or other competitive advantages for the operation of his enterprise. The potential  of the 
network may have influenced the entrepreneur to select a certain niche for his enterprise. 
 
Financial network: This may include dependent contacts to NGOs, formal banks and lending 
institutions,  and informal financial contact with family and friends. 
 
Economic decisions:  During the operation of his enterprise, sometimes working on the 
economic margin, the entrepreneur may be faced with questions related to profit allocation, 
capital accumulation, equipment maintenance/ replacement/ purchase, or economic shortfall that 
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requires him to address the financial network. 
 
Authorities: This item refers to the threat the authorities may represent to the operation of the 
enterprise, taxes or fees that may be imposed, environmental and other regulations in effect, and 
possible problems with access to public services like water and electricity - and how the 
entrepreneur juggles these obstacles.   
 
External assistance:  This item refers to possible external assistance which may be of benefit to 
the entrepreneur, in the form of advice and technical help the entrepreneur may be offered from 
NGOs, public offices etc. 
 
Contractors (formal/informal):  The entrepreneur may involve himself in different kinds of 
cooperation that implies that he agrees with a contractor to deliver a certain volume of 
production within a set time on a fixed basis. This could include subcontracting for formal 
enterprises. 
 
Co-owners and creditors:  The item refers to external influence, for example, the entrepreneur 
may have co-owners in the enterprise, who may influence the operation without taking direct 
influence on the operation.  Or he may have - or have had - loans with formal or informal 
lending institutions which have collateral in his property and thereby influence his operation of 
the enterprise. 
 
Suppliers:  The entrepreneur may be dependent on external suppliers of parts and raw materials. 
If these are same-ethnic suppliers they may represent advantages and/or disadvantages 
compared with using suppliers in a larger competitive market. 
 
Market fluctuations: This item refers to long- and/or short-term variations in the demand for the 
entrepreneur’s products and how the entrepreneur tackles these.     
 
B. Second Question Group 
 
Family economy:  The economic aspects of the enterprise may be partly or fully merged with 
the economy of the entrepreneur’s family, either through contributions to the family income or 
by having some of the family members working in the enterprise. 
 
Economic “balance sheet”:  The so-called “balance sheet” is the hypothetical overview of daily 
or weekly movements of value in and out of the enterprise, measured in economic terms. This 
may include, say, incomes, salaries to the employees, payment to suppliers, operational costs, ad 
hoc expenses, and support of the entrepreneur’s family.  A detailed information of these factors 
is the base for assessing the possibility of a capital accumulation in the enterprise.   
 
Social conditions: This item refers to social aspects that are not covered under section A, i.e., to 
ethnicity of the employees (same-ethnic or other),  firing and recruitment and stability of the 
work staff, relations to the employees’ personal/private situation, labor salaries and benefits. 
 
The routine operation:  This items identify those obstacles that influence the regular operation of 
the enterprise.  
 
C. Third Question Group 
 
Economic status (as of date):  This item identifies the value of the enterprise, including 
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machinery, tools etc. and the real estate itself.  It will quantify the past and expected future 
performance of the enterprise and identify factors which may have an impact on the operation in 
the near future.  
 
Non-economical factors: This item will address the existence and possible effect of structural 
factors, discrimination, ethnicity,  racism, lost opportunities, and social/political obstacles in 
connection with the operation of the enterprise.  
 
Initial decisions:  This item addresses the reasoning behind the establishing of the enterprise, 
how necessary capital was raised, what had been necessary (machinery, housing, tools, other), 
how eventually the ethnic network was used, why the sector of activity was chosen, what kind 
of market assessment was made, etc.  
 
My impression of the enterprise: Type, standard, location and description of housing; degree of 








ADEPH Asociacion Para El Desarrollo Del Potencial Humano, 
Quetzaltenango. 
ADEQ Asociación De Empresarios De Quetzaltenango 
C.E.C.I. Centro Canadiense De Estudios Y Cooperación International 
COOSADECO R.L.   Cooperativa Santiago de Coatepegue (Responsibilidad Limitado) 
COCARS Coordinadora de ONGs de la Cuenca Alta Del Rio Samalá, 
Guatemala. 
CONALFA Comité Nacional de Alfabetizatión. 
CUNOC  Centro Universitario de Occidente, Quetzaltenango.  
EAP Economic active population   
FUNDAP Fundación Para El Desarrollo Integral De Programas 
Socioeconomicos Apoyo A Artesanos Y Microempresas 
IGSS Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social 
INE Instituto National de Estatistica, Republic of Guatemala. 
FUNDESPE Fundación Para El Desarrollo De La Pequeña Empresa . 
MUNI-K’AT Instituto de Formación e Investigación para el Fortalecimiento de la 
Sociedad Civil y el Desarrollo Municipal 
NGO Non-governmental organization (national or international) 
PROSIGUA  Programa De Apoyo Al Sector Informal De Guatemala Convenio 
Union Europea/ Gobierno De Guatemala. 
Q’UQ’ KUMATZ-MENMAGU  Mesa National Maya de Guatemala 
SAT Superintendéncia de Administración Tributária 
S.E.A. Sociedad El Adelanto (a Maya organization). 
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Per Ole Christian Steinert was born in Oslo, Norway, June 13., 1940, by parents Eli Johanne 
Reimer Steinert (born in Roskilde, Denmark, 1906) and Ole Christian Ragnar Hübert Steinert 
(born in Kristiansand, Norway, 1904). Permanent address: c/o professor Bernhard Skaali, Egne 
Hjems vei 2A, 1340 Bekkestua, Norway (e-mail: osteinert@hotmail.com). His vita follow: 
 
ACADEMIC Aug. 1999  Started in the Ph.D. program of the Dept. of Sociology of  the 
EDUCATION   University of Texas at Austin, USA. 
 
 Fall 1999  Rewarded a Master of Art (MA) degree at the University of  Texas at 
Austin, USA, within Latin American studies. He entered the graduate 
  school in January 1998.  
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OTHER Aug. 1981 - Aug. 1982. Visiting scholar at the Dept. of Petroleum  
STUDIES Engineering, University of Texas, Austin, USA. 
OUTSIDE TOPICS: Studies of enhanced oil recovery methods. 
NORWAY 
 Jan - July 1974. Visiting scholar at Massachusetts Institute of  Technology, 
Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
 TOPICS:  Research within seismology on energy source functions for 
discriminating between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions, and 
LP seismic energy distribution patterns.  
  
 May - June 1970.  Working at IBM Seismic Array Analysis Center, 
Washington, DC, and the attached seismic array observatory (LASA) in 
Billings, Montana, USA. 
 TOPICS:  Studies of equipment and computer software related to remote 
control, maintenance and calibration of seismic array instrumentation. 
     --o-- 
  
PROFESSIONAL                             NOVEMBER 1984 - NOVEMBER 1992    
EXPERIENCE                                NORSK HYDRO A.S, OSLO, NORWAY 
 
 Norsk Hydro a.s is the largest industrial conglomerate in Norway (around 
30,000 employees) and is the second largest Norwegian oil company. 
 
 Nov. 1984.  Employed as Chief Engineer in Norsk Hydro a.s., Oil & Gas 
Division, Department of Field Studies. 
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 TOPICS:  Responsible for reservoir and reservoir simulation studies in relation 
to off-shore petroleum reservoirs on the Norwegian shelf in the North Sea. 
 
 April 1985.  Appointed head of  Department of Reservoir Simulation. 
 TOPICS:  In charge of  the department's professional and administrative 
functions in parallel with participation in the professional work. Among other 
things, he was project manager of the Ekofisk license responsible for Norsk 
Hydro's reservoir interests in the field; participated in the development and 
application of a 3-D, two-porosity reservoir simulator on that field during 
1987-89; carried out reservoir studies on different fields within Norsk Hydro's 
portfolio. 
 
 Jan 1990.  Moved to Department of Production Technology to get a broader 
professional basis in accordance with the company's policy to circulate its 
personnel.  He supervised and coordinated the activities in this sector on the 
fields Mjølner and Hermod during their planning phase. (Estimated initial 
investment of each field: $1,000 million.) Both fields were approved for 
development by the management of Norsk Hydro and the Norwegian 
authorities. 
 
 Nov. 1992.  To follow up some of  his interests internationally outside his 
professional career, he applied for and was given one year of leave by Norsk 
Hydro.  At the end of this period he decided to pursue his interests and 
terminated his employment with Norsk Hydro in November 1993. 
  ---             
 
                         APRIL - OCTOBER 1984 
                        NORSK AGIP A/S, SANDNES, NORWAY 
  
 Norsk Agip A/S is a petroleum company which had a staff of  around 70 
employees in 1984. It handles the large interests of its Italian mother company, 
Agip, in the Norwegian North Sea in close cooperation with Agip's staff in 
Italy.  
 
 April - Oct. 1984.  Employed as Senior Engineer with responsibility for special 
projects on the Norwegian shelf. 
 TOPICS: He promoted and followed up petroleum research sponsored by 
Norsk Agip and took part in reservoir studies on fields within Agip’s portfolio 
on the Norwegian North Sea. In this capacity he also maintained link to and 
cooperated with the reservoir staff of  the Italian mother company Agip's 
headquarter in Milan, Italy.  
        --- 
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           APRIL 1976 - MARCH 1984 
                      THE SOCIETY FOR TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC 
                                          RESEARCH AT NTNU (SINTEF), TRONDHEIM, NORWAY 
 
 SINTEF is Norway's largest research institution with a staff of more than  
2,000  employees and with research and development activities in a multitude 
of technical areas.  It cooperates closely with the Norwegian Technical 
University (NTNU), Trondheim. Its main objective is to participate in and 
expand on the research at NTNU, and make the results commercially attractive 
to Norwegian industry and the society in general. 
 
 April 1976 - Fall 1977. Employed as researcher at SINTEF's department of  
petroleum technology, after his graduation as petroleum engineer at NTNU, 
with responsibility for SINTEF's petroleum reservoir simulation activities. 
 TOPICS: His main task was the development of a 3-D, 3-phase compositional 
numerical reservoir simulator, one of the first of its kind, that later was used to 
analyze North Sea reservoirs. Carried out different reservoir research studies on 
fields in the North Sea. 
 
 Fall 1977 - June 1978.  Appointed daily manager of  SINTEF's department of  
 petroleum technology with responsibility for the day-to-day management.  This 
function was carried out in parallel with the continuation of his earlier 
obligations. 
 
 July 1978 - June 1981.  Appointed head of  SINTEF's department of petroleum 
technology and applied geophysics.  The department did contract research 
within reservoir technology, drilling, production and seismic modeling, with a 
staff in 1978 of around 25 researchers at M.Sc. and Ph.D. level. 
 TOPICS:  Budgeting, finance, personnel matters, project acquisition, 
professional supervision and planning.  He served as SINTEF's chief 
coordinator on matters related to petroleum technology topics.  He took the 
initiative and worked out the details for a major enterprise  - the establishment 
of a national research institute of petroleum technology.  The plans got NTNU's 
and SINTEF's approval fall 1980 and the Government's support shortly after.  
With financial support from the oil industry, national institutes were 
established shortly after in both  Trondheim and Stavanger. 
 
 July 1981 - March 1984.  To be able to work more with technical matters 
within his profession, he terminated his manager position in July 1981 and 
completed a one year's sabbatical at the University of Texas at Austin, USA 
(see above).  He returned to SINTEF October 1982 with the clear objective that 
he wanted no administrative responsibilities. 
 TOPICS:  Completed different reservoir simulation studies for the Norwegian 
off-shore oil industry.  He initiated SINTEF's later role as a competence center 
on teaching and technical support within the petroleum sector serving 
developing countries. In this capacity he did consulting  in a number of 
countries in Asia and Africa on behalf of  United Nations (UNDP) and 
Norwegian companies (see last section). 
 
Assignments   1978-80 and 1984-88.  Examiner at NTNU's Institute of  Petroleum  
at SINTEF  Technology on reservoir technology matters. 
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 Spring 1981.  Lecturer at the Institute of Petroleum Technology, NTNU, on 
well testing. 
 
 1979-81.  Member of  SINTEF's coordinating council (OTTER), which 
planned and coordinated SINTEF’s involvement in the off-shore petroleum 
sector. 
 
 Fall 1980. Represented NTNU in the negotiations towards the Government's 
institutions in establishing a national institute for petroleum technology at 
NTNU in Trondheim, which he had proposed as department head at SINTEF 
(see above). 
 
Assignments Refer last section.  
internationally           
   --- 
 
                  APRIL 1967 - DECEMBER 1974 
                  THE NORWEGIAN DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT (FFI)  
                            AND 
                                        THE NORWEGIAN RESEARCH COUNCIL FOR INDUSTRIAL  
                                        AND TECHNICAL RESEARCH (NTNF), KJELLER, NORWAY 
  
 FFI is the second largest technological and most advanced research center in 
Norway with wide responsibilities for military research and industrial 
development in cooperation with Norwegian industry, with focus on Norway's 
defense interests. 
 
 NTNF is the largest research council in Norway.  It is a Government body 
responsible for all Government-supported technical research in Norway. 
  
 NORSAR was at one time the largest and most advanced seismological 
observatory/research center in the world, a joint project between Norway and 
USA, started in 1968 and financed by USA.  Its objective, which had its roots 
in the nuclear test ban negotiations between USSR and USA during the 1960s, 
was to develop scientific methods to discriminate between earthquakes and 
underground nuclear test explosions. The Norwegian research group consisted 
initially of  7 researchers at M.Sc./Ph.D. level with a technical support staff of 
30 persons.  (Refer also web site: www.norsar.no) 
 
 April - Dec. 1967.  He served 9 out his 12 months of military service at FFI's 
section of mathematics at Kjeller, 30 km outside Oslo. 
 TOPICS:  Developed computer software for navigation systems; worked on 
standards for computer mass storage; developed software programs on behalf 
of the Civil Defense Administration for describing radioactive fall-out in 
relation to the use of  atomic weapons in Norway; lectured on programming 
languages and computer use. 
 
 Jan 1968 - Dec. 1974 . Employed as researcher at the seismological 
observatory NORSAR - administrated from its start in 1968 to 1971 by FFI, 
thereafter by NTNF. 
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 TOPICS:  1968-71 Cooperated with IBM personnel in development of software 
programs for remote control of NORSAR's field instrumentation; supervised 
the work of  the NORSAR's field maintenance staff (10 persons); participated 
on the technical side in the build-up of the data center and field installations.  
 
 1972-74. Appointed department head in charge of control and maintenance of  
NORSAR’s field installations and the quality of the on-line continuous 
collected seismic data (staff: initially 11 technicians).  The data were processed 
at the NORSAR center,  but also distributed to more than 50 research centers 
worldwide.  Part of the period he was also in charge of the NORSAR data 
processing center and the transmission network (staff: 12 engineers).  Further, 
he participated in NORSAR's research activities and part of this work - on 
system upgrading, phasing calibration, identification of 'false alarm', criteria for 
setting signal-to-noise ratio alert, etc. - was published. (O. Steinert, S. Husebye, 
H. Gjoeystdal [NORSAR], 1975, “Noise Variance Fluctuations and Earthquake 
Detectability”, Journal of Geophysics, 41, 289-302.) 
 
Assignments Refer next section 
internationally                                            --- 
       
                                           INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND ASSIGNMENTS 
 
After the  As part of his work, as an international consultant and out of   
employment at  personal curiosity, he has visited around 110 countries/regions in all  
Norsk Hydro  parts of  the world (Table 2).  During the year of leave from Norsk  Hydro 
(1993) and the 4½ years that followed,  he visited some 60 countries primarily 
in the ‘Third World’ in Asia, Oceania and Latin-America, with long stays in 
some, to pursue his interests on social, economic and ethnic matters (Table 1).  
After his arrival to USA in April 1997, he pursued studies of Latin America at 
University of Texas at Austin (see above). 
 
During the time 1979-81.  Representative of the Norwegian Ministry of Oil and Energy - and  
at SINTEF, later elected vice-president by the participating eight countries - in the  
1976-84 International Energy  Agency (IEA)’s steering committee for petroleum 
research (EOR), in Paris, France.  
 
 1980 and 1984. On behalf of  United Nations (UNDP) in 1980, he proposed 
and followed up the establishment of a center for training personnel and 
offering laboratory services to the Bangladeshi gas industry, during a series of 
visits to Dakha, Bangladesh.  His proposals were approved by UN and the 
Bangladeshi authorities.  The center came into operation  in 1981.  Based on a 
request from Norwegian agencies who later took over the professional 
management of the center, he was asked in 1984 to assess the operation. 
 
 1981.  Member of the program committee of the “1981 European Symposium 
on Enhanced Oil Recovery”, Bournemouth, England, 21-23 September 1981. 
 
 Oct. 1983 - Sept. 1984.  Carried out on behalf of the Norwegian state foreign 
aid agency (NORAD) an extensive study on Mozambique’s needs for technical 
competence in developing its petroleum resources, with proposals to meet 
these.  The scope of the study implied also assessing the possible use of 
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educational resources in the other SADCC countries, particularly Angola and 
Tanzania. The study started out as a SINTEF project, but was completed as a 
private consultant project on NORAD’s request after he had left SINTEF in 
March 1984.  He included an evaluation of the social implications of his 
proposals.  The final report was later characterized as a ‘landmark’ report of its 
kind by NORAD.   
 
 Nov. 1983.  Hired by ISOT (International School of Technology), Oslo, 
Norway, as a technical advisor on petroleum matters during a one week's 
conference in Baghdad, Iraq, as part of a broad Norwegian trade effort towards 
OPEC, backed by Norwegian industry and the Government. 
 
 Feb. 1984.  Employed by a consultancy company in Oslo, PETCON, to assess 
the operation and professional standard of the petroleum training and 
laboratory center in Dakha, Bangladesh, and offer proposals for the future 
operation and expansion of the center.  He had been responsible for the 
objectives and the design of the center as part of  his work for United Nations 
in 1980 (see above). 
  
During the time 1969-74  The uniqueness of the NORSAR installation and the international 
at FFI/NTNF  interest both in its hardware, software and the ongoing research and system 
development, implied 1967-74 a fair amount of information work 
internationally, i.e., lecturing on conferences, visiting  other research 
institutions, giving talks in different professional meetings and maintaining 
personal contacts at some of the more than 50 research centers that used 
NORSAR's data.  
 
 Aug. - Sept. 1972.  Participated at the request of the University of Denmark 
(Geodætisk Institutt) in establishing a seismic WWSSN recording station in 
Danmarkshavn, North-East Greenland, at 79ºN. 
 
 May - June 1970 and Jan - July 1974.  Studies in USA in relation to the 
NORSAR activities (mentioned earlier). 
--- 
 
Table 1   
Regions Visited Since Fall Of 1992 (As Of August 15, 1999) 
REGIONS Months            Countries  . 
Asia     14  15   
Oceania (Australia, New Zealand, South Pacific, Hawaii) 13        6       
North America:  
 USA (Alaska), Canada   2 2 
 USA (Lower 48)  26 1 
Mexico and Central-America   21       8      
South America    10       12       







Table 2  
Countries Visited 1957-1999 
AFRICA Angola Botswana Burundi Egypt Kenya 
  Malawi Mozambique Rhodesia Rwanda   
  Uganda Tanzania Zaire Zambia 
MID- EAST  Iraq Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria 
ASIA  Afghanistan Bangladesh Burma Cambodia China 
  Hong Kong India Macao Malaysia Nepal 
  Pakistan Singapore Sri Lanka Thailand Tibet 
  Uzbekistan Vietnam  
EUROPE Austria Belgium Czechoslovakia  DDR Faros 
  Denmark England Finland Germany France 
  Greece Greenland Hungary Iceland Ireland  
  Yugoslavia Italy Luxembourg  Monto Carlo Russia 
  Norway Netherlands Portugal Romania Spain 
  Scotland Sweden Switzerland Turkey  
  Vatican State  Northern Ireland  
OCEANIA Australia Fiji Islands New Zealand Hawaii Tonga 
  Western Samoa 
N. AMERICA   Alaska (US) Canada USA 
C. AMERICA Belize Costa Rica Guatemala Honduras Panama
   Nicaragua San Salvador 
S. AMERICA Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Guyana 
  Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Surinam Peru 
  Uruguay Venezuela 
CARRIBEAN Barbados Anguilla Antigua-Barbuda  Dominica Cuba 
  Grenada Montserrat Saint-Martin Sint Maarten St. Lucia
  St. Vincent Grenadines Trinidad-Tobago St.Kitts-Nevis Puerto Rico












The fieldwork  for this study was completed and the draft for the thesis 
was typed in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala, by the author during six 
weeks of June and July of 1999, using an IBM 755C laptop computer. 
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